





PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

BY

R. H. HINGLEY B.A.

RESEARCH STUDENT IN PSYCHOLOGY AT EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK
DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY
1922

BF173
.H5

Q17

Patristic

Aug 5 1822

PREFACE

THE main purpose of this book is to give the general reader a plain account of psycho-analysis, in the belief that insight into its principles will afford the ordinary educated person invaluable help in facing the problems of life. It is hoped, however, that the student who is desirous of making a thorough study of the subject will find it a reliable and helpful introduction. To this end suggestions have been made in various parts of the book for further reading. In addition to the works of Freud himself, the works of Jung, Jones, Brill and Pfister may be mentioned as providing very valuable help. The last mentioned, in his "Psycho-analytic Method" has dealt with the subject from the pedagogic standpoint, and should, therefore, make a special appeal to those interested in education.

A word about the method of this book is necessary. The aim has been to treat the subject in the spirit of sympathetic criticism, but criticism has been strictly subordinated to exposition. The usual tendency of the leaders of the movement has been to expound the subject as the mechanics of psychic energy. This has aroused considerable opposition from the so-called "orthodox psychologist." I have endeavoured to meet this by treating the subject from the standpoint of the psychology of unconscious tendencies. But the main concern has been to give a faithful account of the Freudian doctrine, though the divergencies of the rival school of Zurich led by Dr. Jung have not been overlooked.

The last two chapters, and especially the last, should be regarded rather as speculative essays in application. They should not be regarded as practical programmes to which psycho-analysis is in any way committed. Readers unacquainted with psychology should not be unduly discouraged if they find some difficulties in the first chapter.

A glossary of special terms is appended for the reader's convenience.

For whatever sound psychological insight is to be found in this book I am indebted to Dr. Drever of Edinburgh University. But this does not imply that the opinions expressed are necessarily shared by him. To my wife, also, I am indebted for invaluable help in many ways.

1921.

R. H. H.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE "NEW PSYCHOLOGY" - - -	I
II. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHO- ANALYSIS - - -	16
III. DREAMS - - - Wish-fulfilment Theory—Manifest and Latent Content—Dream Analysis by Free Association—Censorship and Re- pression—Repression, Dissociation and Forgetting—Fear Dreams—Sources of Dreams—Dream Work—Jung's Theory	23
IV. THE NATURE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS - Types of Unconscious Tendency— Rationalization—Tendencies: Modes of Activity—Pleasure-Pain Principle and Reality Principle—Conflict of Tendencies —Instinctive Tendencies	57
V. THE CONTROL OF THE UNCONSCIOUS - Psycho-Catharsis and Abreaction— Transference and Overcoming of Re- sistance—Auto-Analysis—Auto-Suggestion	97
VI. THE PSYCHO-PATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE	119
VII. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND EDUCATION - The Home—The School—Education and Freedom—Sexual Education— Sublimation	129
VIII. SOCIETY AND RELIGION - - - The Social Ideal—The Social Misfit— The Religious Ideal	158
GLOSSARY - - -	186
INDEX - - -	187

PSYCHO - ANALYSIS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE " NEW PSYCHOLOGY "

THE " New Psychology " is an appellation which has achieved a considerable measure of popularity in recent times. But when we inquire more particularly as to the nature of the subject-matter referred to, we find no little diversity of conception. It has been used to indicate the attempt to apply experimental methods to the elucidation of the problems of mental life and the effort to achieve in that realm something of the mathematical precision that is the pride and strength of the physical sciences. It has been used to designate a certain mixture of science, and esoteric speculation as to the nature and destiny of the soul. It has been used as a convenient term to refer to the work of those psychologists, chiefly French and American, who have devoted their energies to the investigation of the subconscious. Finally the disciples of psycho-analysis have not scorned such prestige as this title affords.

On the positive side then, the term " New Psychology " stands for no consistent and recognized system. But on the negative side, all the movements and systems above referred to are united by a common recognition of the inadequacy of the " old psychology."

Let us examine this charge more carefully. It is

generally agreed that it is the function of psychology to explain the nature and working of mental processes. The different phases of consciousness, thought, feeling, will, (or more accurately, the cognitive, affective and conational aspects of experience) have been distinguished and investigated. Sensations, perceptions, ideas and reasoning have been examined with the utmost care. Habit, memory, emotion and volition have been described and analysed. The relation between mind and body has been the subject of endless but indecisive discussions. But to the ordinary lay mind we seem very little nearer to the heart of the secret. Human nature is still an unsolved mystery.

Now we are far from maintaining that the province and aim of psychology should be dictated by the "man in the street." But the psychology that creates a man in its own image, and explains him to its own satisfaction, like the "economic man" of the older Political Economy, will scarcely succeed in establishing its claim to the serious consideration of mankind. The explanation of the development of space-perception may be necessary and desirable, but we need a psychology that can explain the "incompatible temperament" which brings about so many divorces in America and so many ruined homes in England. It is easy to assume the rôle of moralist in this and a hundred other problems of human behaviour. But condemnation is no explanation. It is the business of psychology, not to pass judgment but to explain.

At the same time we must remember that psychology has made great advances. It is no longer engrossed and exhausted in metaphysical speculations about the nature of the soul. It no longer tries to explain human activity by the universal formula of the "association of ideas," or the Utilitarian conception of man's desire for pleasure and aversion from pain. These ideas have been so frequently examined and rejected during recent years that we do not intend to spend further time in

this discussion. They contain an element of truth, which requires careful definition, but no psychologist of the present day would accept these as providing anything like an adequate explanation of the rich variety of man's conduct and experience. Nevertheless, the idea that man's action is determined by a rational estimate of the balance of pleasure and pain has left its mark on modern psychological theory. Long after the Utilitarian theories had been rejected, the conception of man as a rational being held far too exclusive sway. Conduct was explained in terms of ideas and reason. Emotions were regarded as a more or less unimportant accompaniment of the cognitive processes. Feelings were the camp followers of ideas. As for instincts, they were regarded as the monopoly of the "lower animals."

Against this "over-intellectualism" we have to-day a very marked revolt, that has gone so far, that Mr. Graham Wallas, after taking part in the movement in his "Human Nature and Politics," has felt compelled in "The Great Society" to restore the despot Reason to a limited monarchy. For ourselves, we believe that the significance of the non-rational factors in mental process has not yet been exhausted. Indeed it is only just beginning to receive its meed of attention. This revolt has been inspired primarily by the widening of the province of psychology to embrace the behaviour of the lower animals, and in the second place by the consideration of the phenomena which are commonly designated "subconscious." The work of Charles Darwin is, of course, the foundation on which modern comparative psychology is being built. But the linking up of human and animal psychology owes perhaps more to Dr. William McDougall than to any other thinker. The popularity of his "Introduction to Social Psychology" is not due merely to his lucid powers of exposition, but also to the fact that he has succeeded in giving his readers the conviction that he is dealing with a real living mind, and not merely dissecting a corpse.

According to McDougall the roots of human activity are to be found in the *Instincts*.

What then is the nature of Instinct? McDougall has defined it as "an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action."¹

The four things to note about an instinct then are :

(1) It is an inherited or innate mechanism.² It is not peculiar to the individual but common to the species.

(2) This mechanism impels the individual to pay special regard to some particular item or event in its complex environment, e.g., an infant's interest in bright and moving bodies.

(3) When the object is perceived the individual experiences a special kind of emotion, e.g., fear, anger or disgust, etc.

(4) The individual has an impulse to act in a particular manner—to run away, hide, fight, etc.

In the case of a pure instinct, that is, one which has not been modified by experience or rational reflection, there is apparently no foresight of the end. As an example of a pure instinct we might take a bird building its first nest.

Instincts are capable of modification through experience in the higher animals, and by rational reflection as well in the case of man. An object or individual

¹ W. McDougall, F.R.S. "An Introduction to Social Psychology." 14th Edition, p. 29. The reader who wishes to approach the study of psycho-analysis along sound psychological lines, could not be better advised in our opinion, than to make a careful study of this book.

² By this term we mean *a more or less plastic mode of conscious process working towards ends of which it is not aware.*

that is at first regarded with fear or anger, may come to be regarded with curiosity and perhaps in the end with love. Then again two instincts may be simultaneously stimulated. The result may be conflict, or the fusion of the two into a new emotional attitude. As an example of conflict we may take the behaviour of a dog restrained by fear from leaping up to the table at meal times. The conflict of the hunger and fear impulses is revealed in his ill-concealed restlessness. As an example of fusion we may take the emotional attitude of admiration that a man manifests in presence of a great work of art. Here, according to McDougall, we have a fusion of the curiosity-wonder instinct and the instinct of submission.

Through the interaction of these inborn dispositions there is finally evolved in man selfconsciousness. Henceforth his conduct is determined in some measure at any rate by preconceived and deliberately chosen ends. The instincts are not dead, but they are to varying degrees in different individuals modified by experience and organized into a coherent whole. Thus "the evolution of mind in the race," and in the individual, according to McDougall, involves "progress from predominantly mechanical to predominantly teleological determination," that is, from the impulse of blind instinct to the choice of rational foresight.

We have now sketched very briefly and most inadequately a theory of human behaviour formulated in the light of the observations of comparative psychology. There are two questions we must now ask. First, is the theory adequate for the explanation of the phenomena with which it deals, and second, has it taken into account all the relevant phenomena? To the first question, the answer is, That it is the most satisfactory solution that has yet been given. To the second question the answer is, No. But before we ask what is the nature of these excluded mental phenomena, we are prepared, for ourselves, to admit the claim that

McDougall in the preface to the 14th Edition of "An Introduction to Social Psychology" makes, that this theory is capable, without fundamental change, of such adaption and extension as will cover the phenomena in question.

But let us without further delay inquire what is the nature of these phenomena. The second factor which has been at work to bring about the present-day revolt against "intellectualism" is the discovery of "sub-conscious phenomena." In this field of inquiry France has led the way. Charcot, Bernheim and Janet may be mentioned as leading exponents of subconscious theory in that country. This work has been aided and advanced by American investigators, led by such men as Morton Prince and Boris Sidis. The aim of McDougall is to illuminate the problems of human psychology by the help of animal psychology. Their task is to discover what light can be thrown on the working of the normal mind by the study of the abnormal. In this respect they have a closer affinity with the psycho-analytical mode of approach. The phenomena which have received their special attention are automatism, crystal gazing, suggestion, hypnotism, "double personality." It is impossible here to give these fascinating subjects the consideration they deserve. For this we must refer the reader to the works of the authors themselves.¹

We can only state briefly the conclusions of this school of inquiry as represented, for example, by Boris Sidis in his "Psychology of Suggestion." After examining the phenomena he comes to this conclusion—that they can only be explained on the hypothesis of subconsciousness. "*Subconsciousness*," he says, "*is not an unconscious psychological automatism; it is a*

¹ "The Psychology of Suggestion." Boris Sidis. 1898. Appleton.

"Normal and Abnormal Psychology." Boris Sidis. 1914. Duckworth.

"Dissociation of a Personality." Morton Prince. 1906. New York.

secondary consciousness, a secondary self." With regard to this conclusion we wish first of all to remark that it is a sound principle to seek the explanations of psychical process, not by physiological but by psychological concepts. But we have now to ask—is this hypothesis of a secondary consciousness both adequate and necessary for the explanation of human experience and activity.

How are such mental conditions as obsessions, amnesias (forgettings), phobias, hysteria, etc., explained by this theory of a secondary consciousness? Sidis claims that these conditions can be reproduced in the psychological laboratory. The critical activities of the selfconsciousness of the subjects are suspended under the direction of the hypnotist, and in this way direct access is obtained to the secondary consciousness, which is amenable to suggestion in proportion to the degree in which the critical faculties have ceased to operate. In this state the various symptoms of the pathological states can be suggested and will persist in the waking state of full selfconsciousness. The explanation then is found to be in the suggestibility of the subconscious. We have still to ask, But how is the specific nature of the obsession or fear to be accounted for? In the laboratory it is due to the hypnotist. To what is it due in ordinary life? The answer apparently is the accidents of a man's history. A certain man has a great fear of cats. This would be explained by some incident in his career—when he, in a highly suggestible moment, had some painful experience with a member of the feline tribe. Such an explanation may be adequate in many cases—especially in cases where the fear was not permanent. But where the fear or obsession is permanent this explanation will not suffice. For one of the main criticisms of suggestion and hypnosis as therapeutic agencies is their temporary effectiveness. The effects of suggestion wear off. They may be renewed by a repetition of similar experiences, and we

are bound to acknowledge the effects of suggestion increase with every repetition. But in the absence of such renewals we must seek the cause of the trouble, not in an accidental and isolated suggestion, or in the general condition of suggestibility, but in some factor that is more permanent. A second criticism we have to pass on the theory of the subconscious is that it does not provide an adequate explanation of those complicated mental constructions that we find in hysteria, in dreams, and in such products of social thought as we have in the various mythologies. For the broad differences that exist between such mental processes and those of rational reflection it may account by the principle of varying degrees of mental synthesis, but for the specific nature of the experiences of a particular dream it has no adequate explanation to offer.

Again we ask, Is the hypothesis of a secondary consciousness absolutely necessary? The discussion of this question would involve us in the metaphysics of identity. Into this question then we will not at present further inquire, trusting that the more philosophically minded of our readers will see that the question has received consideration, if not explicit treatment, in the conception of conscious activity which we shall endeavour shortly to explain. Meanwhile we shall content ourselves with the assertion that each individual has *one* consciousness and no more. Selfconsciousness, subconsciousness, and "unconsciousness" are but different modifications, or aspects of the same conscious life.

But before we try to make clear what we mean by this we must consider another theory of mental life that has been advanced to explain the nature of human experience. It is the one advanced by Prof. Freud of Vienna, to whom psycho-analysis owes its discovery and chief development. According to him, mind, or the "psychic apparatus," as he calls it, may be conceived of as consisting of three "psychic localities,"

namely, the conscious, the preconscious, and the unconscious. What does Freud understand by these terms? This is a most important question if we are to get anything like a clear conception of psycho-analytical theory. The terms "conscious" and "unconscious" are ambiguous. For instance, we say of a person in a dead faint that he is "unconscious," or of an absent-minded or automatic action that it is "unconscious." But the word is obviously used in a different sense in these two instances. Similarly with the term "conscious." We attribute consciousness to the lower animals in the belief that in varying degrees they feel and perceive, and act accordingly. On the other hand we may reserve the term for that awareness of feeling, perceptions and actions which we believe is the monopoly of man. It is in this sense that Freud uses the term. For Freud, the conscious is that part of our experience of which we are *personally* aware; the preconscious is that part of our experience of which we can make ourselves personally aware by voluntary attention; the unconscious is that part of our experience of which we cannot make ourselves personally aware by attention. To put it in terms of memory, consciousness refers to perceived present activity, preconsciousness to past activity that can be recalled, and unconsciousness to past activity that cannot be recalled except by special technique, such as hypnotism or psycho-analysis. For example, I am conscious of sitting at my table writing. While this consciousness is dominant, the memories of the walk in the wind and the calls I made this afternoon, belong to the preconscious. As I write about them they come up into my consciousness. But there are experiences of my life that I cannot recall. For instance, I can recall just a glimpse of my memory of the first occasion when I slept in a strange house as a child. But the details of the journey to the place, the locality of the house are all completely blank. They belong to the unconscious. There is, however,

no clear line of demarcation between the three "localities." There are certain memories that seem to belong at times to the preconscious, and at other times to pass temporarily into the unconscious. The commonest illustration of this is the case of recalling names. We have all experienced times when we have been unable to *recall* a name which we were absolutely sure we remembered, it may be indeed a name that we are in the habit of recalling quite easily. That is, it usually belongs to the preconscious. But just at a particular moment we cannot recall it. At that moment it has been pushed back into the unconscious.

But this use of the terms "conscious" and "unconscious," while it is undoubtedly in accordance with one of the common interpretations of everyday life, is not psychologically satisfactory, and we cannot but regret that, being woven as it is into the remarkable fabric of Freudian theory, it has met with an acceptance, which upon its own merits, we are convinced, it would never have won. It has involved the use of such contradictory terms as "unconscious ideas," "unconscious wishes," and "unconscious experience," and must obscure the fundamental similarity of the psychic life of the lower animals and man. We are compelled to think of memories as existing unchanged in some antechamber of the mind, and being admitted after scrutiny and possible disguise (*see* doctrine of the Censor, later), into the presence chamber of consciousness. Now this conception of memories existing like pale shadows of themselves in the Sheol of the Unconscious, waiting for resurrection, is unpsychological. Memories do not exist as pale shadows waiting for reincarnation in conscious life. They exist only as a *determination of present experience*. They do not exist as ideas, wishes, etc., but only as tendencies or trends of consciousness. They only become ideas or wishes as they are reinstated in the full, personal consciousness of present experience. Let us try to make this clear by means of an illustration.

I want a fresh packet of tobacco. This is a conscious wish of the present. It sets going a train of activities. I look for my hat and set off along the street. Meanwhile the wish for the tobacco has become a memory. I am attending to other thoughts. But it is still affecting my activity. I am still walking towards the shop, though possibly my thoughts are full of a recent football match. But as soon as I reach the shop, the tendency to bend my footsteps in a certain direction becomes a recognized purpose to purchase tobacco. The point we want to make clear is, that ideas and wishes do not exist as such "in the back of the mind," to use a common phrase, but persist only as unrecognized tendencies and trends of present experience and activity. *As soon as the tendency or trend is recognized it becomes an idea or wish. But some tendencies we are able to recognize on the relevant occasion, others we cannot recognize.* This is Freud's distinction between the preconscious and the unconscious. It is an important distinction as we trust the sequel will show, and thus stated we believe it is free from the criticisms that have been launched against Freud's theory of the unconscious. It is only just to acknowledge that Freud is not oblivious of these criticisms. He meets them by accusing psychologists of making the psychical and conscious equivalent terms. The psychologist retorts that he has identified consciousness and selfconsciousness. Freud rejects the hypothesis of the subconscious, and in so far as it implies two or more independent "streams of consciousness," we believe he is right. But the "subconscious" school is not necessarily committed to such a hypothesis, though some of their statements would apparently bear that interpretation. Finally we believe that these three schools of psychological thought—the "Instinct" school represented by Prof. McDougall and Dr. Drever, the "Subconscious" school represented by Janet, Prince and Sidis, and the "Unconscious," represented by Freud, Jung, and their disciples, are not necessarily

exclusive in their main principles, in fact, that the most satisfactory account of human activity will be gained by a conception of consciousness which does justice to the main contentions of all three.

To those acquainted with the tremendous complexity of the facts, an attempt to formulate such a concept will almost certainly be regarded as foredoomed to failure ; to those who have but slight acquaintance with psychological literature the prospect of a further venture into unexplored country may appear bewildering and uninviting. We will endeavour, as far as the limits of space will allow, to make our exposition as clear and full as possible.

A metaphor may help us to get a firmer hold of the subject. Let us compare consciousness to a midnight procession headed by a torchlight, whose rays can be turned in any direction, concentrated into a beam or diffused over a wide area as need arises. The country lying immediately ahead is lit up, revealing more or less clearly, tracks and obstacles, which the leader of the procession must choose or avoid as the case may be. But the action of the leader of the procession is not determined merely by what the torchlight reveals, he is being pushed and jostled by those behind. The way he actually takes will be determined by three factors—the nature of the country, the purpose he has in view, and the pressure of his followers. On the followers immediately behind he can turn the light. They are tendencies that can be recognized, that is, they are wishes and desires. The more remote followers are outside the light. They are exerting their pressure, some of them at times possibly push their way up into the illuminated area and are recognized. The illuminated and unilluminated parts of the procession correspond to Freud's preconscious and unconscious respectively. The light-bearer is selfconsciousness, with a more or less definite goal in view. He must choose the way, restraining as far as possible the unruly members. But

consciousness is far more complicated still. The members of the procession are organized to a greater or less extent into companies, platoons, etc., such as the "sentiments" of McDougall, or the "constellations" of the psychoanalyst. They are capable of a certain amount of independence. This organization is an all-important conception. It is called *mental synthesis*. Where synthesis is well developed there is clear thinking, consistent action; but where it is defective there is confusion and conflict. Larger or smaller bands may be cut off to some extent from the procession. Then we have what is called a "complex" in psycho-analysis, or "dissociation" in the terms of the subconscious school. When the self through emotional shock loses control we have a special case of dissociation which is pure instinctive reaction, as in the case of overwhelming fear or solicitation of appetite.

This metaphor of the procession must not be pushed too far. Selfconsciousness is not a separate being, sitting enthroned above the more or less obedient subjects we call impulses. It is itself only a recognized and acknowledged synthesis of these same impulses, or at any rate of some of them. The whole activity of consciousness is not necessarily exhausted in personal consciousness. Hypnotism, for example, reveals that we perceive and remember things of which we have no personal consciousness. While certain of our tendencies and experiences are synthesized into self-activity, others may be synthesized into a unity on what Dr. Drever has called the subpersonal level. Walking along the street, my personal consciousness may be engaged in wrestling with a psychological problem, while the business of keeping my body out of contact with other people may be relegated to the subpersonal consciousness.

A second thing we must note is, that the synthesis of impulses, which we call self or personal consciousness is not a fixed one. It changes from moment to moment.

As a rule a strong sense of continuity underlies the change. But if this is weakened we have that type of experience in which we say—"I wasn't myself then!" If it becomes weaker still, till it practically or entirely disappears, we have what is known as dissociated personality. The most remarkable example of this is the case of "Miss Beauchamp," who had at least three well-marked personalities, as Dr. Morton Prince clearly shows.

The selfconsciousness of a given moment does not exhaust the impulses and experiences of that moment. These are pushing at the door. Some are rejected; some are admitted because they are approved. Others are admitted because they are too strong to be kept out. Once these have obtained entry, they alter the nature of selfconsciousness. The desires and wishes that previously ruled may continue to fight on, and then we have selfconscious conflict, or they may be pushed right out of the selfconscious to take their turn for a time at least as nameless rebels. If the suppression is temporary these desires belong to the Freudian preconscious, if it is relatively permanent they belong to the unconscious. *This selecting activity of the self is all-important.* According to the degree to which it is relaxed we have the various degrees of suggestibility in the different hypnotic states, or dream activities. According to the degree in which it is rigidly and narrowly exercised over strong impulses we have the conflicts which underlie the great variety of "nervous conditions," to be found in human life. To this extent, the "subconscious" and "unconscious" schools are in the main agreed, except in the question of terminology, and in this respect we feel that the "subconscious" school is the more consistent and satisfactory. The use of such terms as "unconscious ideas" by psycho-analysts is, we hold, objectionable and unnecessary, but at the same time it does not undermine the truth of their main contention, that there are dynamic conditions of experience which the indivi-

dual cannot trace to their origin, e.g., the man who has a fear of cats, but cannot trace this fear back to some incident of childhood days. But there are two types of tendency which the individual cannot trace to their origin—the innate or inherited tendencies which we call instincts and the acquired tendencies due to an experience which cannot be recalled. The former have been called the "primary unconscious" and the latter the "secondary unconscious." The problem of harmonizing psycho-analytical theory with instinct psychology lies largely in the determination of which tendencies are acquired and which are inherited. Freud apparently acknowledges only two instincts, the selfpreservation, and race-preservation or sex instincts. The result is of necessity, that he gives the latter a far more important place than the "Instinct" school is prepared to admit. The difference between the "unconscious" and "subconscious" schools is due mainly to the different attitude to mental life. The former is predominantly genetic, explaining the present in terms of past development, the latter is predominantly analytic, explaining the present in terms of the present constituent elements. The one places the chief emphasis on "repression" of painful memories, while the other (the "subconscious" school) regards "dissociation" of consciousness as the all-important factor. The comparative psychologists or the "instinct" school, as we have called them, resemble the psycho-analytical school in taking the genetic point of view. But while the former explain the mature mental activity of man by means of the evolution of the simpler mental processes of the lower animals, the latter explain this activity by the history of the individual, that is, the "instinct" school is more phylogenetic, while the "unconscious" school is more exclusively ontogenetic.

CHAPTER II

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

IN the preceding chapter we have seen that psycho-analysis approaches the problem of human behaviour from the standpoint of the abnormal, and that in this respect it resembles the attitude of the "subconscious" school. Ethics defines the normal as the right, the ideal, the rational. In this sense the unconscious is always abnormal. It has nothing to do with the right and rational. It is just as non-rational as a schoolboy's liking for jam tarts. For psychology and medicine the normal is the usual. The abnormal is the unusual, or the usual with some element or aspect unusually developed or atrophied. The study of these abnormal conditions has thrown very great light on the normal functioning both of body and mind. As we have already seen it was from this point of view that the "subconscious" school made their attack on the problem of consciousness. Hypnotic states, automatic activities, and the phenomena of dissociated personality were seen to be only exaggerated conditions of normal states. In a similar way psycho-analysis began with the study of the abnormal condition known as hysteria.

Sigmund Freud of Vienna is the acknowledged founder of this school. In his brief "History of the Psycho-analytical Movement" he traces it back to the examination of a very interesting case of hysteria in the charge of Dr. Breuer, an older colleague. After failing to remove the symptoms, such as paralysis of the right

arm, loss of the power to drink, by means of hypnotic suggestion, Breuer gradually discovered that one by one these disappeared when the painful, repulsive experiences, which were apparently the cause of the trouble were recalled by the help of hypnotism. Breuer, however, did not make any further use of this discovery till urged to do so some years later by Freud, who had now returned from Paris after studying hypnotism under Charcot. Together they began to apply the discovery, and after a time found that it was not enough to *recall* the disturbing experience. The experience must be *relived in all its old emotional intensity*. The application of this principle was called the "Cathartic Method," and marks the first stage of the development of psycho-analysis. For this Freud gives Breuer practically full credit.

The problem of the physician was then to discover the experience which underlay the nervous trouble. In their quest for this Breuer and Freud found themselves being led back to earlier and yet earlier periods of the patient's history—back to puberty and often to early childhood days. This phenomenon was called "regression." So far Breuer and Freud were agreed and worked hand in hand. But at this point their ways parted. Freud maintained that these memories were essentially of a sexual nature. Breuer disagreed and Freud was left to work and fight alone. For many years he was either ignored or fiercely attacked. But he worked on.

The results of these years of isolated work we will try to sum up in a word or two. In trying to track the memories that he held were the specific cause of the nervous disorder, he found that there was always a great deal of "resistance" to overcome. They were *buried* memories and the patient was unwilling to have them disinterred. He found further that in many cases he could not apply hypnotism, and in cases where he could the "resistance" was often only thereby increased. So in 1893 he definitely abandoned the hypnotic method,

and henceforth used the method of "free association," of which we shall have more to say later. In trying to overcome the resistance of the patient to the recall of the disagreeable memories he found that wherever he was successful there was a stage in the treatment in which the patient "*transferred*" on to the physician the emotional attitude which was the root of his trouble. For example, if the cause of the disorder was an undue attachment to, or hostility towards one of the patient's parents, then that attachment or hostility must be *transferred* on to the physician before the patient could be cured. This transference, it must be understood, did not consummate the cure, but was a necessary stage in achieving it. These two conceptions of "resistance" and "transference," Freud asserts are essential for genuine psycho-analysis.

Two other discoveries belonging to this period must be noted. A more careful examination of the "memories" revealed that in some cases they did not refer to actual incidents, but only to imagined ones. The second discovery was the most far-reaching of all. It was the recognition that the *mental processes in dreams are essentially similar to the mental processes of the neurotic mind*. The recognition of this resemblance led to that investigation of dreams the results of which are embodied in Freud's "Interpretation of Dreams."¹

Shortly after the publication of this book the psycho-analytical method was adopted and practised by Bleuler and Jung in the school of Psychiatry at Zurich. It was mainly due to the efforts and influence of this school, as Freud himself admits, that the new therapeutic method received its early expansion. Jung devised a new method which is known as the "Word Association Method." A list of one hundred common words is taken. One by one these words are pronounced by the analyst, and the patient is instructed to respond

¹ "Interpretation of Dreams." Sigmund Freud. Translated by Brill. 3rd Edition, 1920. Allen and Unwin, London.

as quickly as possible with the first word that it arouses in his mind. The time taken to give the response is measured in fifths of a second by means of a stop watch. When the whole series of words has been gone through in this manner they are repeated, and the patient is instructed to give as far as possible the word with which he responded on the former occasion. The responses are then carefully classified. Jung found that the types of response varied considerably, and that similar types of response were given in cases of the same mental disease. This aspect of the question is, however, a question for the trained psychiatrist, and so we shall not consider it further. But other interesting results of the method are worthy of consideration. The first thing that is to be noted is, that the time taken to respond is much longer for some words than for others. Occasionally response fails altogether, or is given after repeating the stimulus word. In some cases the same word is given several times as a response to different stimulus words. Failure to reproduce the original response is also common. These are some of the most important points of the Association Test. They indicate *not intellectual difficulties, but emotional ones*. The words that call out these unusual reactions are linked up with some experience that vitally concerns the individual who makes the reaction. They point to some hidden mental tension or conflict, which it is the business of psycho-analysis to remove. The method of doing this is the same as in the case of dreams, and will be considered later. When the dreams are difficult to obtain this method provides a substitute and has uses extending even beyond this. For instance, it has been employed to distinguish guilty persons from innocent. But as a means of insight into the way the unconscious works it is far inferior to dream analysis.

This method Freud acknowledges as a legitimate development of his own work. So far Jung was apparently in substantial agreement with him, and was

regarded by Freud as his authorized successor. In 1909 they went together to America to expound this new system of psycho-therapy, and found there a much more sympathetic hearing than it had received in Europe. But differences soon began to emerge between the two, and also between Freud and another of his disciples, Dr. Alfred Adler, a fellow-citizen of Vienna.

A brief consideration of these differences is all that we can give. We have seen how Breuer and Freud in examining cases of nervous disorders, such as hysteria, were led back to very early childhood memories or phantasies. In this way Freud was led to explain the mental conflict which is the root of the trouble as due to the persistence of various childish attitudes which were inconsistent with the demands of adult life. The essential elements in these childish attitudes he maintained were sexual. At one stage or another the normal psycho-sexual (the mental side of sex life) development, had been arrested. Jung on the other hand maintained that the conflict was due to the individual's difficulty in adapting himself to his environment, and that the "regression" tendency was due to an effort on the part of the patient to find some experience upon which the blame for the trouble could be laid. The early memories were thus not the *real* cause, but the *imagined* cause of the illness. According to Jung the *real* cause was to be found in the individual's "non-fulfilment of his life's task." Further, he denied that the psychic energy of the unconscious, the urge, or "libido" as it was called, was exclusively sexual.¹ It was on these same questions, that Adler diverged even more widely from his master. He held that this fundamental urge was the "egotistic impulse," Nietzsche's "will to power," and that the sexual instinct is only one form of its

¹ Freud's use of this term has been much debated. It covers not only the significance that is attached to it in common speech, but as far as we have been able to interpret it, it embraces also what we should call the "sensuous." For fuller consideration of this question, see Chapter IV.

manifestation. The failure of this "will to power" to realize its ends, he maintained was the cause of neurotic troubles. At the root of this failure is some organic inferiority. The patient tries to *compensate* for this weakness, by a special concentration of his energies in that direction. The classical example of such compensation is the triumph of Demosthenes over his speech deficiencies. If the effort fails then the patient tries to exploit his inferiority as the blind beggar does his loss of sight. If this fails mental conflict ensues with its varied train of nervous ills. There can be no doubt that the feeling of inferiority and the effort to compensate for it play a large part in human life. But even from these all-too-brief accounts of the theories of Freud and Adler it will be seen that the latter has departed very far from his master's teaching, and that he was only just to himself and the founder of psychoanalysis when he gave his system the new title of "Individual Psychology." While this system contains much that is valuable, we believe that on the whole Freud's criticism of it is just. "The picture one derives from Adler's system is founded entirely upon the impulse of aggression. It has no place at all for love."

This country was very slow to receive the Freudian theories. But it is becoming increasingly recognized that they contain valuable contributions to our insight into the working of the human mind. Dr. Ernest Jones stands as the pioneer and chief representative of the orthodox school, while Dr. Maurice Nicoll and Dr. Constance Long may be mentioned as leading disciples of Jung. Here, as elsewhere, the "rock of offence" has been Freud's sexual theory, and there are many, such as Rivers, McDougall, Myers and Brown, who acknowledge that Freud has thrown great light on the unconscious activities of the mind, but they are not prepared to accept without considerable modification his idea of the rôle of sex.

On this question we shall content ourselves at present

with saying that the question must be faced with as little prejudice and passion as the human mind is capable of. Truth must be our only guide. That we may face the question with what we may call an "equilibrated mind" let it be remembered that if we find in Freud's conceptions much that is repellent, if these conceptions are true, then the very best of which human nature is capable, the highest values on which we can set our hearts, these are to be obtained, not by trampling on and crushing this powerful impulse but by its "sublimation."¹

¹ Freud defines "sublimation" as a process by which an originally sexual aim is exchanged for one which is no longer sexual, but still psychically related.

CHAPTER III

DREAMS

WE have now seen how the psycho-analytical method with its accompanying theory was discovered and what was the nature of its earlier development, and we have seen how Freud's attention was drawn to the similarity of the mental processes in hysteria and in dreams. The nature of these dream processes we must now examine more carefully under his guidance.

Dreams have played a great part in the culture of nearly all primitive peoples, and even among the most highly civilized peoples of the present day there are not a few traces of dream-lore. But for the most part science has treated them as meaningless and unimportant. Efforts have been made to explain and interpret the phenomena but with very little success. The general tendency has been to ascribe them to some such cause as an indigestible supper, or some accidental sensation experienced by the sleeper. The often quoted dream of Maury will afford us a good illustration. He dreamt he was arraigned before a tribunal of the French Revolution. He was tried, condemned, and executed. At the moment when he felt his head being severed from his body he awoke in great distress to find that the top of his bed had fallen on his neck. But we have still to ask, why did he dream of the Revolution, and not of an attack by brigands or a street accident? The answer usually given to such a question is that he must have been reading or thinking about the Revolution

some little time before. We have here another factor which is commonly recognized as playing a part in the formation of dreams—the factor of recent experience. But most dreams are not so coherent as the one we have cited. On the surface they often appear ridiculous and utterly meaningless, worthy only to be compared with the apparently groundless hallucinations and incoherent ravings of an inmate of a lunatic asylum. We shut the lunatic out of sight and dismiss the dream into oblivion for much the same reason. We do not understand them. Possibly we do not want to understand them. But Freud has taken seriously the hallucinations of the lunatic, the foolish obsessions and worries of the neurotic, and the fabrications of the dreamer. If he has not elucidated every problem connected with these mental processes he has at any rate succeeded in throwing on them a flood of light, and into a realm where chaos held almost unlimited sway he has brought a large measure of order and insight.

Before we ask what is Freud's explanations of dreams, it is only just that we should remind ourselves that his theory is not based on the casual examination of a few dreams. His "Interpretation of Dreams," published first in German, more than twenty years ago, was based on the analysis of not less than one thousand dreams. Since then his work has been extended and in some respects modified. It has passed through the fiercest furnace of hostile criticism. But Freud still maintains that his fundamental contentions have not been overthrown. It is sometimes urged as an objection to his theories that they are based upon a one-sided examination of abnormal neurotic individuals. In these days, when in nearly every department of psychology and medicine, pathology is being so extensively used to illuminate the normal processes of body and mind this cannot be regarded as a final and decisive objection. But we may go even further. The objection is not true. The theory was based not merely upon the examination

of the dreams of nervous patients, but on the dreams of normal people as well. The examples he gives in his book are drawn chiefly from a collection of his own dreams. The reason for this is that the analysis of dreams involves such a revelation of the intimate and private affairs of the individual that Freud felt that he could only demand such sacrifice from himself.

I. WISH-FULFILMENT THEORY

Having considered this objection let us now turn to Freud's theory of dreams. *The foundation of this theory is the hypothesis that all dreams are the fulfilment of a wish.* To those who are entirely unacquainted with the system of thought we are endeavouring to expound, this statement will be received with surprise and most probably with scepticism. It is one of the contentions around which the fierce debate on psycho-analytical theories has raged most stormily. That some dreams are obviously simple examples of wish-fulfilments will be readily granted. Most people, possibly, from their own experience could produce such cases. Dreams which are just straightforward imaginary gratifications of bodily needs are by no means uncommon. The sleeper, for instance, is thirsty, and he dreams that he is slaking his thirst with copious draughts from some refreshing spring. On more than one occasion, the writer, having slept beyond his usual hour has dreamt that he had just woke up, and looking at his watch found that he had a good hour to sleep. Rude disillusionment soon followed from some member of the household. This simple dream reveals a complication of two wishes—the desire to sleep, and the desire, less strong possibly, to be up betimes. Freud gives a similar instance of a medical student, who being called one morning, awoke, turned over and dreamt that he was in bed in the hospital where his studies were being pursued. Since he was

already in the hospital there was no need to get up. He could sleep a while longer. The dreams of young children are practically all of this simple type. The chocolates that were denied during the day are supplied in abundance by the dream at night. The entertainment that was prohibited, or proved all too brief in the waking hours is enjoyed without restraint during the sleeping hours.

But the vast majority of adult dreams are not so simple or obvious as the examples just quoted. Leaving aside for a moment, anxiety and fear dreams, the ordinary dream of grown up people is apparently a meaningless jumble of ludicrous situations, without rhyme or reason. Further, even when these are interpreted by the method we shall shortly expound, the dreamer often refuses to accept the interpretation because he cannot acknowledge that he ever experienced the wish of which the dream is the alleged fulfilment. Freud's explanation of this is that the wish is an unconscious wish. This terminology, as we have explained in Chapter I, is unfortunate and misleading. It involves an unwarrantable, or at least undesirable extension of the commonly accepted meaning of the word "wish," and has resulted in a good deal of unnecessary opposition to Freud's theories. We cannot hope to explain these theories so that they will meet with ready and universal acceptance. If it were possible to do this without injustice to their fundamental contentions, it would involve their complete refutation. For the whole structure is built up on the foundation idea that in the individual there is an obstinate resistance against self-revelation. Rightly does Freud recognize that the fierce opposition with which his teaching has met, is both natural and inevitable if that teaching is true. At the same time, and we are sure that he would readily acknowledge this, that opposition in itself is not a sufficient demonstration of the truth of his contentions. Not a little of that hostility has been due, we contend,

to his unusual use of terms which his critics have not always fully appreciated. The use of the term "wish" is a case in point. There is no such thing as an "unconscious wish." A more satisfactory mode of expression of his idea would be the term "unrecognized tendency." A wish is, at least, a *recognized* tendency. We shall therefore use the word "tendency" as a general term, covering the same connotation as Freud attributes to the "wish," conscious or unconscious. It is at once obvious that most of us would be prepared to admit that there are unrecognized, and even undesirable tendencies within us. But if these tendencies are dignified by the title "wish" we should rightly deny their existence, because we feel that this title involves a degree of approval which we have never bestowed upon them. On these grounds we believe, that the wish-fulfilment would be better expressed,—“Every dream is the satisfaction of a psychological tendency.”

2. MANIFEST AND LATENT CONTENT

But there are other objections which would appear to be just as valid against this formula as against the original one. Some dreams apparently reveal tendencies which we not only deny, but which undoubtedly do not exist. The mere denial of them does not disprove them. They may be unrecognized or, to use the Freudian term, "unconscious." But there are some dreams which manifest to all appearance, attitudes and desires which not even the most exhaustive analysis can confirm. The explanation of this leads us to a second and most important fact about dreams. Dreams have *two* contents, the *manifest* and *latent*. The manifest content is that which is obvious to the dreamer. The latent content can only be revealed by analysis. The former may apparently reveal tendencies which are quite inconsistent with the character of the dreamer, but when the dream has been analysed and its latent content

rendered explicit, it will be seen that its meaning is quite different from what a superficial interpretation would indicate. *This distinction of the two contents is of the utmost importance for a right understanding of Freud's doctrine.* As an illustration of this we will give a very short dream of one of Ferenczi's patients with its accompanying analysis.

"I was once called upon to analyse the short dream of a woman ; in it she had wrung the neck of a little, barking, white dog. She was very much astonished that she who "could not hurt a fly," could dream such a cruel dream, and she did not remember having dreamt one like it before. She admitted that, being very fond of cooking, she had many times killed pigeons and fowls with her own hand. Then it occurred to her that she had wrung the neck of the little dog in the dream in exactly the same way as she was accustomed to do with the pigeons in order to cause them less pain. The thoughts and associations that followed had to do with pictures and stories of executions, and especially with the thought that the executioner, when he had fastened the cord about the criminal's neck arranges it so as to give the neck a twist, and thus hasten death. Asked against whom she felt a strong enmity at the present time, she named a sister-in-law, and related at length her bad qualities and malicious deeds, with which she had disturbed the family harmony, before so beautiful, after insinuating herself *like a tame pigeon* into the favour of her subsequent husband. Not long before a violent scene had taken place between her and the patient, which ended by the latter showing her to the door with the words : 'Get out ; I cannot endure a biting dog in my house.' Now it was clear whom the little white dog represented, and whose neck she was wringing in the dream. The sister-in-law is also a small person, with a remarkably white complexion."¹ The manifest

¹ "Contributions to Psycho-Analysis." Dr. S. Ferenczi. Translated by Dr. E. Jones, 1916. Badger.

content of this dream is very brief. The dreamer wrings the neck of the little white dog. The latent content is much more extensive. Only an epitome of it is given. It consists of a great complex of images and reminiscences. The meaning of the dream is rendered explicit. It is the satisfaction of a hostile tendency towards the sister-in-law. Thus we see, even in such a brief and apparently simple dream, the real meaning is very different from the superficial.

Two questions will now present themselves to the reader's mind. How is the latent content of a dream discovered, and why does the dreamer take this round-about and obscure way of obtaining satisfaction? For instance, in the dream just cited, why is the wrath vented on a little dog and not on its real object, the sister-in-law?

3. DREAM ANALYSIS. FREE ASSOCIATION

Let us consider the first question, How is the latent content of a dream obtained? Freud's answer is, By "free association." The patient is made comfortable in an easy chair. Some analysts prefer the patient to recline upon a couch. The muscles are relaxed and the thoughts must be allowed to flow freely. So far the method is essentially similar to that of Suggestion. There is a suspension of the selecting activity of the self which is identical with the state of "relaxation" that is regarded as a necessary preliminary for effective suggestion.¹ But from this point the two methods diverge. When the state of relaxation has been induced suggestion proceeds by introducing the idea that the painful symptoms are passing away, that the patient is getting better and better. In psycho-analysis the element of suggestion is as far as possible eliminated.

¹ Cf. Baudouin, "Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion." Allen and Unwin.

The patient is instructed to give expression to whatever thoughts come into the mind. There must be no selection. Good, bad, indifferent, trivial or profound they should be made known to the analyst. When these instructions have been made perfectly clear, the dream, which has been previously communicated to the analyst, is taken piece by piece, and the subject is requested to say just what thoughts arise as the mind contemplates any particular fragment thus submitted. The thought thus stimulated may appear utterly irrelevant. But it is essential that it should be freely communicated. Freud considers that the best part of the dream to begin with is that which is the most obscure. It is the tender spot. It is quite a common thing for the patient to say, when a portion of the dream is thus presented, that no thoughts arise in connexion with it. This is due either to resistance against the analyst recognized or unrecognized, or to *inner* resistance. Even in analysing one's own dreams one may come up against an apparently blank wall. Behind the wall there is something we don't want to see. If the analyst confidently assures the patient that the thoughts will come, this internal resistance may often be broken down. Resistance against the analyst at the beginning of an examination is due to the fact that the confidence of the subject has not been fully obtained before the inquiry is begun. It is perfectly obvious that if dreams reveal such intimate and painful matters of our life that we are trying to hide them even from ourselves, a very full degree of confidence will be necessary before they can be related to a second person. Resistance to the analyst, which arises at a later stage of the inquiry is due to another factor which Freud calls "Transference." This we shall discuss later. From the foregoing it will be gathered that the patient, during free-association is in a very suggestive state of mind. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the analyst should reduce his rôle as far as possible, during this time,

to that of an impartial observer and recorder. It is a wise precaution to instruct the subject to keep the eyes closed during this part of the investigation. This shuts out one big source of external suggestion and affords the analyst greater freedom for the observation of facial movements and trivial gestures, which often throw considerable light on the mental processes.

But by what right does Freud assume that this free-association method will yield reliable insight into the hidden mind processes? The human mind under such conditions,—conditions which we have all experienced to some extent in moments of reverie, seems to be a somewhat unreasonable and unreliable thing. It is tossed about by the slightest wind of fancy, thoughts seem to spring up suddenly from nowhere, images the most fantastic take shape and vanish. Freud's assumption is based on the hypothesis that psychical process is just as much subject to law as any other process. The conscious mind, or selfconscious, as we should prefer to say, is teleologically determined, that is, it is governed by ideas of ends. The unconscious mind is governed by impulses towards ends of which the mind is not personally aware. But in neither realm does the mind work by chance. When the teleological activities of consciousness are suspended as explained above, we are able to observe the natural trend of the impulses of the unconscious. This hypothesis, of course, cannot be *proved*. But Freud maintains that it is abundantly confirmed by empirical observation. Free association then, is Freud's key to the interpretation of dreams. If it is proved to be unreliable then the door of the dream chamber cannot be opened, and the hidden processes of the mind must be regarded as an inexplicable mystery. But the application of the method brings its own conviction. With patient practice the reader can obtain sufficient insight into his own dreams to convince him of its value. It is wise in analysing one's own dreams to write down the dream as soon as possible

on waking. The analysis can be proceeded with at a later and probably more convenient time. The associations should also be written down as they arrive. Sometimes the meaning of the dream emerges with startling suddenness ; at other times it follows long and devious ways.

4. CENSORSHIP AND REPRESSION

This brings us to the second question which was raised above. Why does the dream not follow the obvious and direct way to achieve its satisfaction ? In some cases as we have seen, in children's dreams for instance, and thirst dreams, etc., it does follow the direct way. In the majority of adult dreams, however, its aim is anything but obvious. What is the reason for this ? Dreams we have seen are imaginary gratifications of psychic tendencies. But these tendencies are very often unrecognized. That is, in Freudian terminology, dreams are the product of the unconscious. Now the reason for the failure to recognize these tendencies is that they are not acceptable to selfconsciousness. What their specific nature is, we shall inquire more fully in the next chapter. For the present, it is sufficient for us to recognize that they are personally repugnant. They are the outlaws of psychic life. They are *repressed*. To effect an entrance into the citadel of selfconsciousness, they must either overpower the watchful sentinel of the self, or so *disguise* themselves as to evade its suspicions. The former sometimes happens, but it results in such distress that the dreamer awakes. Now it is the *function of the dream*, according to Freud, *to guard sleep*. The thirsty sleeper dreams of copious draughts and so can go on sleeping. But if the thirst is too intense to be satisfied by imaginary gratification there is an end to sleep. In the case of thirst there is no need for disguise. It is recognized

as a perfectly honourable and legitimate desire. But the desire to wring the neck of a near relative would probably be repugnant to the moral sense of most people and its gratification could only be granted by means of disguise.

The disguise is due to the activity of what Freud calls the "endopsychic censor." Undesirable tendencies are repressed. They can only be gratified if they assume such disguise as will evade the vigilance of the censor. We must now examine more carefully these notions of censorship and repression. They are of the utmost importance for the right understanding of psycho-analysis. The adjective "endopsychic" simply means that the mind itself criticises its own tendencies. We are our own censors. The recent war has made us all familiar with the operations of the censor in the sphere of national affairs. Occasionally the censor was disregarded or defied. Revelations were made which disturbed and distressed the national mind. People were roused from the slumber of self-satisfaction. In the same way, as we have seen, the sleeper may be awakened by the overpowering of the endopsychic censor. On the other hand references were sometimes made to unpublished disasters in such a way that they escaped the watchful eye of the censor. Even official reports of reverses were often couched in such language as to give the impression that they were really victories. The object of this was, of course, the maintenance of national *morale*. Whether the rôle of the censor, even in our own country, was not too strictly regarded has been debated. It has been suggested that if the people had been more fully trusted, the temporary alarm would quickly have passed into a more bracing preparation for the struggle. But the authorities on these occasions were concerned only about the *immediate* effects of bad news. In this respect they resembled the individual unconscious. Dr. Rivers, in his "Instinct and the Unconscious," says, "The experience which tends to be

forgotten or repressed is the *immediately* painful. If we forget an appointment or a letter in connexion with which we anticipate unpleasant emotions, the ultimate consequences may be even more unpleasant than the immediate experience from which we escape by the act of forgetting. If we were able to consider rationally the consequences of the lapse, we should find that in most cases the course that would give us least trouble would be to keep the appointment or to write the letter. *The process of active forgetting takes no account of these ultimate consequences but is directed exclusively towards the avoidance of the more immediate pains and discomforts.*"¹ The "process of active forgetting" to which Dr. Rivers refers is due to the repressing activity of the censor.

Another respect in which the endopsychic censor resembles the national official is in the delegation of power. So vast was the material to be examined, much of the work had to be done by subordinates. Certain kinds of news were suppressed without reference to the supreme censor. Only the most important and difficult questions were submitted to his personal examination. A similar division of labour may be found in the realm of the individual mind. Dr. Rivers in the volume just referred to, brings out very clearly the distinction between "witting" and "unwitting" repression. Probably every one can recall more than one occasion in which deliberate effort was made to banish some unpleasant experience from the mind. As a rule we try to get away from the painful items of our past. When this effort is deliberate we have witting repression; when it is spontaneous and unrecognized we have unwitting repression. This later activity Rivers has called "suppression," reserving the term "repression" for the deliberate and fully conscious effort. Witting repression corresponds with the activity of the supreme

¹ Page 29, "Instinct and the Unconscious." W. H. R. Rivers, M.D., F.R.S. Cambridge, 1920. [Italic ours.]

sensor in national affairs ; unwitting repression corresponds with the more or less automatic functions of his subordinates.

It has been objected to Freud's doctrine of the endo-psyche sensor that it is merely metaphorical. What is the real psychological nature of the sensor ? In the case of witting repression the answer it seems to us is obvious. It is the critical activity of self-consciousness. Impulses and experiences that conflict with the idea of the self that is dominant at the moment we regard as alien. They are banished. If they are so strong as to persist in spite of this decree they give rise, according to Rivers, to the nervous disorder known as anxiety or repression neurosis. The psychological nature of unwitting repression is not as simple or obvious. It is due to the operation of consciousness at the sub-personal level. In Chapter I we showed how an impulse or tendency may operate without our being personally aware of it. In a similar manner it is possible for one impulse or system of impulses to operate in the suppression of another impulse without the conflict coming into the realm of full consciousness. For instance, it is possible for a man to be so absorbed in his work that the appetite for food may be temporarily suppressed. There is in this case no deliberate effort. It is simply the repression of one interest by another. *This unwitting repression is the activity on which the whole psycho-analytical theory is built.* And it must be borne in mind that when an impulse or experience is repressed it does not cease to exist. It exerts a bias on the whole trend of the individual life. It may be that it produces vague and inexplicable feelings of uneasiness, or an inability to perform certain actions, or a compulsion to perform others, or a mysterious fear of certain kinds of places, or animals. But in all these experiences the individual is oblivious of the real cause which lies in the unwitting repression of the memory of some painful event. He may try to explain his actions or his fears

but he cannot give the real reason. He is like a person who receives a command in the hypnotic state to perform some strange action after he returns to waking consciousness. He forgets the command but obeys it all the same.

According to Freud the critical vigilance of the censor is relaxed in sleep. This relaxation apparently varies in degree. In the lowest degree the dream is an obvious gratification of crude primitive appetites. In its highest, the tendencies that have been refused satisfaction during our waking life, can only find fulfilment by means of the most elaborate and far-fetched disguise. The censor admits the meaningless or ludicrous, but refuses to accept that which is flagrantly at variance with its sense of the right and proper. The degree of disguise is determined by the relative strengths of the repressed tendencies in operation and the vigilance of the censor. We can watch the process at work in day-dreams when we indulge in fantasies that are a compensation for the unrealized aspirations of our workaday world. The aspiring lover drifts in imagination with his loved one along some peaceful stream, or dies in despair upon her doorstep. The unsuccessful business man sees in fancy, branch after branch develop under his capable management, or else the whole concern collapses in bankruptcy with himself as a central figure in the drama of cruel fate. How far imagination is indulged in these day-dreams will depend on the relative strength of the love and ambition and of the weariness or hopelessness of the moment. A study of one's own day-dreams, in our opinion, affords a self-knowledge and an introduction to the simpler mechanisms of real dreams which would prove most helpful in the gaining of real psycho-analytical insight. But this is not to be obtained by five minutes' casual introspection. Day-dreams are only a degree less delusive than night dreams.

And now to sum up what we have endeavoured to

explain in the foregoing paragraphs—the “meaningless” dream, that is, the ordinary adult dream is the *disguised* satisfaction of a *repressed* tendency.

5. REPRESSION, DISSOCIATION AND FORGETTING

Before we pass on to consider yet another objection to this theory we must consider more carefully the effects of repression. We shall use this term, repression, to signify *unwitting* repression unless the contrary is clearly indicated. The effects of witting repression we can all easily observe. The effort to forget is too painfully obvious to pass by unnoticed. But the effects of unwitting repression are always misunderstood. To Freud is due the credit for their elucidation and the revelation of their history.

A simple illustration, for which the reader will probably be able to find parallels in his own experience, will show what is meant. Some time ago I met a friend, by chance, in the street. Our previous meeting had been a painful one for us both. My self-esteem had received a rude blow. But a little reflection was enough to convince me that my friend was not to blame under the circumstances, and I resolved that it should make no difference to our friendship. Accordingly, at the second meeting, I promised to call next day. But it was not until a week later that my promise was remembered. Such forgetting cannot be explained as mere oversight. The engagement could not be regarded as too trivial to be recalled. Why then was it forgotten? Freud in his “*Psycho-pathology of Everyday Life*,” has shown that such forgetting is due to repression. It is not a passive process but an active one. Apart from my resolve there was something within me that shrank from a renewal of the painful experience. The tendencies of the “unconscious” were at variance with the purpose of personal consciousness. There was a temporary

“dissociation,” a cleavage of interests, and a consequent forgetting. It is not enough to secure dissociation, that there should be conflict of impulses. One of them must attain such ascendancy as to drive the other, temporarily at least, out of the realm of personal consciousness. For the time being the repressed experience is beyond recall. The hypocrite, who, to use a common witticism “prays to his God on Sunday, and preys on his neighbours on Monday,” may not be a conscious hypocrite. There may be such a dissociation of interests that he is utterly unaware of his inconsistency. This dissociation may be so extensive and complete that we may have the phenomena of double or even multiple personality, a veritable Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. The “sub-conscious” school, to which we referred in Chapter I, has made extensive use of this conception of dissociation to explain the phenomena of hypnotism, amnesia (pathological forgetting), multiple personality, etc. The idea has proved both valid and useful. But Freud goes deeper still and asks, How does this dissociation come about? His answer is, By repression. Repression produces dissociation, and dissociation results in forgetting. There are two types of forgetting. One type is due to lack of interest. I may read the results of last Saturday’s football match and forget them immediately, because I have little interest in football. I forget a painful engagement, not because I am not interested. I have a painful interest in it. But I forget it because it is repressed by a positive aversion to unpleasant experiences. And we cannot emphasize too much the fact that repressed, forgotten experiences are not “dead and done with”; they live on and exert an unrecognized influence upon our waking life, and in our dreams and moments of absent-mindedness find their most unfettered expression.

6. FEAR DREAMS

Let us turn now to another objection to Freud's dream theory. Even in the form we have stated it, substituting "satisfaction of tendency" for "wish-fulfilment," the common phenomena of "fear dreams" apparently shatter the whole hypothesis.

Before attempting to answer this objection we must point out that there is no one simple explanation which will account for all fear dreams. Each dream must be taken separately and explained by its analysis. This is obviously an impossible task. Absolute proof of our contention cannot therefore be established. But it is possible to indicate certain considerations which will show how such dreams can be understood.

First of all we must bear in mind that a certain degree of fear is a source of satisfaction. Without it life would lose its adventure. A fear dream may be the realization of a desire to escape from the humdrum round of real life. As such it may be classed with "blood-curdling" novels, cinema films and theatrical displays which appeal mainly to this emotion. It may be objected that in the dream the individual plays the leading part, while in these entertainments he is a mere spectator. To this it is sufficient to reply that the picture or the play is only really effective in so far as it compels the spectator to "identify" himself with the fortunes of the *dramatis personæ*.

But when fear is intensified into terror, or because of the vague mystery of its object, assumes the form of anxiety, then this explanation obviously breaks down. In the case of terror we reach, as Freud points out, the limit of the hypothesis. In the dream, as in real life, terror is due to a feeling of utter helplessness in the face of an imminent and terrible danger. The desire to escape is frustrated. But just at the moment the fatal blow is about to fall the sleeper invariably awakes. If

we accept Freud's theory that the dream is the guardian of sleep we shall see that his "wish-fulfilment" contention breaks down just at the point that the dream itself fails. If we consider that the terror dream invalidates this dream theory, then, in the name of consistency, we must deny that in waking life the fear-flight instinct is a mechanism of self-preservation, because in the extreme case of terrified collapse it fails to fulfil its function.

The case of anxiety is more difficult. Anxiety is akin to suspense.¹ In both there is an element of hope, however small. But the hope does not relieve. It constitutes that incalculable element which makes dread harder to bear for many natures than the actual calamity. The difference between anxiety and suspense lies in the sense of responsibility. In true suspense this sense is absent because nothing can be done. We can only watch and wait. But in anxiety there is always, at least, a feeling that some measures of precaution or remedy can be taken. Hence the sense of responsibility. For instance, during the recent war, relatives at home were in a state of suspense as to the safety of their loved ones at the front. They could do nothing one way or the other to affect it. But the element of anxiety was also revealed in the shoals of letters and parcels that were dispatched every day. It was possible to some degree to relieve the mental burden and the physical hardships of the fighting men. To this extent suspense was changed into anxiety. This illustration will make clear what Freud means when he says that anxiety is a "defence mechanism." It was a defence against the dread that the "boys" might be suffering from an insufficient supply of clothing, food, etc. Anxiety in dreams, and in waking life, is the emotion

¹ The writer has no record of a genuine suspense dream. If such a dream is possible it would constitute, he feels, an unanswerable argument against Freud's theory. Temporary suspense there may be, but it is bound to obtain relief or end in the terror that awakens the sleeper.

that prompts to the provision of safeguards against some dreaded danger. If these measures are successful the wish is fulfilled. If they fail, anxiety issues in collapse, and the sleeper awakes.

These are general considerations which will at least show that the Freudian theory is not to be dismissed summarily because many dreams are coloured by the painful emotion of fear. When we come down from the general to the particular we find still further evidence which confirms the theory. Let us consider very briefly two types of anxiety dreams—those which centre round examinations and the missing of trains.

The clue to the understanding of examination dreams was given to Freud by his colleague Dr. Stekel.¹ The latter observed that in his experience the examination dream occurs only to those who have passed the examination, never to those who have gone to pieces on it. In his waking life the individual is confronted by some difficult problem or test. In his dreams he goes back to his old examinations. It is as though the dream said to him, "You worried about your examination. There was no need, you got through. You will get through your present troubles."

The missing of trains finds a similar consoling explanation. An obvious and common association in such dreams is, train—depart—death. The missing of the train in such a case implies therefore—you are not going to die yet. From this simple example it will be seen how important the analysis by association is, if we are to arrive at the true interpretation. We do not wish, however, that it should be taken for granted that all dreams of this type have the same meaning. The only safe way of interpretation is by careful analysis of such instances.

There is another type of dream which we may consider here. It is the dream of the death of relatives and friends. These fall roughly into two classes—one, in

¹ "Interpretation of Dreams," p. 231.

which the dreamer feels the sorrow natural to such an occasion, and another in which no such emotion is felt. In the second case the dream tendencies have no concern with the death. Analysis reveals the death is just the occasion for the realization of utterly extraneous interests. Freud gives a particularly good example of this type.¹ A young lady patient related the dream thus: "I saw little Charles lying dead before me. He was lying in his little coffin, his hands folded; there were candles all about, and, in short, it was just like the time of little Otto's death which shocked me so profoundly." The analysis revealed that on the occasion of the funeral of Charles' little brother Otto, a certain professor had been present, whom the young lady loved and had reasonable expectations of marrying. But the interference of relatives had put an end to the expectations. The love, however, persisted and the young lady sought every opportunity of seeing her beloved at a distance. The dream meant, therefore, that she wanted a renewal of the old understanding and the opportunity to get into such close relations to the professor as the funeral of her nephew Otto had provided. At the time she related the dream she had in her bag a ticket for a concert at which the professor was to be present.

But in the type of death dream where sorrow is present the explanation is different. Analysis reveals that the sorrowful emotion is the outcome of a repressed "wish that the person in question may die," or, as we should prefer to put it, it is the result of repressed hostile tendencies. These tendencies probably belong to early childhood. They are not incompatible with real affection. Love and hate quickly succeed one another in the changeable world of a child's emotions. As a rule the hatred is suppressed and forgotten. But it lives on in the form of excessive sorrow at the mere idea of harm befalling the loved one. The bitterest drop in the cup of bereavement is the memory of un-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 128.

kindness or indifference to the one we have lost. The relation of brothers and sisters, children and parents, is not that unmingled affection which some of us would fain persuade ourselves it is. Rebellion and jealousy play a part in the drama of early life which is uncongenial to the standards of later years. I have an authentic record of a tiny tot who, on being taken to see her newly born little sister, promptly slapped the baby's face. My own little boy of eleven months is generally regarded as a bright and lovable little fellow, but if his strongest appetites or impulses are thwarted he is capable of displaying a passion which would be alarming if it were equalled by his physical strength and skill. Life and property are not sacred to the child. He knows nothing of the rights of others. He feels only his own imperious desires, and nothing must stand in the way of their gratification. As the child grows these passionate impulses are usually repressed. But if they are merely forced into the background of the unconscious, they will live on and find expression of some kind, if it is only in the world of dreams. This conception of the nature of childhood's passions has met with great opposition. It certainly does not express the whole truth. But we shall consider the question more fully when we deal with the nature of the unconscious.

7. SOURCES OF DREAMS

The consideration of the part childhood impulses play in dream life brings us to the question of the sources of dreams. There are three—(1) recent experiences ; (2) childhood experiences ; (3) sensational experiences.

The dream never deals with trivialities, but always with vital concerns of the individual. If this is apparently contradicted by the manifest content it is confirmed by the latent content. According to Freud there is present in every dream, some element, important or

trivial, which is taken from the experiences of the previous day. There is a mass of evidence to support this, but the writer is unable to confirm it as universally true in his own experience. But there is no doubt that it is true of a vast number of cases.

That the dream usually involves childhood experiences will not be so readily admitted. Many dreams find an obvious and satisfactory explanation by means of comparatively late experiences. But a dream may have more than one meaning. It may have many. If the analysis is continued it is often found that earlier and yet earlier periods of life are involved. At first sight this may seem to prove that the method of interpretation is worthless, or at least that its results are unreliable. But a right conception of the nature of consciousness will help us to see this problem in its true light. Our whole past lives on in the present, not indeed in the form of a storehouse of impressions and memories, which may or may not be accessible to us, which may or may not be exerting an influence on present experience; but the past lives on as an ever-active determination of the present. According to this view, memory is just the reference of these determining impulses to the experiences in which they originated. "Our past, as a whole," Bergson says, "is made manifest to us in its impulse; it is felt in the form of tendency although a small part of it only is known in the form of idea." Now an idea is just an impulse rendered luminous and relatively definite. Mere impulse lacks this quality of luminosity and definiteness. It may find its satisfaction in various ways, so long as these are not inconsistent with the general trend of the impulse. What happens then in dream analysis is this. During free association, active interest in the external world is suspended. A fragment of the dream is presented and the appropriate impulse is thus stimulated. This impulse now must find its gratification in past experiences. Occasionally some one experience stands

out as pre-eminent, but often enough it has close rivals. Take for instance, the analysis of the dream of the wringing of the neck of the little dog (page 28). Here the patient has a succession of impressions, wringing the necks of pigeons and fowls, pictures and stories of executions, all of which furnish more or less satisfactory outlets for the impulse. If we were able to follow up the analysis, we should probably find in spite of the patient's assertion that she "could not hurt a fly," that her sister-in-law was not the only person against whom her unconscious harboured a vindictive design.

A dream of my own may serve to make these points clear. In my dream I stood at the lower end of the down platform of the railway station of my native place. A train was just moving out on that side but in the wrong direction. A man of athletic build, clad in a light grey suit, ran along the platform and attempted to board the train. But losing his foothold he slipped between the platform and the footboard. He was followed by a stouter person bearing on his back a big square box, so large that it would have been useless for him to attempt to enter any compartment. When the train was gone I was talking to a third person whom we will designate C. There was another train at the opposite platform going in the right direction, and as it began to move off C ran across the metals and boarded it from the permanent way. C was the only one of the three persons whom I definitely recognized. The dream occurred at a time when I was trying to fill a post which had been resigned after an angry altercation. The post had been temporarily filled but the man I regarded as being most suitable for the work was C. Starting from this point with my free associations I recognized the athletic figure as the one who was doing temporary duty. Though I could not see his face I identified him by his build and his clothes. The man with the box was apparently the man who had resigned. The meaning of my dream was thus made clear. Though I had no

personal objection towards the temporary substitute, his admitted lack of proficiency led me to desire that his engagement should soon be terminated. Thus in the dream he meets with an accident and fails to board the train. C was the candidate I favoured and whose election was secured in the dream under the symbol of his successful attempt to board the train which was going in the right direction. This interpretation involves only recent experience. But if we start as Freud advised from the most obscure part of the dream, we shall see that it leads to earlier experiences, and to the fulfilment of different desires. Now the most vague part of the dream was the accident. Starting from this I recall a similar accident at the same station, the story of which greatly impressed me as a boy. From this point the associations run along two different but ultimately converging lines. The first line begins with the memory of an occasion, when, in my early years I attempted to board a swiftly moving tramcar. I was carrying a basket and the attempt was clumsily made. The result was that I was flung down into the road, but fortunately not hurt. From this, memories of early blunders and painful experiences crop up, the consequences of which I am aware persist up to the present. The two men who failed to enter the train seem to stand for wrong personal interests badly executed. Their identity is blurred. I do not wish to remember or recognize them. But C, with whom I am more recently acquainted, apparently represents new and right interests, which in my dream, at least, are being fulfilled. His identity is clearly perceived. Nevertheless he boards the train, *after it has started, not from the platform but from the permanent way*. This apparently trifling detail of the dream confirms the course of the free associations which lead on from childhood mistakes to the present hope and assurance that analytical insight (a belated and unorthodox attempt to board the train of personal ambitions) will enable me to nullify the

effects of the blunders of early years. The second line of associations, starting from the accident in the dream, runs briefly in a similar direction. It goes back again to boyhood. I remember very vividly the story of how a little baby relative of mine had witnessed a shocking railway accident. For long after this the mere sight of sparrows on the railway line caused the little one to cry out in alarm. Since then that relative has grown up and has suffered from some trouble, which to me, knowing few of the details, has been obscure. My next association is a recent conversation with a medical friend as to the likelihood of such a case proving amenable to psycho-analytical treatment. Thus along different lines the associations converge on a hope that increased insight into hidden psychical processes will result in a more effective and satisfactory adaptation to life's demands. Even now the interpretation is not exhausted. But as Freud points out every dream analysis leads into the infinite. It cannot be exhausted. Another point this dream illustrates besides the childhood memories, is the ego-centric interests of the dream. The hero of the dream is always the self. The manifest content of the dream, as in the one we have just cited, may appear to contradict this contention, but the latent content abundantly confirms it.

The third source from which dreams are drawn is sensational experience. We use the word "sensational" in its psychological and not in its everyday significance. Doubtless the reader will be able to supply instances from memory of dreams which have been woven round some bodily sensation. Sensations of pain, hunger, cold, etc., and those arising from digestive disorders, and so on, may all act as dream stimuli. In fact attempts have been made to explain all dreams along this line. But the attempt has met with little success. In the first place it has been found impossible to identify any sensational element in a vast number of dreams, and in the second place, even where

such experiences are present, we have still to explain the strange use that is made of them. Digestive disorders may favour dream-making, but they do not explain the form the dream takes. We cannot leave this aspect of the subject without drawing attention to the fact that the dream may not merely use a sensational element, but may definitely and emphatically deny it. Freud gives a specially good example of this. At a time when he was suffering from furunculosis, he dreamt he was riding a horse, a thing that would have been utterly impossible under the conditions. In the dream the wish to be free from this painful disease was thus fulfilled.

8. DREAM WORK

We have seen that in nearly all adult dreams the tendency fulfilment is nearly always more or less disguised, and that this disguise is due to the repressing activity of the endopsychic censor. We must now briefly consider *how* the disguise is brought about.

The first factor that plays a part in this work is that of *condensation*. A comparison of the manifest and latent contents of any dream will show that the latter is very much more extensive than the former. Each item of the dream is over-determined. Thus the railway accident which occurs in the dream related in the last section is determined by not less than three separate experiences, the memory of the story of a similar accident at the same station, the memory of the attempt to board a tramcar, and the memory of the startling accident witnessed by my baby relative. This condensation may take place by the processes of identification and of fusion. In the latter process two or more different persons or places are fused together. The dream person may have hair that reminds the dreamer of one acquaintance, a beard that reminds him of a second, and a manner that arouses thoughts of a

third. The process of fusion indicates that for the dreamer these persons have some emotional significance for him in common. The fusion of words is of frequent occurrence. One of the instances given by Freud—Norekdal, is commonly cited. It is the fusion of two of the names of Ibsen's characters, Nora and Ekdal. Dr. Ernest Jones gives other illustrations—Magna from Maggie and Edna; Kipperling from Kipling, and Kipper.¹ In the process of *identification* we have something which is akin to substitution. Two persons or places are merged together till the identity of the one is almost completely lost in the other. It is, of course, the obscured person or place that is really the important one. The commonest identification is of ourselves with some other person. In the train dream we have analysed it will be seen how I identify myself with all three persons concerned, but it is only in the case of C that the process is completely satisfactory.

The second factor at work in dream disguise is that of *displacement*. This is the name given to that dream activity which provides the dream with a false centre of interest. The thing that stands out most clearly in the dream is often the least important factor. It is the part that is most obscure and most readily forgotten that is usually of most vital concern. The reason for this is obvious if we accept the theory of a repressing censorship. The emotions aroused in the dream are frequently incongruous, or out of proportion with the object that arouses them. This, according to Freud, is because the emotion has been displaced and attached to some relatively insignificant object, with the result that the vigilance of the censor is evaded. Thus we see in the dream of the train, if we begin the free associations from the clearly recognized C, we are led to a relatively superficial interpretation which was in complete harmony with my fully conscious and

¹ "Papers on Psycho-analysis." Dr. Ernest Jones, pp. 92 ff. Baillière, Tyndall and Cox, 1918.

avowed intentions. There was no need to dream since there was little or no repression, nor was I so concerned about the problem that it should disturb my sleep. But the interest of the dream belongs mainly to the accident, which was rather obscure and not of great manifest emotional significance. Starting from this point my associations are more personal and intimate, so much so that I find I have invented the want of space as an excuse for abbreviating and generalizing them.

These two factors, Condensation and Displacement, are the "two craftsmen to whom we may chiefly attribute the moulding of the dream."¹ But there are two other factors which determine the course of the dream, *regard for presentability and secondary elaboration*. The effect of the former is the substitution of harmless and innocent operations for activities which would arouse the opposition of the censor. We are thus brought face to face with the question of symbolism in dreams. Freud claims from the examination of an enormous number of dreams that certain activities in dreams have practically always a common significance. This is antecedently probable, but we believe that the reader will be wise in attempting to interpret his own dreams, to ignore these symbols and adhere steadfastly to the method of free association. To deal with the question of symbolism at this stage would only result in imparting a bias to these associations. We therefore strongly recommend that dreams should be interpreted first of all without a knowledge of symbolism. It is more difficult, but the results will be more convincing. Later, if more information is desired on this subject, the reader might refer to the works of Freud, Jones and Silberer.

Secondary elaboration is due to the censor. Not everything in the dream is due to the unconscious. Many people will remember occasions, when during

¹ "Interpretation of Dreams," p. 286.

the course of the dream, the dreamer says to himself, "It is only a dream." In this way the censor is consoled for having allowed repugnant material to creep in. But the general effect of secondary elaboration is to bring the dream thoughts into a more consistent unity resembling the operations of conscious thought.

But we cannot close this brief exposition of Freud's dream theory without drawing attention to one more point. Freud maintains that all the dreams that occur in one night are concerned with the same interests. An interesting confirmation of this occurred in the experience of the writer a few months ago. A married lady friend related a dream in which she was playing the piano. But instead of ordinary music she was confronted by exquisitely beautiful vases. Her playing translated their visible into audible beauty. A few associations were sufficient to lay bare the underlying wish—the desire for a child. When this was intimated to the dreamer, she immediately confessed that she had had a second dream in which the wish was more explicitly manifested, thus confirming Freud's contention that later dreams are usually *less* disguised expressions of earlier ones.

9. JUNG'S THEORY

The exposition of dream theory given above is an attempt to state as briefly and clearly as possible the doctrines of Freud, to whom is due the credit or, as many think, the discredit of opening up the dream world to the light of waking consciousness. We must now consider the modifications of this theory introduced by Dr. Jung of Zurich.

In the first place we should bear in mind the emphatic and oft repeated assertion of Jung that, as far as the theory of dreams is concerned, his contentions do not

contradict the theory we have expounded, but supplement it.

The elaboration of the doctrine affects three main points: (a) compensation; (b) symbolism, and (c) finalism.

(a) *Compensation*.—Jung maintains that dreams have a compensating function and cites the example of Nebuchadnezzar's dream in the fourth chapter of Daniel. "He dreamed of a tree which had raised its head even up to heaven and now must be hewn down. This is a dream which is obviously a counterpoise to the exaggerated feeling of royal power."¹ Vicious dreams he regards as a compensation for the suppressed evil tendencies of a virtuous life. Here we are bound to confess that we feel he carries his theory of compensation too far. As we shall endeavour to show in the next chapter, the unconscious knows nothing of the distinction between good and evil. These are distinctions which belong entirely to the realm of consciousness. But apart from this, Jung's compensation idea is merely another way of putting Freud's wish-fulfilment theory. But it raises an interesting question which Freud states and answers thus. "Should we take lightly the ethical significance of the suppressed wishes which as they now create dreams, may some day create other things? I do not feel justified in answering these questions. I have not thought further on this side of the dream problem. I believe, however, that at all events, the Roman Emperor was in the wrong who ordered one of his subjects to be executed because the latter dreamt that he had killed the Emperor. He should first have endeavoured to discover the significance of the dream; most probably it was not what it seemed to be. And even if a dream of different content had the significance of this offence against majesty, it would have still been in place to remember the words of Plato, that the virtuous man contents himself with dreaming that which

¹ "Analytical Psychology," Jung, p. 281.

the wicked man does in actual life. I am, therefore, of opinion that it is best to accord freedom to dreams.”¹ It would be a rash thing for the present writer to dogmatize where such an experienced authority is diffident. That the manifest content of dreams can be influenced is indubitable; and more than this the writer is convinced that the affective quality can be to some extent modified by suggestion. But whether the attempt to control dreams without a radical sublimation of the unconscious processes would be a wise course is a question which we feel unable to answer. On the other hand there is considerable evidence to show that psycho-analytical treatment is attended by marked changes in dream tendencies. And the writer’s experience is that, at least, a marked improvement in dream quality may be achieved without deterioration in conscious life, if this is accompanied by the insight into unconscious processes such as psycho-analysis affords. Indeed, it seems reasonable on the basis of Freud’s theory to question whether any sublimation is real that is not attended by dream improvement.

(b) *Symbolism*.—The second point on which Jung differs from Freud is the question of symbolism. We have seen that the latter claims that certain operations have a common symbolic significance. We have refrained from giving an account of these so that the reader may interpret his dreams without being biased by the suggestion these contain. Jung cites the following dream of one of his patients. “I was going up a flight of stairs with my mother and sister. When we reached the top I was told that my sister was soon to have a child.” Now according to Freud, going upstairs has a common symbolic meaning. But Jung asks, “If I say that the stairs are a symbol, . . . whence do I obtain the right to regard the mother, the sister, and the child as concrete; that is, as not symbolic?”²

¹ Freud, op. cit., p. 492.

² Jung, op. cit., p. 301.

This objection is apparently unanswerable. In any case the procedure by thorough free association is in accord with the principles of both schools.

(c) *Finalism*.—This question is of great practical and theoretical importance. Jung fully admits the adequacy of the theory we have endeavoured to expound in the foregoing pages, as a *causal* explanation of dreams. It answers satisfactorily the questions, What is the nature of a dream, and how does it become to be what it is? But he contends that we must go further and ask, What is the dream's purpose? The answer that has been already given to this question, that it is to guard sleep, he regards not as untrue, but insufficient. The tendencies that are active in the dream are not fully defined in terms of their origin, but they are only fully understood when we take into account their ends or objects. This is what he means when he says that the *causal* explanation of dreams must be supplemented by the *final*. Every dream therefore may be interpreted in two ways, in terms of the past experience in which it finds its material, and also in terms of anticipated experience in which it finds its satisfaction. But Jung has weakened his contention by the introduction of moral distinctions into the realm of the unconscious. Both he and Freud have failed to take into account the "herd instinct." Now this instinct is just as egocentric and non-moral as the egotistic and sex instincts. It is only altruistic in its effects. The conflict between the herd instinct and the other two provides the basis for moral life as soon as selfconsciousness dawns. But the wolf that relinquishes private pursuits at the call of the pack does not make a moral choice. It is just a question of the relative strength of two impulses. This criticism affects mainly the theoretical consistency of Jung's position, but it is not without its bearings on the practical side. We shall understand this better if we take a concrete example. One of his patients related the following dream. "I am standing in a strange garden,

and pluck an apple from a tree. I look about cautiously to make sure that no one sees me.”¹ The dream was attended by the “feeling of having a bad conscience.” We will leave the causal explanation with just this remark that it revealed as wrong *but was not so regarded by the patient*. According to Jung this feeling of guilt was due to an unconscious moral impulse. “By disregarding these things he was really overlooking something in himself, for he possesses a moral standard and a moral need just like any other man.” We should prefer to explain the feeling of guilt as due to the activity of herd instinct.² The practical result of this distinction would be that he might have been right in spite of the feeling of guilt. As long as the conflict was on the level of subpersonal consciousness the unrecognized operation of this instinct would account for this feeling. But when the real nature of the conflict has been rendered explicit in the full light of personal consciousness then the man is capable of exercising real moral choice. Then he may rightly decide to do the act which had been the real cause of his guilty feeling, unless we hold that the herd is the final arbiter of right and wrong. But this brings us face to face with questions of ethics. And here we are compelled to side with Jung as against Freud.

Let us look at the problem in the light of another concrete incident. A man comes to a psycho-analyst for the treatment of psycho-sexual impotence, that is, sexual impotence due to mental causes. The man is freed from his disability by the treatment. Here, according to the Vienna school the treatment ends.

¹ Op. cit., p. 303. Readers who wish for further acquaintance with Jung's work would be well advised to *begin* with his “Analytical Psychology.”

² This does not mean that the existence of conscience is denied, or that it is merely the blind operation of herd instinct. Conscience operates only on the level of full selfconsciousness. It is not merely an emotion; nor is it a kind of moral “faculty.” It is the self passing moral *judgment* upon the self. In the case mentioned above there appears to be no real moral judgment, but only herd emotion.

It is no concern of the physician what the man does with his newly found freedom. He may wreck the life of some trusting girl, or help to swell the trade of the prostitute. But we ask, Can such a man be regarded as truly free when he is actuated by such impulses? Answer the question in which way we will we are face to face with moral issues. To ignore them is not to evade them. They cannot be evaded. To consider them is to grant the fundamental contentions which lie at the heart of Jung's position. For ourselves we cannot see how the question of mental health can be isolated from the question of moral well-being. We are quite aware that it may be a doctor's duty in what we may call the realm of physical medicine, to restore to health and continued depredation some sick scoundrel, but we cannot consider that in the realm of mental medicine a doctor has completed his cure, if he has left his patient with anti-social tendencies. What are really anti-social tendencies may perhaps be a question of debate, but it cannot be a question to be ignored.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

THE dream, it is claimed, is the *via regia* into the unconscious. We are now in a position, therefore, to pursue that road of discovery and explore those hidden processes of the mind. But the reader who wishes to form an impartial judgment on the nature of the processes will be well advised to defer the reading of this chapter till he has thoroughly analysed a few of his own dreams in the way we have described. The thorough analysis of a few dreams will be far more valuable and illuminating than the cursory examination of a larger number. To enable the reader to form such an unbiased judgment we have refrained hitherto from the consideration of the question of symbolism, and from any detailed consideration of the nature of the tendencies that find their satisfaction in dream activity. The key to the dream lies in free association. The association cannot be really *free* if it is influenced by preconceived theories. But with patience and practice there should be no insuperable difficulty in obtaining that state of drifting consciousness which is the prerequisite of really free association.

I. TYPES OF "UNCONSCIOUS" TENDENCY

Having made this suggestion let us turn to the considerations with which this chapter is concerned—the nature of the unconscious processes. The unconscious

consists, not of ideas or emotions, but of tendencies. It is true that psycho-analysts often use the terms "unconscious idea," etc., but we have seen that this usage is undesirable and we believe unnecessary. An unconscious idea is not an idea at all. It is simply a tendency. An unconscious emotion is not an emotion. It is sometimes described as a "pent up" emotion, and as such it plays a large part, as we shall see later, in one form of psycho-therapy. But "pent up" emotion will be better understood and described as a feeling of tension due to the unresolved conflict of tendencies. The tension is not unconscious. It is usually in the very focus of consciousness. But the tendencies that produce it may be unrecognized. Indeed, they may be beyond the possibility of recognition by means of volitional attention, and in this case they would belong to that realm which Freud has named the unconscious. If they can be recognized by voluntary attention they belong to the sphere of the preconscious. At the actual moment of recognition they are fully conscious.

The concern of psycho-analysis is chiefly with the tendencies that are described as unconscious. These fall into three classes. In the first class we have the tendency of which the subject is utterly unaware. As an example of this we may take the man who has an unconscious tendency to domineer over other people. It is quite possible for him to be utterly oblivious of such a tendency. It is the existence of this type of phenomena that limits the usefulness and effectiveness of self-analysis. Instance after instance of the domineering spirit may be provided to the man we are describing, but he will either fail to take note of them or explain them away by some agreeable, but unwitting subterfuge. This limitation of self-analysis, however, may be to some extent overcome by a knowledge of the tendencies that psycho-analysis has revealed in human nature generally. The second type of tendency which we would distinguish

is that in which the subject feels impelled towards some end, but he has no clear idea of what the end is. In such a case there is usually a feeling of restlessness and dissatisfaction, which often enough ends in a man having a smoke, a drink, or indulging in some other form of "dissipation." Frequently the origin of this feeling cannot be accounted for. This brings us to the third type of tendency we would distinguish—the tendency of unknown origin. As an example of this we may cite the case which Dr. Rivers discusses at length in his "Instinct and the Unconscious." It is a case of claustrophobia—fear of enclosed places. The patient had a morbid dread of closed rooms, tunnels and dug-outs. But he could give no account for this. Analysis subsequently revealed that its origin lay in a forgotten incident of childhood, when the patient had been the victim of a trying experience in an underground passage.

There are three types of tendency then which we must keep clearly in mind—the unknown tendency, the tendency with an unknown end, and the tendency of unknown origin. This classification is not strictly logical, being neither exhaustive nor exclusive, but it will serve to bring out the distinctions that are of practical importance. It is the third type that mainly concerns us. The criticisms of our social environment may enlighten us with regard to the first; and personal reflection may go a long way towards the elucidation of the second; but the question of the origin is hidden from our introspective gaze, and very frequently from the critical scrutiny of friend and foe alike. But the question is more obscure still. For very often when we are unaware of the real cause of a tendency we invent an explanation which may be personally but not psychologically satisfactory. To this process of invented explanation has been given the name of "rationalization."

2. RATIONALIZATION

This term is applied to that mental process by which we substitute an explanation that is personally agreeable for the real one which is uncongenial. This substitution is not deliberate. It is the effect of the general tendency to avoid the unpleasant. The explanation is given in all sincerity and is regarded as adequate and true. But more careful examination reveals its inadequacy.

In the last chapter the writer related a dream of his own. Up to a certain point the free associations were given in detail; after that they were abbreviated and generalized, on the ground of limitation of space. But a little reflection revealed that the real reason was an unwillingness to divulge certain private, personal memories. Another instance may be given from recent personal history. A few months ago my baby boy showed signs of digestive disorders. As these continued for some time my wife and I discussed carefully all the changes that we could remember having taken place in his dietary about the time of the onset of the trouble. Finding nothing that could account for it we set it down to some change in the quality of the milk he was getting. But as the trouble showed no signs of improving the doctor was called in. He was unable to suggest the cause till just as he was about to leave it occurred to my wife to mention that she had been giving the child rusks to eat. At once it was suspected that he had been swallowing these without proper mastication, and subsequent events amply proved this. But why did it not occur to either of us to mention the rusks when we were considering the details of his food? The answer to that question, we both recognized, was that we were pleased to think that he was now able to eat solid food, and it was much easier to give him a rusk than to prepare his liquid refreshment. To a third person the explana-

tion may seem patent and unavoidably obvious. But to quote the old proverb in a slightly altered form—there are none so blind as those who do not wish to see. If the reader examines his own recent history in the light of these remarks he will doubtless find abundant evidence of rationalization. The excuses we offer for our failings are often threadbare enough in the eyes of those to whom they are presented, though in our own they may appear respectable garments. To those who are prone to excuse-making psycho-analysis would suggest—apologize if necessary, but never make excuses. In all departments of human activity this rationalizing process may be seen at work, in religion, politics, commerce, medicine, and even in science. Jones gives an illustration from the sphere of medicine. Centuries ago, on the grounds of a mythical ætiology of hysteria certain drugs were prescribed for its treatment. These drugs are still used in various forms. “But the necessity of teachers of neurology to provide reasons to students for their treatment has led to the explanation being invented that the drugs act as ‘anti-spasmodics’—whatever that may mean.”¹

Actors, ministers, teachers, surgeons, physicians, artists, poets, may all give their reasons for the vocations they have accepted. But these reasons will be very different from those crude primitive tendencies which psycho-analysis claims to be the motive power of their various activities. These tendencies are indignantly denied and wrathfully repudiated. They link up the finest and noblest achievements of human nature to its basest and most degraded forms. Whether psycho-analysis is right in doing this must be established by strictly impartial scientific enquiry. There is no need for hysterics. If the worst that has ever been “discovered” by this new method of inquiry is true, it is rather a ground for hope than for despair and disgust, for the virtues of the saint are but the sublimated

¹ “Papers on Psycho-analysis,” p. 14.

passions whose perversion has produced the sinner. If the contentions of psycho-analysis are utterly wrong, if there are no such tendencies in human nature, then there is no need for alarm, for ideas are powerless, so modern psychology tells us, unless they are the expression of tendencies. This does not mean that any Tom, Dick, or Harry should be allowed to exploit the method any more than he is allowed to trade in drugs or dynamite. The only argument against the prosecution of this inquiry that remains, is that it is better to "let sleeping dogs lie." But the answer is obvious. The dogs are by no means all asleep. The world is full of snarling destroying passions. And those that are asleep, how long will they sleep? In short, our contention is this—if these tendencies do exist in human nature, it is better that we should know it that we may have at least a clear conception of the problem that we have to solve; if they do not exist, then not all the psycho-analysts in the world can create them. These considerations do not prove that the contentions of psycho-analysis are right. They are not intended to do that. They are intended only as preliminary considerations which will enable us to bring to the subject a judgment that is as unbiased as possible.

3. TENDENCIES. MODES OF ACTIVITY

Before we inquire what is the nature of these repressed tendencies it will help us to get a clearer understanding of the problems we have to consider if we glance briefly at the part tendencies play in the phenomena of behaviour. Everything we do or say or think is the outcome of the interaction of tendency with environment. The most fleeting fancy that finds a momentary lodgment in the mind is the product of such interaction. The environment is not passively accepted, nor does it mechanically determine the forms of mental activity.

Particular features of the environment are selected for special attention, and particular relations are selected for special modification. This selection is determined by the psychical tendencies of the organism.

But these tendencies or cravings or urges, as they are sometimes called, are not to be conceived as existing in isolation from the cognitive and affective processes of the mind. They constitute the dynamic factor in all psychical activity. By widening McDougall's definition of instinct to include acquired tendencies, and these having ideational or conceptual ends,¹ we obtain a conception of the phenomena which is psychologically satisfactory. A tendency is a psycho-physical disposition which determines, firstly, the direction of attention to specific kinds of situations, and, secondly, the nature of the affective and conational responses that are thereby evoked. In other words our interests determine the manner of our response to the world of things and thoughts in which we live.

Tendencies may be classified as innate or acquired. The important point for us to bear in mind is that the latter are always modifications of the former. New interests do not suddenly appear from nowhere. If this were possible psychology would be impossible. It is true apparent exceptions to this rule are by no means uncommon. There are occasions when new impulses, and indeed new personalities, which seem to find no explanation in previous experience, do suddenly emerge. But we must give up all hope of explaining

¹ This use of the word "tendency" is, perhaps, wider than the usual. What we wish to emphasize is the conative element in all mental process. All our life is governed by an interaction with environment, determined partly by the nature of that environment and partly by the more or less specific and plastic types of conation with which the individual is endowed. In *man* there is an *impulse to attempt to co-ordinate these tendencies*. Graham Wallas calls it "Thought Instinct." It is this apparently that Freud refers to by the name of "Reality Principle." We may deny it the name of Instinct, we may prefer to call it reason, but we can hardly deny that it is a *dynamic* factor of consciousness.

such phenomena, if we do not believe that we shall ultimately be able to explain them as modifications of innate dispositions in the course of their interaction with a changing environment.

The question now arises, In what respect is a tendency modifiable? Fundamentally it cannot be altered. It may be strengthened by exercise, or weakened by lack of exercise. The occasion of its stimulation may vary as the result of experience. Take the case of a horse which shies at an old coat lying on the roadside. His master brings him back, and quietly but firmly insists on his facing the dreaded object, till at last he sniffs at it with curiosity and finally becomes indifferent. This does not mean that the fear-flight instinct is eradicated. The horse may still be afraid of steam-rollers, and no matter how well he is trained it will always be possible for some situation to occur which will stimulate this disposition. What actually happens is that objects acquire new affective meanings; they stimulate a different tendency or combination of tendencies. It is most important that it should be clearly understood that a tendency does not *discriminate*. If it is stimulated at all it can only *identify*. Thus for the fear instinct of a nervous horse, an old coat lying by the side of the road, or a heap of stones, or a crouching beast are all one and the same thing. They have the same affective meaning. Their resemblances are perceived but their differences are ignored. This is what is meant by the process of identification, a process of the utmost importance because of the part it plays in primitive thought, both of the individual and of the race. "The tendencies of the primitive mind—as observed in children, in savages, in wit, in dreams, in insanity and other products of unconscious functioning—to identify different objects and fuse together different ideas, to note the resemblances and not the differences, is a universal and most characteristic feature, although only those familiar with the material in question will

appreciate the colossal scale on which it is manifested. It impresses one as being one of the most fundamental and primordial attributes of the mind."¹ In its pure form it is manifested only on the level of pure instinctive activity. When learning by experience is introduced the factor of discrimination appears. This factor manifests its maximum of activity in the deliberate reflection of selfconsciousness. At the same time it is not strictly correct to say that identification is the perception of resemblance. It is rather the uniform and active response to the common element perceived in varying situations and objects.

Identification is the basis of symbolism. But symbol formation only begins on the ideational level of consciousness. The coat lying on the roadside is not the symbol of a wild beast to the horse. Symbol formation involves the substitution of a relatively simple and agreeable object, activity or image for a relatively complex or disagreeable one. But that substitution is always determined by some underlying identity of response witting or unwitting. Thus a box can never be a symbol of the idea of liberty. The affective responses are incompatible. But the wind can be and is used as a symbol of freedom, while the colloquial expression, "to be in a box," is frequently used to express the idea of absence of freedom. This identity of response may be quite unrecognized. Thus everybody recognizes the sceptre as the symbol of power, but how many have recognized the underlying connection between the two? This absence of recognition is considered by psycho-analysts to be the mark of true symbolism. Whether this restriction of the meaning of the term is legitimate may be questioned, but there can be no doubt that the distinction is an important one. Both in dream activity and in waking life it enables tendencies to find a satisfaction that would be denied if the real significance of the symbol were clearly

¹ Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

understood. Interpreted in this sense the symbol is at once a means of expression and concealment just as the signs and passwords of freemasonry are a means of communication between the initiated, while outsiders are left in complete ignorance. This symbolic activity involves, therefore, the conflict of two tendencies or groups of tendencies, and is a kind of sublimation of energies of which the censor cannot approve. When it is carried to extremes it is an indication of extensive and deep-rooted conflicts that are exhausting psychic energy in useless strife.

One of the most striking features of this activity is the similarity of its products in widely different times and places. This similarity has been explained by Jung as due to inheritance of archaic thought forms. But with Jones we feel that a more satisfactory explanation is to be found in regarding them as created afresh in each individual through the operation of similar tendencies. It is this uniformity that constitutes both the value and the temptation of the activity. If dreams could be reduced to the complication of universal symbols their interpretation would be a matter of relative simplicity. But even Freud admits that images that usually have a definite symbolic meaning may vary in their significance and on occasions must be taken at their face value.

Restricting the use of the term, it is not surprising that psycho-analysts find in sex life the most fruitful field for the growth of symbols. Even those who would question the accuracy of many of the particular applications of the theory would acknowledge this. Sex instincts are so strong, and at the same time the object of so much concealment that it is only to be expected that they should give rise to varied and extensive symbol formations. To convince us of this no extensive investigation into the realms of anthropology and philology is necessary; a frank examination of everyday experience is sufficient. The results of such

research would no doubt be a revelation to most people as to the extent and variety of this type of psychical activity. But while ready to accept such evidence and ready to grant the general truth of such contentions it is very probable that most people will object to the legitimacy of defining the symbol as an agreeable image substituted for an associated but disagreeable one. With this criticism we agree. The term covers the substitution of a relatively simple and concrete image for a relatively complex and abstract one. At the same time it cannot be too plainly emphasized that it is the former type of symbolism that is of especial value in the exploration of the hidden processes of the mind, and that we need to be on our guard against the strong tendency to explain every instance as an example of the second type.

Then again while the symbol itself remains constant over considerable periods of the history of the individual or of the race, its affective meaning may vary to a very great extent. This development is a psychical fact that demands, we maintain, more consideration than orthodox Freudians are usually willing to grant. Without taking this aspect of the question into consideration we are not in a position to estimate rightly the significance of the symbol either for the individual or the race. We are prepared to admit that the secret of the capacity of a given symbol powerfully to stimulate the mind lies in its appeal to one or other of the great primary instincts, but the *stability* of the symbol lies in its capacity to arouse the activity of an *organized system* of interests. And the question of primary importance is, What is the *present* significance of the symbol, what is the nature of the interests it evokes at the present moment? If these are in harmony with the main interests of the individual or society then the question of origin is of very secondary importance. But if it lacks such harmony and therefore exerts upon the mind a tyrannical influence, it may be desirable to lay bare its origin

and history in order to secure emancipation from its baneful effects. For instance, it may be possible to trace the ultimate origin of the Christian eucharist or mass to some crude, primitive and barbaric custom. But the question of primary importance is, What is its significance for the individuals and communities that celebrate it to-day, what is the nature of the interests that it calls into play, and of the cravings that it claims to satisfy? Are these interests in keeping with a harmonious development of the personality, and do they subserve a more effective and satisfactory adaptation to environment? It must be borne in mind that what we are concerned to discover is not, the theories or theology by which the custom is justified, but the nature of the affective and conational processes involved.

When a symbol fails to provide a means of such adaptation as we have described, it is really a symptom of some hidden conflict. Let us look for a moment at the case of a man who through contact with modern thought finds some symbol of his religious faith, some item of his creed or practice called in question. Suppose, for the sake of illustration, he is brought to realize that his belief in eternal punishment is really an indefensible gratification of an unrecognized cruelty tendency. What possibilities are open to such a man? In the first place he may relinquish his old belief and leave the tendency unsatisfied. But if the tendency is strong this course will result in unbearable restlessness. In the second place he may seek a new symbol, perhaps in socialism, whereby he may gratify the tendency in a more legitimate manner by denouncing and exposing the wicked oppressions of the capitalist. In so far as this provides a more satisfactory adaptation it is an instance of sublimation. On the other hand the symbol may be conserved by a modified interpretation which calls into play a modified set of tendencies which do not conflict with his developed moral judgment. In this

case the symbol is retained, but in an altered form. Lastly he may defy the criticisms of modern thought and cling to his old belief, probably affirming it with a greater vehemence than ever. In this case the symbol has become a symptom of mental conflict. Such an instance affords insight into the mechanism of the neurosis as Freud has explained it. It represents a regression from the attitude of independent reasoning to a relatively infantile attitude of unreasoning submission to authority, and the fixation of interest upon a static symbol. Of this phenomena we shall have more to say later. Meanwhile we trust that sufficient has been said to show how important the subject is, if adequate insight is to be gained into the hidden and subtle working of the human mind. We have refrained from giving examples of the common symbols that occur in dreams because we believe the reader will be more satisfied if he discovers these for himself. But it must be clearly understood that this will involve taking the dream piece by piece, and image by image, and with great patience submitting each to a thorough process of "free association," carefully following the instructions that were given in the last chapter.

4. PLEASURE-PAIN PRINCIPLE AND REALITY PRINCIPLE

In the last section we endeavoured to show how the process of identification in interaction with the endopsychic censor produces the phenomena of symbolism. Identification is due to the stimulation of the same tendency by different "objects." But tendencies may not only be stimulated, they may also be satisfied or denied satisfaction. This brings us to the consideration of what Freud has called the Pleasure-Pain and Reality principles. As these terms have been usually defined it seems to the present writer that the former is open to

many of the criticisms that were passed on the pleasure-pain theories of the Utilitarians. But the distinction, while it was not discovered by the psycho-analytical school, has received at its hands something like its rightful position as a factor in mental development, and we feel it is not impossible to state it in terms that obviate the criticisms referred to.

Primarily, a tendency is a psychic "structure" determining a mode of reaction. The successful functioning of a tendency is attended by a feeling of pleasure, while unsuccessful functioning is an occasion of pain. This affective experience normally subserves a more effective functioning of the disposition. "But the satisfaction, which attends the successful operation of an instinct, as pleasant, may itself become the object of 'desire.' In this case an 'acquired appetite on the ideational level can be formed in connexion with instinctive activity.'"¹ As an example of this Dr. Drever takes an illustration from school life. "The teacher who always tries to make school work interesting by effort on his part, to attract the pupils to attend by means of story, picture, and, in short, all the tricks of the 'show lesson,' not merely develops mental 'flabbiness' in these pupils, but also develops the 'appetite' for such lessons. Let us say the subject is geography. There is developed in the class an 'interest in geography,' but it is an 'interest disposition of the appetite order.' It fastens upon the pleasant amusing parts of the lesson, is impatient of everything not coming under these categories, and ends in a 'craving' for mere amusement which becomes more and more fastidious and difficult to satisfy, and which is accompanied, on the intellectual side, by a greater and greater tendency towards passivity in the mere enjoyment of the experiences."² Such is the nature of the working of the pleasure-pain principle.

¹ Drever, "Instinct in Man." Cambridge, p. 254.

² p. 255. Op. cit.

Freud is inclined to see in the reality principle a genetic development from this. For ourselves we should feel inclined to reverse the order of development. As a matter of fact all psychical activity, we believe, involves the three phases of cognition, conation and affective experience. We may start with a craving or tendency, but it is a craving for something however vaguely defined, and it is conditioned by a feeling of pain or pleasure. But the isolation of pleasure-pain as an end is the product of later experience, which is itself the outcome of a reality activity. But what Freud apparently understands by these terms, is that each tendency is concerned with its own satisfaction and is indifferent to the gratification of others (pleasure-pain principle) but it is necessary for the good of the whole that these tendencies should be co-ordinated and regulated to this end (reality principle). "The function of the latter," says Jones, "is to adapt the organism to the exigencies of reality, to subordinate the imperious demand for immediate gratification, and to replace this by a more distant but a more permanently satisfactory one. It is thus influenced by social, ethical, and other external considerations that are ignored by the earlier principle. It can, however, only guide and control the pleasure principle, adapting this to the environment ; it can never abrogate its activity."¹ On this statement interpreted in conjunction with the above exposition we have no adverse criticism to pass. Reality then includes both tendency and environment. Every conflict is the outcome of the clash of these two principles—the attempted gratification of one interest or set of interests at the expense of the rest, the turning away from reality in the quest for pleasure or the avoidance of pain.

Another distinction of great importance which Freud makes, which depends on the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of tendency is that between primary and secondary

¹ Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

process. Jones has brought out this distinction very clearly. "The infant finds by experience that satisfaction of a given need—e.g., hunger—is associated with a certain perception—e.g., the sight of food. The recurrence of this need therefore brings with it the desire to reproduce the perception associated with satisfaction of it. It is probable that at first this may occur by regression of mental processes so that a hallucinatory perception is produced. Experience, however, soon teaches that this method is inadequate permanently to still the need, and that in their capacity in this respect there is an important difference between perceptions externally evoked and those internally evoked. Internal perceptions are adequate only when they are durable, as in the hallucinations of the psychoses. The psychical energy corresponding with the need therefore sets in action further groups of mental processes, the function of which is to modify the environment in such a way as to bring about an externally evoked perception of the kind desired: for instance the child cries until it is fed." The process concerned with imaginary gratification has been designated "primary" and that which is concerned with real gratification has been called "secondary." We doubt whether the terminology is entirely satisfactory, for the reasons stated above, but there can be no doubt as to the importance of the distinction. All too often the "psychic energies" are dissipated through the primary system in day-dreams and fancies when they should be working through the secondary system to procure more effective adaptation to the environment. When this tendency is carried too far there ensues one of those many forms of mental illnesses which are roughly distinguished in popular thought as "nervous breakdown" or "insanity." But in normal lives we can frequently find signs of this experience in worry, traces of hysteria, mild forms of compulsion and obsession. "Neuroses constitute, per-

haps, the most widely spread form of disease. Persons quite unaffected in this way certainly comprise the minority of the general population. The high-frequency incidence of the neuroses is commonly under-estimated through a number of considerations being incorrectly appreciated. A large proportion of cases never reach medical inspection at all. Many patients with obsessions for instance, do not regard their position as being strictly pathological and amenable to medical treatment, but struggle along as best they can, attributing their troubles to personal peculiarities. Others are too ashamed of the ridiculousness or of the unpleasant content of their obsessions to bring themselves to seek advice. Similar remarks apply to the numerous cases of sexual perversion and inversion (the latter condition alone is said to be present in two per cent of the population), of anaesthesia and impotency, and of criminality of a neurotic origin. Then should be borne in mind the tremendous frequency of drug habits and excessive drinking, the neurotic basis of which is now known. There is further the large number of people suffering from what may be called social maladjustment, consisting in inadaptability, inefficiency, incapacity to meet situations, abnormally intense fear of death or of poverty, hopelessness or even despair and so on ; it is now known that factors similar to those present in the neuroses are also in action in these cases. The appalling roll of yearly suicides—the least frequent outcome of such states of mind—should alone warn us against estimating too lightly these more social forms of neurosis.”¹ We have taken the liberty of quoting at length these words of Dr. Ernest Jones in the hope that they may reach a different circle from that to which they were primarily addressed. We have quoted them for three reasons: In the first place, to show the extent and variety of the effects of the breakdown of the reality-principle, in the

¹ Jones, “ Treatment of the Neuroses.” Baillière, Tindall and Cox, 1920.

second, to strike a blow at the tendency to regard such cases as shirkers, slackers, or even criminals, or on the other hand to regard them with a helpless and demoralizing pity; and finally, to encourage such sufferers to seek relief along sound scientific lines of insight into the mental mechanisms which underlie their troubles. In the more severe and long-standing cases competent advice should be sought, but in those milder forms from which few of us are free, patient and courageous effort to understand the hidden mind processes will result in a more effective adaptation to the demands of life.

5. CONFLICT OF TENDENCIES

From the foregoing it will be realized how important it is that we should discover, if possible, the factors that are at work in bringing about the failure of adaptation. These are to be found, according to psychoanalysis, in the conflicts, and especially the hidden conflicts of the mind. Hitherto we have spoken of tendencies very largely as if they operated in entire independence of one another, and it is true that each tendency is concerned only with its own satisfaction. But in its quest for an object a given tendency may light on one which, at the same time stimulates another tendency, possibly an opposing one. For instance, curiosity and repulsion may both be stimulated by one and the same thing. What is the result? One of the interests may apparently triumph, and the other be defeated. But the issue is not the same as if the defeated impulse had never been aroused. The object becomes all the more repulsive because of the repressed fascination, or all the more compelling because of the latent activity of the apparently defeated disgust. The result is, that there is a more or less permanent "fixa-

tion " of interest on the object. This is what is known as a *complex*, a term which figures very prominently in psycho-analytical literature. A complex is the fixation of interest on some object through the operation of a counter interest. Such fixation, because of its painful character, is usually more or less repressed and, indeed, may be so completely repressed as to be inaccessible to ordinary processes of self-conscious introspection. But the issues of the conflict may not be nearly so simple as this. The relative strengths of the opposing interests may be so nearly matched that the outcome is a compromise or compromise formation as it is usually called. Symbols, interpreted in the narrower sense indicated above, are instances of this phenomenon. So also are the symptoms of the neurotic. If we take the two tendencies just mentioned, the mind may turn away from the object in sheer disgust, but the curiosity compels it to find some other object resembling the original one in some respect, but without the strongly repulsive features. A miser's interest in gold is a commonly cited example of such a compromise formation. The sovereign of pre-war days inspired in most people a feeling which the pound note of to-day is quite incapable of awakening. Its value in the world market was only a rationalization, for that value was not a matter of vital concern to the average individual in those days. Healey in "Misconduct and Mental Conflicts," gives a number of cases of kleptomania in children, which a mental analysis revealed to be simply a compromise formation, of which the underlying conflict was predominantly sexual.

On the other hand if a tendency runs counter to that organized system of tendencies known as the "social self" it may be converted into its direct opposite. In this case we have what is called a "reaction formation." A hypersensitiveness to cruelty may be a reaction formation to the tendency towards cruelty. The converted drunkard usually affords us another example

of this process, indeed religious conversions are often just an extensive system of such reaction formations.

These formations, both compromise and reaction may have real social value, but the danger, even in such cases, is that they may exercise a tyrannical and obsessional influence to the detriment of other interests.

But the most important consequence of conflict is dissociation, whereby interests and groups of interests are repressed and rendered inaccessible to conscious control, with the result that we often do things without knowing the real reason for our action, or we act under a sense of inexorable necessity, or we stand helpless before a task that is well within the compass of our powers, although we may be ignorant of these facts because of the activity of the rationalizing tendency. It is the business of psycho-analysis, by means of free association, to lay bare the hidden roots of these psychical growths that the tree of life may be freed from their parasitic depredations.

And now before we come to the consideration of the nature of the tendencies which are involved in these conflicts, let us briefly consider a question which may possibly have arisen in the mind of the reader, especially if he is acquainted with ordinary psycho-analytical literature. Much has been said about tendencies, impulses and interests, but very little about affects, feelings and emotions. In answer to this we would say first of all, that these terms are frequently used in a way that the ordinary psychologist cannot approve. And in the second place, that while we recognize that the conative aspect cannot be isolated from the affective, yet we regard the latter rather as giving colour and warmth to life, while it is in the former that we find the dynamic of its movement. It is the function of the artist to reproduce the colour and warmth as well as the movement; it is the chief business of the scientist to explain the movement. The essential thing is the

tendency. In emphasizing this, while we have departed somewhat from the lines of orthodox exposition, we have been true, we believe, to the guiding ideas which Freud has stressed in the reality principle, and emphasized still more strongly in the claim that the therapeutic aim of psycho-analysis is the "overcoming of resistance."

6. INSTINCTIVE TENDENCIES

We have seen that all behaviour is determined by tendencies, and that the tendencies of mature life are simply modifications of those that belong to earlier days. In spite of apparent exceptions we must work on this principle if we are ever to achieve understanding of the problem of human behaviour. Tendencies are not suddenly thrust upon us from the outside. The question then, we must consider, is, What are the tendencies with which we are born? What are those innate psycho-physical dispositions which determine the direction of attention and the response of the organism? These are the instincts as defined by McDougall. The question resolves itself then into an enquiry into the nature of the instinct tendencies.¹

Freud has classified these as belonging to two main groups—Ego and Sex Tendencies. Some thinkers prefer a threefold classification, distinguishing a third group under the name of Herd Instincts. The biological function of these groups of impulses is to be found in the preservation of the individual, of the race,

¹ It is only possible to consider this most important question in a very brief fashion. The reader who is concerned to give the matter fuller consideration may be advised to read McDougall's "Introduction to Social Psychology," Dreyer's "Instinct in Man," River's "Instinct and the Unconscious," Tansley's "New Psychology and Life," and Trotter's "Herd Instinct in Peace and War."

and of society respectively. From this point of view we are inclined to recognize the separation of the herd instincts as desirable, and with Trotter to regard these as a most important source of repressing activity. With this writer we are inclined to agree further that while psycho-analysts have given a great deal of attention to the *repressed* tendencies, not sufficient consideration has been given to the nature of the repressing dynamic. It is true that these are usually more accessible in the nature of the case, since they are not repressed, to introspection. But the repression may take place upon what we may call the instinctive level of consciousness, and its true nature thus escape our observation. The practical importance of this may be seen in such a case as that already cited of one of Jung's patients (p. 54).

But while we recognize the value of such a classification we are convinced that a simple enumeration of the instincts such as that given by Dr. McDougall and the rather fuller one given by Dr. Drever is preferable. An examination of Tansley's attempt to bring these into the categories of the threefold classification confirms this preference.¹ McDougall's list of the instinct tendencies is as follows: Flight, Pugnacity, Repulsion, Curiosity, Self-assertion, Self-abasement, Parental Instinct, Reproduction (sex), Feeding, Gregariousness, Acquisition, Construction. "Taking the list, then, without criticism, and at its face value, we find that the instincts of self-assertion and self-abasement form the basis of the ego-complex, and the instinct of gregariousness that of the herd complex, while the instinct of reproduction and parental instinct lie at the root of the sex complex. Of the remaining seven "simple instincts" all are concerned in the first place with man's relation to his material environment, and at the same time are so intimately connected with the ego that they may almost

¹ See "New Psychology," Chap. XVII. The Primitive Instincts.

be said to form part of the structure of the ego-complex."¹ He remarks further that these instincts "constantly interact and modify one another." But we would point out that many, if not all, of the instincts which he regards as forming the "ego-complex," are so frequently employed in the service of the sex and herd complexes that the classification loses much of its value. Take for instance, curiosity. This tendency is so frequently sexually determined that Freud apparently regards it as primarily and fundamentally sexual, and that its non-sexual manifestations are sublimations of, or reactions from, its original nature. And this is true to a greater or less extent of practically all the other instincts of the ego-complex, even of the two which are regarded as its main determinants—the self-assertion and self-abasement tendencies. McDougall himself has argued that what Freud calls Sadism and Masochism are self-assertion and self-abasement sexually conditioned.² The critical question is, Are these tendencies primarily directed towards ends that *can rightly* be considered as sexual or to ends that are truly non-sexual? A similar problem arises, though perhaps not to the same extent, in connexion with the herd instinct. For this reason we prefer to follow the method of McDougall rather than to adopt either of the more general classifications. The only satisfactory method of settling the issue between Freud and his opponents is to begin with definitely recognized tendencies and carefully trace their history and manifestations both in normal and abnormal minds. But a preliminary difficulty lies in the way—the connotation of the term sexual. As is well known Freud uses this term to cover phenomena which were previously considered as non-sexual.

¹ Op. cit., p. 181. Tansley uses the term "complex" in a wider sense than the one in which we have used it. For him, it is "a system of associated mental elements, the stimulation of any one of which tends to call the rest into consciousness through the medium of their common effect."

² See "Social Psychology," p. 396, Footnote.

We have now reached the storm centre of psycho-analysis—the rôle of sex in human behaviour. There is an increasing recognition of the mental mechanisms that we have endeavoured to describe in the previous chapter, but Freud's conception of sex and the part it plays in the determination of behaviour has proved a "rock of offence" to great numbers. To describe anything as sexual is for many minds synonymous with calling it "unclean" or "base." Probably this difficulty will never be utterly overcome because of the close physiological association of the sexual organs with those of excretion. The demand of scientific enquiry for an impartial and detached attitude finds here its most difficult problem. It must contend with two opposing impulses, the one of a morbid curiosity which battens on the unpleasant, and the other of a loathing revulsion. The way in which Freud's theories have been received constitutes one of the most powerful pieces of evidence as to their substantial truth. It has also been urged against his theories that they are based upon a one-sided examination of abnormal cases. But in other departments of the biological sciences the value of pathological study is universally recognized. While we do not wish to give the impression that we regard this question as finally settled, still less that we regard the sexual as playing a *principal* part in every mental conflict, we are bound to admit that the evidence seems to us overwhelming as to the importance of this tendency, and we are prepared to find, because of its biological importance, because of ordinary observation of ordinary life, and finally and chiefly, because of the very constitution of the mind, that it is a factor of greater or less significance in every mental reaction. There is no need to emphasize the biological value. The whole race owes its existence to this impulse. It would be natural therefore, to expect a correlative *psychological* importance. With regard to the last point, we need only say that the conception of psychical

activity which we have endeavoured to expound in these pages necessarily involves this result. Every "moment" of consciousness is a synthesis of *all* the preceding moments in a new integration with the present "situation." There may be dissociation, but the dissociation is never complete. The existence of a repressed complex implies some degree of activity. In other words we react to every situation with the *whole* self, though possibly not with a perfectly *united* self, and that *self* is a sexually conditioned self. The second consideration we have only mentioned, because this book is addressed primarily to the general reader rather than to the purely scientific one. In this connexion it needs only to be pointed out that a man can never entirely forget that he is a man, or a woman that she is a woman. We react to members of the opposite sex in a perceptibly different way from the members of our own. Probably the most detached professor that ever addressed a class cannot regard his male and female students with quite the same feelings, and even if he did it would still be a fact of profound sexual significance. But there is no need to labour the point. It is obvious.

But difference of opinion may arise as to the degree of the influence of this factor. The study of "War Neuroses," mental disorders due to the abnormal strain of modern warfare, has led many to the conclusion that sex plays a far less important part in the production of various types of mental disorganization than Freud maintains. Here, at any rate, it is claimed that the factor of outstanding significance is the repression of the "fear-flight" instinct. The instinctive reaction in the presence of danger is to run away or hide. If this tendency is thwarted or repressed, there comes a state of strain which may be so intense as to cause anxiety neurosis, or some form of hysterical anæsthesia or paralysis or convulsive action, or possibly of mental collapse. The therapeutic methods that were based on

this conception by men like Myers, Brown, Rivers, and MacCurdy were attended with such satisfactory results that we are bound to acknowledge that the theory has real worth. In fact there can be no doubt that the continued repression of any strong instinctive tendency must gravely affect the manner of adaptation to reality. But the question arises, Is this repression sufficient to account for the mental disorganization that is to be found in such cases as we are now considering? We do not presume to be competent to decide when authorities differ, but there are one or two considerations that are worth noting even by those of us who are not directly interested in the problems that the war neuroses present. Dr. Rivers has shown that these fall into two classes, anxiety and hysteria, and that the first class consisted mainly of officers while the second included chiefly men of the rank and file. The reason for this he finds chiefly in the nature of the training to which these two sections of the army were submitted, and in the very different degrees of responsibility that devolved upon them. In the case of officers, initiative and enterprise were stimulated, while in the rank and file submission to authority was the guiding principle. Now the symptoms of the nervous trouble in both cases resemble a regression to an infantile state, a characteristic which has been shown to be a mark of all other neuroses. There is no need to regard this statement as reflecting in a derogatory manner on those who have suffered from this distressing trouble. It is the way we all react to situations that impose too great a tax upon our strength and resources. We have a picture of the hysterical mode of reaction in the child who is ordered by his mother to take a pill. He tries and fails not because the pill is too large, but because he involuntarily inhibits the action of the swallowing muscles. He may make no effort to swallow, asserting that it is impossible. In such a case we have a kind of temporary psychic paralysis. Or on the other hand, to demonstrate the

reality of his goodwill he may make repeated and strenuous but ineffectual efforts to comply. Analysis of such cases reveals that such actions are really an unconscious attempt to perform some action in the doing of which the individual has previously failed. It is as though he were trying to demonstrate to his superiors (the parent substitute) that he is trying his utmost, but that the thing is utterly beyond his powers. In the case of anxiety we have a different picture. When a child is in difficulty he turns for help and guidance to his parents. If for any reason, for instance, lack of sympathy or fear of revealing his weakness, he is unable to do this, there ensues a state of anxiety. Now as we shall see presently, Freud regards this parent relationship as a normal feature of sexual development. If such an interpretation is correct, we see that the repression of the danger instincts is only a match set to the fuel. Keeping to this metaphor we may use it to explain Freud's theory of nervous disorders. Every mental conflagration is due to three factors: the nature of the fuel (congenital endowment), the way it is prepared (sexual history) and the kindling flame (current conflict produced by the repression of some impulse, not necessarily sexual). It is obvious that nothing can be done for the patient in respect of his native endowment. It may be possible by certain methods to extinguish the fire, but if nothing else is done it is obvious that the fire may soon break out afresh. The only satisfactory way is to arrange the materials that they may not so readily take fire from every flying spark. This means that the history of the individual must be reconstructed. In one sense this is obviously impossible, but in so far as that history stands for a fixation of interest on childish objects it is possible to a very great extent. To the degree that psycho-analysis has been able to achieve this it has fulfilled the old prophecy,—I will restore unto you the years that the locust hath eaten.

We must now consider the nature and development of the tendencies which are comprised under the activity of the sex instinct. We shall endeavour as simply and briefly as possible to explain Freud's ideas, not laying them down as final and incontrovertible, but as a body of doctrine for which there is a tremendous, and ever-increasing amount of evidence. Many refuse to accept that evidence because they do not find it confirmed by an examination of those mental processes which are open to ordinary introspection. Such criticism is entirely beside the point, since the evidence referred to is not derived from such an examination of superficial consciousness. There are three ways in which Freud may be shown to be wrong, if he is wrong. Either it must be demonstrated that free association is not a reliable method of enquiry, or that the method has been wrongly used, or that the results of its application are wrongly or imperfectly stated by psycho-analysts. With the first objection we have already briefly dealt in the last chapter. With regard to the other two, it remains only to say that those who have given the method a thorough and impartial examination are substantially agreed as to the results, though like Jung they may seek to explain them as symbolic. For ourselves, we believe that the right attitude is the open mind, taking each case on its merits, examining it with scientific detachment, bearing in mind the undoubted fact of resistance, and that the overcoming of one resistance complex does not preclude the possibility of further and even deeper resistances. Further it must be borne in mind that resistance is not a monopoly of the patient, the analyst himself has his own complexes and it is, therefore, regarded as desirable that he should himself submit to analytical examination.

The main difficulty of Freud's theory is that, as far as we have been able to discover, he nowhere lays down any clear criterion of sexual activity. He does not, of course, restrict it to the mere function of reproduction,

or even to an interest in the organs that are directly involved in such activity. Both its object and its aim are subject to considerable variation. In this respect he has certainly not departed from the common usage of the word. Everybody recognizes the lover's caress, or the treasuring of a handkerchief or a lock of hair, as due to the activity of sexual interest. But Freud traces this interest at work in phenomena where it has not generally been recognized, especially in its infantile forms.

The *first* stage of this interest is called the auto-erotic. The new-born child is concerned almost entirely with its own bodily feelings, hunger, warmth, internal discomforts of various kinds. At first these are but vaguely differentiated, if differentiated at all. The external world scarcely exists as far as it is concerned. But gradually the interests are more clearly defined. It obviously obtains satisfaction by sucking its nourishment, and a sense of pleasurable relief through the processes of excretion, and another source of gratification, which we must distinguish from the first, in sucking its fist or some other part of its body. In these two latter tendencies Freud finds the origin of sexual interests. Later these interests are more or less successfully drained off into other channels, that is, they are sublimated. But the point for us to keep in mind is, that *the object of earliest sex interest is the self*.

The *second* stage is reached when the interest is turned to external objects. And the objects of most profound emotional significance to the child are soon discovered to be the mother and father, and especially the former. This relation, even for the young child, is exceedingly complex. No doubt the part the parents play in the provision of nourishment is an important factor, but probably far more important is the emotional atmosphere with which they surround the child, and to deny that these emotions are very largely sex-determined is to deny that there is any essential psychical differences

between motherhood and fatherhood. And very early the child reveals a different mode of response to these parental variations. It is a matter of common observation that generally speaking there is a marked preference on the part of boys for the mother and, on the part of the girls, though perhaps not to the same extent, for the father. This difference of response is very much obscured by the complexity of the factors of the relationship. But psycho-analysis claims that it is a natural and extremely important stage in the development of sex interest. In the case of the boy, the mother is the object of a tender regard which is not extended to the father, while the latter is regarded with feelings of hostility and jealousy. Later on these feelings are repressed or sublimated and therefore forgotten. When they are repressed they form what is called the *Œdipus complex*, from the Greek legend according to which Œdipus, by a cruel fate, becomes the unwitting destroyer of his father and marries his mother. This complex, it is claimed, is one of the most important factors in the production of the neuroses. It is easy to see how such tendencies may be over-stimulated by sentimental indulgence on the part of the mother and stern repression on the part of the father. The emancipation from the parent relationship is rarely complete. Again and again the mode of a man's response to his environment is determined to a very large extent by this factor. For instance he identifies himself with his father, and acts as his father would in such a situation, or he identifies some third person with his father, and reacts to him as though he were his father, or again when things go wrong he may turn to some one for comfort and help as he turned to his mother in his childhood days. As an illustration of the part that the relation to parents plays in the production of nervous disorders we will quote a particularly interesting case which is given by Dr. Ernest Jones.

It was the case of "an unmarried American lady of

twenty-six. She was the eldest daughter and had always been passionately devoted to her mother, regularly taking her side in parental quarrels. Since the age of fourteen she had been obsessed by the fear that her mother, who for many years had suffered from chronic heart disease, might die. She had never left home until, at the age of twenty, she went to an educational centre some two hundred miles away. Here she reproached herself for having left her mother, whom she had always tended.

“One evening, shortly after receiving a rather bad report of her mother’s health, there was a college debate, and the side she defended had to wear as a sign of their partisanship a small red cloth shield. That night she dreamed that she saw her mother’s bedroom very distinctly. It resembled the actual room in every detail, except that on the wall opposite the bed was pinned a red shield, and that her mother was lying dead. She woke in horror, and on the next day she travelled home by the first train. Here she found her mother ill in bed, but apparently in no greater danger than usual. Her first act, and surely an extraordinary one, was to pin on to the wall opposite the bed the little red shield. She rationalized this action as being intended to give her mother the opportunity of looking at an interesting memento. She slept with her mother, and on the second morning she woke to find her dead beside her. The shock of this she had never got over ; she tortured herself with remorse that in some mysterious way she was responsible for her mother’s death, she felt herself always haunted by her spirit, and was totally unable to undertake any occupation whatever, even five years after. She suffered from a phobia of red, and had never been able to revisit her home.”

The analysis revealed that “at a very early age the patient had been greatly in love with her father, and had indulged in fantasies in which she saw herself supplanting her mother in various circumstances. About

this time, a disliked aunt, who lived with them, died, and the idea occurred to the patient that if a similar calamity were to happen to her invalid mother the loss would have its compensations in other directions. The wish here implied was strongly repressed, but lived on in the unconscious, where its activity was manifest only in the reaction formation of the patient's excessive devotion to her mother and steadily increasing indifference, or rather antipathy, towards her father; a pronounced homosexual tendency aided this process."¹

This case provides us with an example of the way the parent relation works, and at the same time illustrates other mechanisms which we have discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter.

The *third* stage in the development of sex interests is that in which it is directed mainly to members of the same sex. Ordinary observation reveals that at a rather vaguely defined point in the history of the child, with the opening up of the wider world outside of the family, there is manifested a special interest in the members of the child's own sex, with an aloofness from the opposite sex and a marked tendency to under-rate its worth. There arises a certain amount of spontaneous sex segregation, when boys find their playmates among boys, and girls amongst girls. This stage, while probably not of such profound importance as the previous one, if not outgrown, has a great effect on subsequent development, and if not sublimated, leads to serious mental conflicts, and possibly to gross perversions.

The *fourth* stage is that of puberty, which is marked by important physical changes, and generally by a period of great mental stress, in which the previous development plays a tremendous part. In the normal case, this experience results in an emancipation from family bonds and the direction of interest towards

¹ Ernest Jones, " Papers on Psycho-Analysis," p. 225.

members of the opposite sex, and finally in the choice of a marriage partner.

All the way along, these stages are conditioned, and probably primarily determined by, an interest in the bodily organs, in certain physiological activities, and especially in the great mystery of human origins. This development is obscured by repression, and by sublimation in which the energies are absorbed in non-sexual activities.

Side by side with this development of the *object* of the sexual interest, there is a development of a sexual *aim*. In the early stages this is relatively vague and diffuse, and apparently far removed from its ultimate goal of the procreative act. Sucking, touching, and seeing certain parts of the body are the main forms of activity. At first the sexual organs have no predominant attraction.

There are two pairs of correlative tendencies which must be specially noticed, the desire to see and to be seen, and the desire to inflict pain and to suffer pain. To these tendencies have been given the names, Observationism, Exhibitionism, Sadism, and Masochism respectively. Here again, in the normal case, these phenomena are obscured by the same agencies of repression and sublimation. It is an obvious fact that the very young child has no sense of shame, that he has a positive delight in nakedness, a tendency which most adult people regard as rather delightful than otherwise, if it is outgrown at the right stage. The curiosity that underlies observationism is not so generally approved, and possibly for that very reason not so generally recognized. Still less are the cruelty and suffering impulses approved, and probably most readers will find some difficulty in admitting that they are part of our natural and original endowment. Memories of the recent war, however, should be sufficient to show that we have not altogether outgrown these tendencies. Nor should we be right in regarding our late enemies as

possessing a monopoly of this pleasure in inflicting pain. Doubtless the militaristic spirit had fostered it to a greater degree among them, but we may be sure that war cannot be waged without a release of the sadistic impulses. The war again affords us an insight into the close connexion of this tendency with the sex impulse as it is more strictly interpreted. Rape and rapine are twins. The soldier is ever ready to turn lover as the increase in the marriage rate during the war years bears witness, to say nothing of the other facts which most people seem only too anxious to ignore. But there is another side to war. There is suffering as well as fighting, and we may be sure that if men and women could find no satisfaction in suffering, the recent war would have come to an end long before it did, for it was above all a war of endurance. It scarcely needs to be pointed out that as a rule, the masochistic tendency is stronger in women than in men, while the reverse is true of the sadistic impulse. Still, both exist in differing proportions in both sexes. Further, it requires little insight to realize that these interests, sublimated by the inspiration of a noble cause, provide the dynamic of those characters and careers which have aroused the world's highest and most desirable admiration.

Such in briefest outline are the main principles of Freud's theory of sex. If we compare these impulses with the instincts enumerated by McDougall we shall see that there is a close connexion. There are obviously close affinities between Freud's conception of observationism, exhibitionism, sadism, and masochism, and McDougall's conception of curiosity, self-assertion or self-display, pugnacity and self-abasement respectively. The difference between the two is apparently that Freud regards these impulses as primarily and fundamentally sexual, only becoming partially de-sexualized in the course of the history of the individual. McDougall, on the other hand, regards them as primarily non-sexual, but as capable of being sexually determined. For

ourselves, we are inclined to think that the truth lies somewhere between the two. In the newly born child there is no clear distinction between the ego tendencies and the sex tendencies, as Freud calls them. It is only in the course of its history that these become increasingly more clearly defined. But that the strictly called sex interest does emerge even in normal cases much earlier than McDougall seems prepared to admit, appears to us undeniable from such evidence as is available. But as to the question of the extent to which these tendencies, for instance, curiosity, are sexually determined, we do not feel at all competent to say, but at the same time we are bound to admit, that the evidence points very forcibly to the idea that they derive a great part, if not all their dynamic from that interest, and that they are so closely intertwined with it, that in the absence of wise education they are very liable to be subordinated to it.

We must now consider the rôle that Freud assigns to the sexual instinct in the production of mental disorders. The important factor to remember in this connexion is, that the development of the interest in respect of its object, and the sublimation of its aim, rarely proceed with perfect smoothness and completeness. This development may be attended with varying degrees of failure. This failure may not become clearly apparent till the demands of adult life reveal the defect. The development has been arrested or partially arrested, and the interest more or less fixed on one or other of the relatively primitive objects, the self, the parents, or the same sex, with the result that the normal objects of adult life are unable to arouse sufficient interest or energy, or they provoke a conflict which involves varying degrees of mental disorganization. Freud does not regard the conflict of non-sexual impulses as capable of producing a neurosis. All they can do is to bring about a regression to a primitive fixation, and it is this fixation which is the specific cause. The late Dr. J. J. Putnam, a man equally respected for his profound learning and

high character, has said, Freud, "has worked out, with incredible penetration, the part which this instinct (sex) plays in every phase of human life, and in the development of human character, and has been able to establish on a firm footing the remarkable thesis that psycho-neurotic illnesses never occur with a perfectly normal sexual life. Other sorts of emotions contribute to the result, but some abnormality of the sexual life is always present, as the cause of especially insistent emotions and repressions." Even Jung, who endeavours to explain the neurosis by means of the two factors of congenital disposition and current conflict, and suggests that the psycho-analytical theory should be liberated from the purely sexual standpoint, says later on in the same book—"I am often asked why it is just the erotic conflict, rather than any other, which is the cause of the neurosis. There is but one answer to this. No one asserts that this ought necessarily to be the case, but as a simple matter of fact, it is always found to be so, notwithstanding all the cousins and aunts, godparents and teachers, who rage against it."

We have seen that psycho-analysts attach great importance to the activity of the Œdipus complex, which brings about in the adult a regression to the childish attitude to the parents. Recent developments of the work have emphasized the importance of an even more primitive regression, to the self-love stage. To this regression is given the name of Narcissism. In this case the interest is withdrawn from external objects and fixed upon the self as it is, as it was, or as it would like to be, or a part of the self (e.g. its child). It is easy to see how such a conception may be used to explain such phenomena as conceitedness, wounded pride, a self-centred and visionary idealism, or an extravagant infatuation with one's offspring. Possibly psychology itself may be regarded as the product of sublimated narcissism. This may account for the contempt and even suspicion with which it is regarded by the

“practical man.” This factor, it is claimed, is of very great importance in bringing about those serious forms of mental illness known as melancholia and dementia praecox, and constitutes a serious obstacle to remedial efforts by making transference, which we shall shortly see is a necessary stage in the treatment, very difficult if not quite impossible.

In the foregoing account we have avoided the use of a term which figures largely in psycho-analytical literature. It is the term *Libido*. Freud uses this term to stand for sexual desire in all its forms. Jung uses it in a wider sense as equivalent to Bergson’s “life force.” We have avoided the use of the term altogether, for the simple reason that we do not see the necessity for it, and because it is frequently used in what we regard as an unpsychological manner.

When we turn to the non-sexual instincts we find a regrettable blank in psycho-analytical theory. If we grant that it is the sexual tendencies which are the object of most of the repression that goes on in the human mind, we have still to enquire what is the nature of the repressing forces. Trotter in his “Herd Instincts in Peace and War,” has especially drawn attention to this omission, and his treatment of the subject, though all too brief, is suggestive. Freud recognizes only two classes of instincts, the Egoistic and the Sexual. What he includes in the former is not very clear. But all conflict is due to the clash of elements of these two groups. But there is a sense in which all tendencies may be regarded as ego tendencies. They all work towards some end which, if achieved, normally brings a feeling of pleasurable satisfaction, or at least of pleasurable relief. Maternal love is as ego-centric in its satisfaction as the desire for food. But the satisfaction of the maternal impulse involves the consideration of the well-being of another, while the strictly ego tendencies require no such reference. If this external reference is accepted as the distinguishing feature

between the altruistic and the egoistic tendencies, we shall see that the sex impulses described above are partly altruistic and partly egoistic, while it is obvious that the herd instincts must always involve this external reference.

Let us consider very briefly the nature of the herd or gregarious instinct. The outstanding feature is Suggestibility in its widest sense, involving all three phases of psychical process, cognitive, affective and conative. Using the term in this manner, Dr. Rivers has defined suggestion as "that aspect of the gregarious instinct whereby the mind of one member of a group of animals or human beings acts upon another or others unwittingly to produce in both or all a common content, or a content so similar that both or all act with complete harmony towards some common end." The fundamental aspect of this unwitting action of mind upon mind is the affective, what McDougall calls sympathy. In the hypnotic state it is usually called *rapport*. It is an emotional responsiveness or sensitiveness to the feelings of some other mind or minds. Starting from this point Ferenczci and Jones have argued that suggestibility is essentially sexual. A considerable amount of evidence has been adduced to support this contention. There are two recognized types of suggestion, the one working through authority and fear, while the other works through persuasion and "love," and it is claimed that these are determined by the different emotional responses of the child to father and mother respectively. Herd suggestibility may be regarded as a development of this, but if it is, it must be through a process of de-sexualization. The main interests of the herd are food and protection, and it is obviously necessary for individual interests, including the sexual, to be subordinated to these, or the herd would perish. When we come to the human herd the situation becomes more complicated. The sexual impulses are subjected to stringent regulation, and these regulations are not merely

imposed upon the individual, but by virtue of the latter's suggestibility they are *accepted*. If the acceptance is complete then the individual interests are directed into socially satisfactory channels, but if the acceptance is incomplete, there arises internal conflict and repression. *It is important to remember that external pressure is never sufficient alone to bring about repression*; there must always be some degree of acceptance, whereby the judgment of the community is accepted as right or true, that is, the social judgment is introjected, to use the technical term, and the individual makes it his own. If the opposing tendency persists it is regarded as wrong, and the individual strives to suppress it. This conflict may take place on the personal level of consciousness or on the subpersonal; in the latter case the individual has no true idea of what is going on, and is therefore unable to deal with it satisfactorily. It is possible, of course, for the suggestion to be rejected. In this event the conflict is external, and gives rise to no repression.

The situation is still further complicated by the various partial herds to which civilized man belongs, such as the family, the workshop, the trade union, the club, the church, the nation. The suggestions coming from these different sources may give rise to conflict, and the adjustment of these various suggestions give rise to the conception of an absolute standard such as God, conscience or reason.¹

This sketch of the herd instincts is admittedly all too brief and inadequate. Trotter's contention that it is the main source of the repressing activity seems undeniable, and we can only hope that psycho-analysts may give it the same thorough examination that they have devoted to the sexual impulses. It forms the chief part of that wider question of the nature of the reality to which it is the aim of the analyst to reconcile the neurotic. Jones has said that the neuroses are the

¹ It is not intended to imply that such conflicts are themselves entirely adequate to explain these ideas.

result of a conflict between the individual and society. The therapeutic aim is to reconcile the two. But to what society is the individual to be reconciled? Is it to society as it is, permeated we are told by neuroticism? Obviously this is a tremendous question, but we cannot consider that psycho-analysis rests on a secure foundation till it can provide a satisfactory answer to this problem.

In conclusion, we would say, that, while we do not consider the problem of the primary instinctive tendencies as definitely settled, we believe that the most satisfactory conception is to regard such mechanisms as McDougall enumerates, as being gradually differentiated from a relatively homogeneous life impulse, primarily in the interests of the ego, but very early in the interests of sex, and later in the interests of the herd. With the exception of what Dr. Drever calls the appetite tendencies, such as hunger, thirst, and sex in the narrower sense of the term, these instinctive mechanisms are probably all capable of being conditioned by these three main interests. *But the sex interest is of special significance, not only because of its native strength, but also because through repression, it accumulates still greater stores of energy, and is frequently compelled to find its satisfaction in most devious ways.*

CHAPTER V

THE CONTROL OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

IN the last chapter we have endeavoured to explain the nature and modes of activity of those mental tendencies and conflicts, which functioning outside the range and reach of ordinary personal consciousness, have such important consequences for the individual, being the specific cause, it is claimed, of those forms of mental illness, known as the "psycho-neuroses," and of many of those minor disabilities and maladjustments, from which few of us, if any, are entirely free. If this claim is true, it will be obvious that there is little prospect of our being able to control these tendencies, or to end these conflicts by a direct effort of will power. We are fighting against unseen, or disguised foes, and more than this, we are fighting with greatly depleted forces, for our foes are "those of our own household." We cannot emphasize this point too strongly. The symptoms of the neurotic, the tremors, the paralyses, the compulsive actions and many of the pains, are what Freud calls "wish-fulfilments," by which the individual is enabled to escape from the too-exacting demands of life. This is the reason which explains the resemblance of the neurotic to the malingerer with whom he has been so often confused. He *is* a malingerer, but a malingerer against his will. To treat him as a "slacker," a coward, or a hypocrite, is only to aggravate his troubles, but on the other hand, to treat him with large doses of well-meant compassion is no better. Nor is it sufficient to tell him that his

symptoms are but devices of the unconscious to enable him to get out of the "firing line" of life's battle. He probably would not believe it, and if he did, it would only add to his already intolerable burden. Blame, pity, and exhortation are at the best of little use, and in some cases may do serious harm. The first requirement is insight, not only on the part of the physician, but also on the part of the patient. For this reason the co-operation of the latter is far more important than in the treatment of physical ailments. Without it no progress can be made. A keen desire to get well is therefore a great help to the treatment, indeed a practically indispensable pre-requisite. Patience, courage and intelligence are necessary for successful results. Psycho-analysis is not a pill that has just to be swallowed to cure all manner of diseases, but it is a highly individualistic method which is dependent upon the tracing out of those complicated and often hidden tendencies which are the spring of so many of our activities. It is obvious, therefore, that it will require a very considerable amount of time, but that time is more than redeemed, when the treatment is successful, by the elimination of those conflicts which are the cause of so much wasted energy and ineffective striving. Let us inquire now more closely as to the main lines which this treatment follows. It works by means of free association, through psycho-catharsis and abreaction, through transference and the overcoming of resistance to freedom which is its aim. The meaning of these terms we shall now endeavour to make clear.

I. PSYCHO-CATHARSIS AND ABREACTION

The material on which the analyst works in the patient's dreams, because they provide the easiest and most direct access to the unconscious. But if these are

not available he may begin with the patient's symptoms or use Jung's Word Association Method described in Chapter II. This material is interpreted by the aid of free association which we have already described. Here we need only repeat the warnings as to the necessity for complete mental and muscular relaxation, for the utter abandonment of every effort to guide or restrain the direction of consciousness, and for complete frankness in recording whatever comes into the mind, no matter how trivial, irrelevant, or unseemly it may appear. Hypnosis is sometimes used to aid and abridge the process, or to recall forgotten experiences, but Freud abandoned its use on the ground that instead of lessening the resistances, after a certain stage it increased them.

It is the aim of free association to bring to light those forgotten experiences or fantasies which are the repressed factor in the mental conflict. To this process is given the name *psycho-catharsis*. Now the significant fact about these forgotten experiences is not the experiences themselves but the tendencies which they reveal, tendencies of which the patient is either utterly ignorant, or which he has misinterpreted because they have been deflected by compromise or reaction formations. This process of psycho-catharsis is obviously necessary, therefore, if the individual is to exercise control over these hidden impulses, he cannot be expected to control forces of which he is unaware or does not understand.

But there is another aspect of the question which we must consider. Whenever a tendency is stimulated, an emotional experience peculiar to it is also aroused. If the tendency is denied its satisfaction then the emotion is also checked in its development. If, for instance the instinct to run away from danger is aroused but prevented from finding its natural expression, then the accompanying emotion of fear is also checked, or to use an expressive colloquialism, is "bottled up."

When such an experience is recalled, the recall is attended by a revival of the emotion and if this is allowed unfettered expression it is frequently followed by a sense of relief. This process, commonly termed "letting off steam" is perfectly familiar. It is only when the original conflict is so intense as to involve some considerable degree of *amnesia* that it is regarded as pathological. In such a case free association or hypnosis is necessary to recall the experience, and the revival of the emotions is known as *abreaction*. The value of abreaction as a therapeutic method has come to the fore in connexion with the treatment of war shock. Dr. W. Brown, of London University, lays great emphasis on its importance. His opinion deserves to be treated with the greatest respect both on account of the extent and the success of his work at an advanced Neurological Centre in France. He says, "In most cases of nervous shock caused by shell explosion a state of intense fear is aroused in the patient's mind, which, from its very magnitude, produces loss of self-control and apparent loss of consciousness. There is no real loss of consciousness, but the attempted repression, and control of the fearful emotion at its inception brings about a splitting of the mind, which appears later as amnesia of greater or less extent, often involving other losses of function also, such as dumbness, deafness, tremulousness, or paralysis. The fact that under light hypnosis, and with the appropriate suggestions, these memories return, together with the lost voice, hearing, etc., is evidence that they were not abolished at the time, but were simply split off from the main personality. It is also evidence that the shock worked mentally rather than by its accompanying *physical* concussion (which is often absent). In my method, then, the patient goes through his original terrifying experiences again, his memories recurring with hallucinatory vividness. It is this that brings about the return of his powers of speech, and not direct suggestion, as in the

ordinary method. My second modification of the ordinary method is in my manner of awakening the patient. Remembering that his disability is due to a form of dissociation, and that in some cases hypnotism accentuates this dissociation, I always suggest at the end of the hypnotic sleep that he will remember clearly all that has happened to him in this sleep. More than this, I wake him very gradually, talking to him all the time and getting him to answer, passing backwards and forwards from the events of his sleep to the events in the ward, the personalities of the sister, orderly, doctor and patients, i.e. all the time re-associating or re-synthesizing the train of his memories and interests."¹

It will be seen from this account that Dr. Brown's method involved not only recall of the forgotten experience by the aid of hypnosis, and the working off of pent-up emotion, but also the re-synthesis of the dissociated and therefore forgotten experience. In a symposium which appeared in the Medical Section of the "British Journal of Psychology," in October, 1920, the question of the value of abreaction is introduced by Dr. Brown, but Dr. C. S. Myers, who was Consulting Psychologist to the British Expeditionary Force, after acknowledging the high value of the former's work, takes up the position that it is *the recall and especially the re-synthesis that are the important factors and not the abreaction*. He supports this contention from his own experience and method in which he discouraged any strong emotional expression. "My own experience," he says, "in recovering memories both in the waking and in the hypnotic states was that the acting out of the emotional experience was of relatively little consequence, but that what was of importance was the revival of the unpleasant memory of the scene. Dr. McDougall in his contribution to the same symposium

¹ W. Brown, "Psychology and Psycho-therapy." 1921, Edward Arnold.

criticizes the conception of "pent-up emotion" and regards the re-synthesis as the all-important factor. He points out that war-shock patients not infrequently suffer from fits in which they live through the old experiences with realistic intensity and are no better, but rather worse as a consequence. To these criticisms Dr. Brown replies that he recognizes the importance of re-synthesis but asserts that he found that those cases that were marked by the most vigorous abreaction made most satisfactory progress. It is not easy to form a reliable judgment where authorities of such eminence and experience are at variance, but the discussion points strongly to this conclusion that while abreaction may possibly be helpful, it is not essential, but what all are agreed is essential is the recall and re-synthesis of dissociated experiences. This conception of the therapeutic value of abreaction is confirmed by the most recent developments of psycho-analysis in the treatment of ordinary neuroses. Freud, in his early work with Breuer, as we have seen, regarded emotional revival as an important factor, but in his later work he places the emphasis on transference and the overcoming of resistance. These conceptions we must now examine.

2. TRANSFERENCE AND OVERCOMING OF RESISTANCE

The reader will have noticed that in the special modification of psycho-analytical treatment for war-shock cases, hypnosis was extensively used. It is true that it was used by Myers and Brown mainly for the purpose of recalling forgotten experiences and not with the view of effecting a cure by means of suggestion. But it has been maintained that in spite of this the real secret of the therapeutic value of the method lay in unconscious suggestion. Freud very early abandoned

hypnotism as being more of a hindrance than a help, but the same explanation of the success of his method has been advanced on the ground that the state of free association is identical with the state of relaxation which is the necessary pre-requisite of effective waking suggestion. Freud explicitly recognizes that these two states are practically identical, but he denies that cures are due to suggestion. In the first place, the analyst plays as far as possible a passive rôle in the examination. He refrains from offering suggestions by word or sign, and on no account offers advice. But it is replied that in the highly suggestible state of free association, the patient is susceptible to indications of thought and feelings, which in the normal state would pass unnoticed. This is admitted, but it is still contended that *analysis works not by means of suggestion, but in spite of it.*

We must examine this contention more closely. The first requirement of effective suggestion whether waking or hypnotic, is, as we have said, the production of a certain affective state in the individual, called suggestibility. This is brought about by various devices, but the aim of one and all, is to secure a suspension of the activity of the endopsychic censor. This suspension varies in its degrees but it is probably never quite complete, unless it is in the deepest hypnotic trance. This state induces a special and exclusive susceptibility to, and dependence upon, the person making the suggestions. This personal relation is called *rapport*. It is inspired, on the one hand, either by fear of, or respect for the hypnotist, because of his authority or power, or on the other, by the feeling of trust or affection, because of his kindly interest or gentle manner. In either case there is a marked dependence of the patient on the physician. Psycho-analysts regard this feeling of dependence as an extension of, or rather transference of, the childish feelings with which father or mother were regarded respectively. Now it is obvious

that if it is true, that many, if not most, nervous disorders are caused by the failure of the effort of self-emancipation from this childish relationship, then by inducing the state of suggestibility and *rapprochement*, we are only aggravating the evil we are trying to overcome. To suggest that the patient shall show a more independent spirit only results in a reaction formation, which is manifested in a self-assertiveness, with marked childish characteristics. This transference occurs no less in psycho-analysis than in suggestion. The patient lives over again his emotional life and the physician becomes the object of his love and hate.¹ But in analysis it is only a stage, though a necessary one, in the course of the treatment. It constitutes at once, both the difficulty and the hope of the physician. On this point Jones quotes the very significant words of Freud. "It is undeniable that in his endeavour to emerge victorious over the transference phenomenon the psycho-analyst is faced with the greatest difficulties, but it should not be forgotten that it is just these difficulties that render us the invaluable service of making the patient's buried and forgotten love-excitations current and manifest, for in the last resort no one can be vanquished *in absentia* or *in effigie*." Transference, then, is really a reconstitution of the childish situation which lies at the root of the nervous trouble, but instead of the father, mother, self, or whatever form the original love object assumed, the same interest is now directed on the physician. The value of this is, as Freud points out, that it is an actual situation that has to be dealt with, and not merely an imagined or remembered one.

But if the patient were left at this stage little good would have been done. It would be like curing the pain in one tooth by transferring the discomfort to another. But by means of the free association the patient is

¹ The difference between abreaction and transference is that the former is a revival of past experiences while the latter is a revival of emotional attitudes towards a new object.

brought to see for himself what is the real nature and origin of that interest which is being directed upon the analyst. It is not enough to *tell* the patient what is the nature of the mental trouble from which he is suffering. He would almost certainly refuse to accept the explanation, and if he accepted it the acceptance would be superficial and of little practical value. The reason for this should be clear from the previous chapter. It is not merely that the neurotic is suffering from wrong ideas. He is suffering because of the clash of active forces, because of the arrestment of the normal development of that complex of interests, called sexual in the broadest sense of the term, an arrestment which is due to the action of some opposing system of interests. The object of desire is repugnant to the social and moral self and it is therefore repressed. The very idea of it is banished. It is therefore only to be expected that the path of enlightenment by means of free association will be obstructed at every turn. This obstruction is called *resistance* and it is the vanquishing of that resistance which is the ultimate aim of the treatment. To this end the individual must be brought to feel the full force of that resistance. No advice is offered with a view to relieving the tension, but at a suitable moment the patient is shown that his difficulties in association are due to resistance and not due to the mere fading of memory. After this, says Freud, "We must allow the patient time to immerse himself in this resistance (of which he is now conscious), to work through it and overcome it—by carrying on the work according to the psycho-analytical rule in spite of it. Only when they have reached the point of most intense resistance do patient and doctor through their combined work discover the repressed tendencies which are feeding the resistances—tendencies as regards the existence of which the patient would otherwise have failed to be convinced. In this the physician can do nothing but await the completion of the process—a process that cannot be

avoided and that cannot always be hurried." The psycho-analytic rule referred to, in this passage, is that which insists on the passive rôle of the analyst, and the refusal of aid, direction or advice to the patient during the course of his free associations. If this principle is strictly adhered to, then the very recall of the experiences, fancies and desires involves the gradual breaking down of the resistances, otherwise the recall would be impossible. What then, is the position at this stage? Repression has been removed, and the patient realizes that his trouble is due to certain repugnant tendencies. But those tendencies are still there, and they are still repugnant. But he has one clear gain. He knows now what are the forces he is fighting against. He is no longer fighting in the dark against a foe, which the darkness not only veils but magnifies. But this is not all. Since the repression has been removed the fixation of the interest has been relieved, and the energies which have been wasted in internal conflict or forced into unsatisfactory channels, are now free to be directed towards the external problems and difficulties of life. *The tension has been relieved, and the sexual interests, if not entirely, at any rate to a very considerable extent, are free to be directed to non-sexual ends, that is, they can be sublimated. The task of sublimation must be tackled by the patient himself. To turn to the analyst for help and advice would only be to relapse into the position of servile dependence from which he has just been emancipated. But he can face the task with confidence because he faces it now with undivided forces.*

One other point we must notice in connexion with this treatment. It has been assumed that because repression is the cause of nervous trouble, that it is the sole task of the analyst to remove that repression and the one concern of the individual to give rein to his natural impulses. This is a gross and unjust caricature of the method and has been repeatedly repudiated by

the most eminent authorities. Psycho-analysis affords no sanction for so-called "free living." The individual is freed from his conflicts that he may direct his desires towards a more satisfactory social adaptation.

3. AUTO-ANALYSIS

The main purpose of this book is to enable the general reader to obtain such insight into the hidden processes of the mind that he may be able to exercise more effective control over his life. But we would repeat the warning we have already given. Persons suffering from morbid dread, morbid introspectiveness, or any form of hysterical instability should not attempt to cure themselves by self-analysis. Competent medical and psychological advice should be sought in such cases. But there are a vast number of minor disabilities that may be removed, or at least mitigated by self-examination in the light of the principles we have been expounding. We have called these disabilities "minor" because they do not entirely incapacitate the sufferer from taking his place and responsibilities in life, but they nevertheless are attended by very painful and crippling effects. As instances of such disabilities, we may mention, lack of independence, or its opposite, unwillingness to be advised, undue hesitation and vacillation, thoughtless impetuosity, obstinacy, procrastination, undue sensitiveness to the opinion of others, undue fear, reticence or self-disparagement, compulsions and obsessions of the less severe type, etc., etc. It is not satisfactory to dismiss these things as mere habit, or think we have said the final word when we have ascribed them to heredity. Heredity is probably as often an excuse as it is a cause. With regard to habit its strength is commonly regarded as due to frequent repetition, but a little reflection will show that this is only partially true. For instance, a bank clerk who

has worn the same type of collar for twenty years, may not find it a very great difficulty to substitute another style, but he simply dare not go to the office without a collar of some kind. The fact is that it is not merely the frequency of repetition that determines the strength of a habit, but the strength of the tendency which underlies it. In self-analysis, therefore, we must be on our guard against superficial explanations. It is not sufficient to explain our omission to do a certain thing by saying, "We forgot." We must ask "Why did we forget?" And to this question it is not sufficient to reply that we did not pay enough attention at the time that the engagement was made, or that we were overwhelmed with business when the time for keeping it arrived. We must go deeper still. Why did we not attend? Why did we manage to remember a dozen other things, of more trifling importance in spite of the demands that were being made upon us? And the answer is always that we were either not sufficiently interested, or there was something within us that made us want to forget. It is interesting, too, to note how we are inclined to exploit our physical weakness to excuse our mental and moral deficiencies. A "splitting headache" is a common complaint of the student who is faced with an examination for which he feels himself but ill-prepared. Medical science is only now beginning to realize how varied and extensive is the mental factor in the production of physical ailments. In his "Mental Hygiene," Dr. W. A. White says, "The number and duration of physical and apparently physical disorders which may originate at the psychological level is endless. It includes many forms of asthma, sore throat, difficult nasal breathing, stammering, headache, neurasthenia, backache, tender spine, 'weak heart,' faint attacks, exophthalmic goitre, aphonia, spasmodic sneezing, hiccough, rapid respiration, hay fever, gastro-intestinal disturbances (constipation, diarrhoea, indigestion, colitis, (ulcer of stomach), ptosis of kidney, diabetes, distur-

bances of urination (polyuria, incontinence, precipitancy) menstrual disorders, auto-intoxication (from long continued digestive disturbance), nutritional disorders of skin, teeth, and hair, etc., etc." Indeed, we may say, that there is no illness in which the mind does not play some part. We all recognize that the "spirit" of the patient is an important factor in his recovery, but what we do not always realize is that, the patient may sincerely desire to be well, but at the same time may have unconscious tendencies to cling to his illness, perhaps because he enjoys the special attention he gains by it, or because it enables him to evade some difficult demand that life is just at that time making upon him. And what is true with regard to illness, is true with regard to all our life problems. We shall make little progress in analysis if we do not remember that at one and the same moment it is possible for us to face a given problem in two contradictory ways. We may imagine that we are doing our utmost, but all the time secret fears and hidden desires, may be dividing our strength. In fact we may be sure that any task which requires constant renewal of resolution is not receiving our undivided attention. We may tell ourselves that we are doing our best, and we may be perfectly sincere in this self-assurance, but the fact is that we are not doing the best we are capable of. It is not till the task absorbs us by its own compelling interest till everything else is forgotten that it is calling out our real best. It often happens that such an interest is elicited subsequently when by an effort of will we take up an uncongenial piece of work. On the other hand the constant whipping up of ourselves frequently makes the business all the more disagreeable. In such a case the only way to succeed is to eliminate the secret fears and the hidden, alien interests that distract and divide.

But doubtless the reader has long been thinking that all this introspection and analysis tends only to further division and weakness. The horrible fate of Hamlet

looms before his eyes as a terrible spectre and warning. We do not claim that introspection has no dangers. Persons of a brooding disposition, or unstable emotions, will be wise to avoid it unless under the guidance of a skilled analyst. In any case, we may expect the immediate result of self-examination will be a lowering of capacity. We may compare a person beginning such a course to a man who having learnt golf unaided and being dissatisfied with his progress turns to an expert for instruction. The immediate effect is an apparent deterioration in his play. The effort to remember how he shall hold his head and his club and what he is to do with his feet, makes him forget to keep his eye on the ball. But if he perseveres in following the instructions the result is usually a vast improvement in his play. In the same way, "the remedy" says Tansley, "for the evils brought upon man by his increased self-consciousness is, then, to increase it still further, but always in the light of objective knowledge. He must try to know himself, not by applying catch-words and cant phrases to the forces at work within—a habit which leads to the confusion of things which are essentially different and the separation of other things which are essentially the same—but by a patient study of the mind as it actually is, and of the conditions under which it works, of the real meaning of his thoughts and conduct." There are two rules which the self-analyst should bear in mind, and if these are obeyed he need not fear the ultimate effects of introspection. The first is—let your introspection be progressive. Do not "stew" continually over your faults and failings, but find their causes. The second rule is—see that thought leads to action. In the early stages there should be no hurry about this, but if it does not eventually lead to a stronger, calmer and more effective attitude to the problems of life, it is because some tendency or group of tendencies has evaded discovery, or the introspection is being used for an excuse for

postponing the unpleasant task of facing reality. There is need for watchfulness, for the unconscious is fertile with excuse and evasion. There is a tremendous amount of psycho-analytic truth in the words of the book of Genesis: "Now the serpent was more subtil than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made." There will be no need for any exposition of this truth if it is remembered that the serpent is perhaps the commonest sexual symbol.

We do not think it would be wise, even if it were possible, to attempt a thorough-going self-analysis, but we will now attempt to sketch out a scheme which should be possible and helpful to the reader who has really grasped the principles we have been expounding.

First of all examine and interpret carefully and patiently a few of your own dreams. This should serve a double purpose. In the first place it should bring to light certain tendencies which are not obtaining full satisfaction in the waking life, and in the second place it will enable you to understand more fully the ingenious ways in which the unconscious seeks to obtain such satisfaction. If these tendencies are such that you cannot arrange your lives so that they can obtain their real and natural satisfaction, either because of the circumstances in which you are placed, or because they are repugnant to your moral sense, then you must find some other way of dealing with them. Repression is never entirely satisfactory, but we do not say that it is not sometimes necessary and successful, but it can never be better than the less of two evils. It always involves a loss of psychic energy. It is far better, if possible to sublimate these tendencies by directing them towards satisfactory objects. But it must not be imagined that any tendency can be "switched off" from one object to *any* other. The new object is a substitute for the old one, and must stand in some "felt" relationship to it, though that relationship need not be clearly realized.

The problem of sublimation is, therefore, a personal one. It must be solved by the individual concerned. But we may point out that ordinary sexual desire can at any rate be partially sublimated towards the interests of religion, social service, literature, art, science, business enterprises, etc. The essential thing is, that these new interests shall be creative, progressive and absorbing. The second thing, and most important thing to do is, to discover what is the general nature of your attitude towards life. Is it cautious and timid? Is it rebellious or rash or cynical? Are you lacking in independence? Are you too reserved and inclined to "chew the cud" of your own grievances? What is your attitude to the opposite sex, is it hostile or scornful or painfully bashful? Do you love the "limelight"? Are you goaded by curiosity? Do you take a delight in reading about or seeing brutal displays, or are you unduly sensitive to anything that savours of cruelty, or are you inclined to pose as a martyr, the victim of an unjust fate? It must be remembered that in asking such questions there is always a strong tendency to justify the attitude by attributing it entirely to the nature of the "facts" of life, and to refuse to admit that *it is the way we regard the "facts" that is of supreme importance*. Then having decided this question with care, the next thing is to ask, what are the factors that are determining this attitude? Reviewing your life patiently and carefully inquire whether there has been any partial fixation of interest on the self, on the parents or on your own sex. Has there been any failure in the effort to sublimate the sex aims enumerated in the last chapter—exhibitionism, curiosity, sadism and masochism? It is not enough to review the life history in a brief half-hour. You must come back to it again and again, immerse yourself in it and live it over again. Brain racking and puzzling should be avoided. Searching and striving are not of much use. Rather let the pageant of your life come

up before you and lead you where it will. But pay special attention to the question of family relationships. Such an examination if patiently and faithfully carried out should reveal the dynamic energies underlying your life's activity and the conflicting tendencies which waste power and render so many efforts futile.

Another useful, as well as interesting exercise, especially for those who have very scanty dream material to draw from, is to take some habit, some forgotten engagement, or some mistake such as will be described in the next chapter, and subject it to analysis to find the hidden tendency or unconscious wish which underlies it.

Having thus laid bare the impulses and conflicts of which your life's activity is the outcome, the task remains to formulate some life plan in which they may find harmonious development.

Such a procedure as we have here outlined obviously departs to some extent from the strict psycho-analytical method, and cannot be expected to yield such striking results as are obtained with the skilled guidance of an experienced analyst. For this reason we believe it is desirable to supplement auto-analysis by auto-suggestion.

4. AUTO-SUGGESTION

Hypnotic suggestion has been rejected by the orthodox psycho-analyst, as being more of a hindrance than a help in his work. Hypnotism, he asserts, increases the deeper resistances, it does nothing to remove the undesirable state of dependence of the patient on the physician, its therapeutic effects are frequently as ephemeral as they are dramatic, it works in the dark, treating symptoms rather than causes. But the new Nancy School of Auto-suggestion, founded by Coué, whose methods have been expounded so ably,

by Baudouin¹, avoids all these objections, save the last. There is no dependence on a second person since the suggestions are made by the patient himself, and since they can be renewed at pleasure, there is no need for the effects to be temporary. It is true, however, that this method works, like its forerunners, in the dark. It leaves the "subconscious" to deal with the causes, of which consciousness may be entirely ignorant. Further, suggestions arising from the self will necessarily be conditioned by the blindness and prejudices of that self. But if the self-examination advised in the last section has been carefully carried out these objections will very largely be obviated.

It is only possible here to outline the barest essential principles of this method. The reader who is interested is strongly advised to read Baudouin's book, "Suggestion and Auto-suggestion," for himself. It is full of a wealth of illustration and detailed guidance which will prove invaluable to anyone who wishes to take advantage of this method. The foundation principle is the law of Reversed Effort. "The harder we try to think the good idea, the more violent will be the assaults of the bad idea." "Voluntary effort essentially presupposes the idea of a resistance to be overcome." To put the idea in Coué's own picturesque formula, "When the will and the imagination are at war, the imagination *invariably* gains the day. In the conflict between the will and the imagination, the force of the imagination is in direct ratio to the square of the will." This mathematical formula is, of course, not to be regarded literally. If the analysis prescribed in the last section has been carefully carried out, this conflict will be understood and what is even of greater importance, the factors producing it will be clearly realized, and as a consequence the opposing tendencies will be considerably weakened. For instance, if we recognize that unconsciously we are

¹ "Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion," Baudouin, 1921. Allen and Unwin.

inclined to magnify the difficulty of a certain task that we may gain more credit if it is successfully performed, or find greater consolation if we fail, then that very recognition in itself is frequently sufficient to break down the obstacles that arise, in this case, from excessive self-love. But in self-examination the analysis may not be complete, and consequently the fixation of interests only partially broken down. It is for this reason that auto-suggestion is recommended to supplement it.

The problem now before us is, how to eliminate the need for that volitional effort which so frequently only thwarts its own ends.

The first thing to do is to give up striving, and allow the body and mind to attain that state of complete relaxation which we have described as the pre-requisite for free association. Then just as the mind is beginning to drift away, as it were, into dreamland, then the desired end is allowed to come before the mind as vividly as possible, as something that is bound to happen, or something we are bound to do, because we cannot help doing it. If the state of relaxation has been properly attained the opposing tendencies which have previously inhibited the fulfilment of these desired ends will be in abeyance, and opposition removed. If the suggestion is reinforced by a strong emotion then its fulfilment is further assisted. There are really three stages in the process we have described. The first is the state of relaxation which has been sufficiently elucidated, the second is what we have called the state of mental drift when the diverse interests awakened by contact with the outer world begin to fade away, and interest begins to converge, as it were, of itself, upon some more or less vaguely realized goal. To this stage has been given the technical name of "collection." The third stage is called "contention" when the direction of the drift is determined by the introduction of the desired end. The more vividly this end is imaged the more likely are the chances of its realization. But

all through there must be no sense of striving or strain. Particularly good times for the practice are night and morning, just as you are gradually dropping off to sleep, or gradually returning to full waking consciousness.

Another most interesting discovery that Coué made and verified in the course of his exceedingly extensive experience, was, that there is no necessity to repeat this process time after time in connexion with each separate item in respect of which improvement is desired. But every night and morning *without fail*, betwixt sleeping and waking, the suggestion should be made, slowly, but as vividly as possible, "Day by day, in all respects, I get better and better." "In all respects," should be emphasised and underlined. Occasionally the details of the desired improvement should be dwelt on, such as, "I am getting stronger, every organ in my body is functioning better and more regularly; I am facing my life with a more reasonable independence and confidence, my difficulties are diminishing before my increased capacity," etc.

This method may seem to be too simple to be of any value. But it should be remembered that it has been tried in a vast number of cases, of the most varied and obstinate types, both in functional and organic troubles, with the most effective results. It is true we understand but little of the mechanisms by which these changes are brought about, but research is revealing more and more the effect of mental and especially emotional states on physiological activity. It is at once the difficulty and hope of a movement like this that we do not know the limits of the capacity of mind in its power over the body. But Baudouin says, this method "has secured incontestable results *in cases alleged to be incurable, in patients given up by practitioners employing only the conventional methods of treatment.*" There is, of course, some danger that a person practising the method may be led to delay seeking necessary medical

or surgical advice ; but in ordinary methods there is always the risk that one may be poulticing an appendix when a surgeon should be called in to remove it. We are always bound to exercise a certain amount of discretion and judgment. When in doubt, see a doctor, is a safe rule. Auto-suggestion can still be used in co-operation with his treatment. Further, it should be remembered, if through fear we refuse to use the method of deliberate, reflective auto-suggestion, we simply leave ourselves open to the casual and harmful suggestions with which life abounds. Analysis should provide us with a prophylactic against these, and the body and mind thus fortified against harmful influences and germs, should be developed by positive suggestions that are both healthful and good.

It may possibly appear to the reader that the introduction of Suggestion to supplement Analysis is really a confession of the insufficiency of the latter, and that analysis is an unnecessary waste of time and trouble if suggestion is effective. To the first objection the reply is, that if the analysis is thorough, then it requires no assistance from suggestion. But as we have already admitted, it is difficult, if not impossible, for self-analysis to attain this ideal. Then why not abandon auto-analysis and substitute auto-suggestion ? Because the latter, in the mental realm at any rate, is limited largely by the very conditions it seeks to remove. It is an attempt to educate the unconscious up to the level of the conscious. But if the conception of the mind we have tried to expound is at all reliable, then the conscious itself is very largely determined by the unconscious. We seem, therefore, to be in a vicious circle, striving to lift ourselves by tugging at our waist-band. But if we cannot escape from the circle altogether, we can increase the radius and the area of our freedom. Analysis helps us to bring into the light of self-consciousness some of the hidden tendencies, and to see how these are deflecting our ideals and

ambitions. In this way it can raise still higher the level of the conscious and thus enlarge the sphere of the operation of suggestion. To put the whole matter in a nutshell—self-analysis tends to yield more insight than power ; self-suggestion yields more power than insight. Let them marry.

CHAPTER VI

THE PSYCHO-PATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE

ALTHOUGH psycho-analysis can only be considered as being yet in its infancy, it has already been applied, with the most striking results, not only to the treatment of neurotic illnesses, but also to a wide variety of human problems; and just as it has been successful in showing that there is a coherence and consistency in the strange creations of the dream, and the mind of the hysterical or even "insane" person, so also it has been applied to discover the hidden meaning of those strange and often fantastic mental creations, the myth, the legend, and the fairy tale. By means of its mechanisms Freud has endeavoured to discover the secret of those strange primitive institutions known as the totem and taboo. He has applied them also to the elucidation of the problems of the psychology of wit. The inspiration of genius, the mentality of the criminal, educational and sociological problems, the nature of religious experience, the common blunders, mistakes and accidents of everyday life, have been surveyed in its light, and to all these problems, it has, to say the least, brought fresh and stimulating insight. It is obviously impossible in the scope of this book, for us to do more than consider very briefly the application of this method to one or two of these questions.

In his interesting and probably most popular book, the title of which we have assumed as the heading of this chapter, Freud has dealt with the forgetting of

names, words and engagements, mistakes in speech, reading and writing, accidents and errors, and has shown with a wealth of examples, that these are not due to mere chance or oversight as we are apt to think, but to definitely ascertainable psychical causes. The unconscious works with a rigorous determinism. Such simple incidents as we are here concerned with, are to be found in abundance in the course of our ordinary experience, and frequently the underlying "wish" lies so near the surface that a very slight analysis is sufficient to reveal it. For this reason the study of such cases is particularly helpful for the novice in analytical procedure. But the beginner must keep clearly before him the distinction between conscious purpose and unconscious tendency, and be constantly on his guard against the danger of substituting excuses for psychological explanation.

We have already given two examples on pages 37 and 60. Dr. Ernest Jones, in his treatment of this subject, gives an example very similar to the latter, in which I attempted to diagnose the cause of my little boy's illness. "An instance, which is hard to credit, though I can vouch for the accuracy of it, was related to me by a medical friend. His wife was seriously ill with some obscure abdominal malady, which might well have been tubercular, and, while anxiously pondering over the possible nature of it, he remarked to her, 'It is comforting to think that there has been no tuberculosis in your family.' She turned to him very astonished and said, 'Have you forgotten that my mother died of tuberculosis, and that my sister recovered from it only after having been given up by the doctors?' His anxiety lest the obscure symptoms should prove to be tubercular had made him forget a piece of knowledge that was thoroughly familiar to him."

Such an example in itself is sufficient to show that forgetting is not always due to obliviscence, a natural

process of fading from the mind. The fact is that the more we examine our forgetting the more we are impressed with the fact that it is very frequently, if not always, motivated by a wanting to forget. It is quite true that at the same time we may also want to remember. Some time ago in the course of a conversation on this subject with a lady, the latter, being unwilling to recognize the truth of these conditions, said, "But how is it, when I am very busy, it is often just the thing I want to remember most, that I forget?" I evaded the question by telling her to give me the full particulars the next time such a thing occurred. The fact is, that such forgetting is frequently motivated by a desire to play the rôle of a martyr to overwork, a fact which I did not think it wise to communicate in the course of a casual conversation to one who was quite unversed in mind analysis.

This kind of motive plays a larger part in our lives than most of us are prepared to admit. Undoubtedly the plea of overwork is frequently a defence mechanism of an inferiority complex. There are cases of people who steadily accumulate work, and commit themselves to new undertakings which are obviously beyond their capacity. The reason for this is frequently to be found in the desire to have a satisfactory excuse in the event of any particular task not being satisfactorily performed. In such cases, it not seldom happens that the thing that is omitted is the very one that is of the greatest importance or interest. It is as though the person said, "Look here, you can see how overworked I am. I have actually forgotten to go to draw my pay."

It has been objected that if we are inclined to forget painful incidents, learning by experience would be almost an impossibility. But is it not true that we learn more by succeeding than by failing? It is the *almost* successful efforts that impress us and stimulate us most as a rule. If the memory of failure is too vivid it discourages and paralyses. All we know of the psychology of sugges-

tion and fear confirms this. It is only as a wrong effort is used to indicate how the right effort shall be made, that it is of any value. Then the more we can forget the wrong way and concentrate on the right, the more likely we are to succeed. It is true that when we have become experts we may often refer to the bungles at the beginning. But these memories are no longer unpleasant. They minister to our self-esteem.

Further, we must bear in mind that it is the unpleasant rather than the painful that we try to escape from. It is a commonplace that "pain may be sweet." At any rate, if it is not sweet in the moment of actual experience, it may become so in memory. The victim assumes more the rôle of the hero. But in the purely unpleasant we can find no satisfaction. We turn away from it and forget it, unless we can convert it into something less repugnant. But—it may be asked—why are there some unpleasant things we do not forget? In the first place it may be said, that there are probably *no* unpleasant things which are not subject to *some measure* of forgetting. Two years after the event it does not recur in memory either with the frequency or vividness that it did the following week, or with the frequency or vividness of some pleasant event of equal importance. Another factor is undoubtedly at work, and that is the factor of mental organization. If the event touches our lives at many points, it is obviously more difficult to forget than if it touched only at a few. This is one reason why a broken friendship is more difficult to forget than a broken arm.

But the reader may still think that while this explanation does cover some examples, there are many cases where it breaks down. To put the objection in the concrete form in which it was expressed by a critical correspondent—"Personally, I am satisfied, as I tell my wife, as to why I forget her commissions—they are a nuisance—but I have not yet found out why I lose my ten-shilling notes, and my umbrella. Freud claims to

explain too much.”¹ According to Dr. E. Jones the explanation of the losing of an umbrella depends upon the place where it is left. To leave it in the house of a friend indicates a desire to return. To leave it in a public conveyance suggests a desire to be parted from the object because of its own intrinsic qualities or because of its associations. With regard to losing ten-shilling notes, it would be necessary to consider the individual cases on their merits. Personally I find I have two ways of regarding them. If they are clean new ones, I fold them neatly and put them carefully away; if they are old and dirty, I push them without ceremony into the pocket which comes handiest. Here they keep company with a variety of other things which I do not wish to lose, but which I do not want to be troubled with at the moment. I do not want to lose these notes, but there is a distinct tendency to treat them as dirty scraps of paper.

For some time I have been running over my recent experiences to find some further material to illustrate this chapter. I could think of nothing suitable, but all the time there is one incident which I might have been expected to recall at once. Only a week or two ago I left a bag of valuable books, and a parcel of my wife's on the platform of a certain railway station. But why did this incident, which caused me considerable concern at the time, elude me when I was looking for such instances? The reader may have the facts and draw his own conclusion. After the event, being interested in the causes of such forgetting, several times I had asked myself, Why did I forget that bag? But I could discover no reason. *The incident apparently did*

¹ The above was a part of a typewritten communication. If it is read in connexion with what follows immediately afterwards it affords an interesting illustration of another type of phenomena which it is claimed finds a similar explanation. The writer continues, “Bergson has his own theory of forgetting. And there is the case of old people and the insane to show that we forget proper *manners* first.” He intended of course to write “*names*.”

not fit in with the theory which I wished to demonstrate, and so I failed to recall it in this connexion. I have again submitted this incident to examination with a view to discovering why I left the bag and the parcel. The more I think of it the more I feel convinced that the explanation is to be found in this direction. I was returning with my wife and maid and child from holiday. For some time we had been couped up in a stuffy compartment. I couldn't stretch my legs and I couldn't smoke. We had the usual holiday impedimenta—boxes, bags, etc. When we changed at a certain station on the journey we had to show our tickets. To do this I was compelled to put down the bag of books and the parcel I was carrying. I produced the tickets, then lit my pipe, and went off in search of the heavier luggage that was to be placed in the guard's van, leaving behind the things that I was carrying. The forgetting was apparently motived by a selfish, but unconscious desire, to be free from the responsibilities, restrictions and encumbrances which family travelling involves.

It has been pointed out that women, and especially women in love, are particularly sensitive to this truth. But it is probable that where a thing touches us very intimately and we are not blinded by our own complexes we are all aware of the fact. Be that as it may, let any young man excuse himself to his sweetheart for failing to greet her in the street on the ground that he did not see her, or failing to keep an engagement with her on the ground that he forgot, and he will probably get a lesson in mind analysis which will be far more impressive than any he will get in the pages of this book. The tendency of the young man genuinely in love is all in the opposite direction. He is apt to "see" his loved one in the most unlikely places and in the most unlikely people. He is on the look out for her wherever he goes, and many a time his heart begins to palpitate at the first fleeting glance at some stranger who for the moment he imagines to be the adored one. More than once

after receiving the news of the death of my most intimate and lifelong friend in the War in East Africa as I went about my duties in France and caught sight of some stranger in khaki, I had an uncanny feeling for a moment, "It's——" Closer examination revealed scarcely the slightest resemblance. There can be no doubt, what we want to see we often do see, and what we want to forget we often do forget. As Brill says, most people are more inclined to mislay a bill than a cheque.

"Slips of the tongue," provide further examples of the way unconscious tendencies often reveal themselves. Freud gives numerous examples in his book. We will cite one of which he was the victim. "Before calling on me a patient telephoned for an appointment, and also wished to be informed about my consultation fee. He was told that the first consultation was ten dollars; after the examination was over he again asked what he was to pay, and added: 'I don't like to owe money to anyone, especially to doctors; I prefer to pay right away.' Instead of *pay* he said *play*. His last voluntary remarks and his mistake put me on my guard, but after a few more uncalled-for remarks he set me at ease by taking money from his pocket. He counted four paper dollars and was very chagrined and surprised because he had no more money with him, and promised to send me a cheque for the balance. I was sure that his mistake betrayed him, that he was only *playing* with me, but there was nothing to be done. At the end of a few weeks I sent him a bill for the balance, and the letter was returned to me by the post-office authorities marked 'Not found.' "

The mislaying of articles also provides a fruitful field for investigations of this kind. Again we are indebted to Freud for a most interesting case. It refers to a young man who tells the story in his own words. "Several years ago there were some misunderstandings between me and my wife. I found her too cold, and though I fully appreciated her excellent

qualities, we lived together without evincing any tenderness for each other. One day on her return from a walk she gave me a book which she had bought because she thought it would interest me. I thanked her for this remark of 'attention,' promised to read the book, put it away, and did not find it again. So months passed, during which I occasionally remembered the lost book, and also tried in vain to find it.

"About six months later my beloved mother, who was not living with us, became ill. My wife left home to nurse her mother-in-law. The patient's condition became serious and gave my wife the opportunity to show the best side of herself. One evening I returned home full of enthusiasm over what my wife had accomplished, and felt very grateful to her. I stepped to my desk and, without definite intention, but with the certainty of a somnambulist, I opened a certain drawer, and in the very top of it I found the long-missing mislaid book."

But Freud has gone even further and analysed cases where apparently arbitrary numbers have arisen in the mind, and shown that they are determined by definite psychical causes. But such instances usually demand more skilful analysis, and, to persons unversed in the science seem far-fetched and improbable.

The analysis of cases of forgetting of proper names is usually less difficult, but at the same time often rather more complicated than the simple and perhaps rather obvious examples we have already cited. For this reason they provide a particularly useful exercise. Freud, at the beginning of his book, and Jones in the chapter we have referred to, both give a detailed examination of such instances. The following case may possibly prove helpful in the investigation of this type of experience. On no less than three occasions since returning from active service I have endeavoured to recall the name of a certain French village where I lived for two months, and in addition to this, I had lived

in another village only two miles away and had been in constant communication with it for another five months. On each occasion I was compelled to refer to a map, and even then there was a strangeness about the name, though there could be no possible doubt as to its correctness. My memory for names is usually good. Why then, did I forget the name Grévillers? Before analysing this instance it should be said that my memory of the name was partly determined by a vague visual image of the spelling, and partly by an auditory image of its common English pronunciation, and scarcely at all by its proper French pronunciation which was rarely heard. It was commonly referred to as Greyvillers or Grave-ill-ers. The nearest I could get in attempting to recall the name was Etretat or Etaples, both of which places I was perfectly aware are many miles away, the only similarity in these names being the first vowel sound, though I found it an easy matter to establish connexions by association between them and Grave-ill-ers, as follows: Etretat, Etre = to be, "To be or not to be, that is the question" (Hamlet). The connexion with "graves" is obvious. The second part of the word, etat, aetat (Latin), generally found on tomb stones, and in obituary notices; Etaples, common pronunciation, "ate apple," reminds me of the penalty on Adam's disobedience (*see* Gen. ii, v, 17). The connexions are obvious, though I am bound to say that I am not aware of any morbid interest in death.

Turning now to the forgotten word itself, and taking first the part that was most obscured, *ill*. At once there comes to my mind the only illness that has been of any consequence in my life. But it certainly cannot be described as grave, nor was I ever under the impression that it could. Possibly my fear was that it was not grave enough to enable me to escape from an impending situation that I could not help but regard with some degree of forboding. Of course I was not aware of this at the time, but when I review the course that the illness

took, the two partial recoveries that I made, when I over-hastily took up my work in such a way that it was almost certain to aggravate the trouble, when I remember that I did finally manage to evade the dreaded situation, I am bound to admit that the "unconscious wish" to be ill had no small bearing on the course of the trouble. There are several other facts which point in the same direction. Such an experience one does not usually regard with pride. Taking now the first syllable of the word, Gré, my associations are, malgré, mal—ill. Gré—wish, liking, pleasure. Already sufficient associations have been given to show that the significance of the word Grévillers is overdetermined as "desired illness." Similarly if I take the syllables, villers, the associations lead back to an incident, which even now I cannot help regarding with some degree of repugnance.

We have given this example in some detail to indicate the way in which rather more difficult cases may be attacked. But the reader will probably be inclined to doubt the validity of such analysis till he has tried similar ones for himself. A little practice in such self-examination will serve to put us on our guard against the attempt to find a refuge from reality in such excuses as forgetting, accident, overwork, illness. It should not be imagined, however, that we are maintaining that the "unconscious wish" is the only factor, and that there are no genuine cases of accident, overwork, or illness, but what is maintained is that they are far more rare than is commonly supposed.

CHAPTER VII

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND EDUCATION

A SATISFACTORY theory of education can only be built up on a satisfactory philosophy, a sound ethic and an adequate psychology. We may, therefore, dismiss at once the idea that such a theory can be constructed on a basis of pure psycho-analysis. We cannot emphasize too plainly, in view of certain claims that have been made, that psycho-analysis is not a "new psychology." The utmost that its founder would claim is that it is a new and exceedingly important development of psychological theory and technique. Further we do not believe it is desirable, necessary or possible to apply the full technique of this method to the task of educating the ordinary child. And finally, we must remember that rapid as the growth of this study has been, it is still in its infancy and it would be nothing less than a blunder and a crime to allow our children to be the victims of some enthusiast with a smattering of what is recognized as a most difficult and complicated branch of knowledge. Nevertheless, we believe it can throw a great amount of light on the problems of education, suggest new view-points, and furnish some guiding principles. From what has been said in previous chapters it will be recognized that two of the chief aims should be the elimination, as far as possible of the methods that work by repression, and the provision of opportunities of sublimation. We shall now consider briefly from this point of view the two great educational institutions, the home and the school,

and then the new movement inspired by the ideal of "Freedom in Education," the problem of sexual enlightenment, and finally the nature and possibilities of sublimation.

I. THE HOME

Psycho-analysis recognizes in the home, even in these days of universal, compulsory education, the chief factor in the determination of the life and career of the individual. It is the first five years of a child's life that are of the greatest importance in the shaping of his character and attitude to the world, and we are beginning to realize that these are of far greater importance than the acquirement of knowledge or of skill. In these five years the home has almost undisputed sway. And in the home the factor of greatest significance is not the economic, far-reaching as that may be, nor yet the explicit efforts directed towards training and discipline, nor even the example of the parents, but something deeper and more powerful still, what we may call, in its widest sense, the spiritual relations of child and parent. We have already drawn attention to the part that the parent relation plays in the production of nervous disorders. This alone would be sufficient to indicate that an influence that is able to bring about such baneful results must be powerful indeed.

This problem of family relationship has been made the subject of a series of most interesting psychological experiments by Miss Fürst, M.D., a pupil of Dr. Jung. By means of the latter's word association method described in Chapter II, she examined twenty-four families, consisting altogether of one hundred test persons; the resulting material amounted to 22,200 associations." The responses were classified into fifteen groups for each separate person, according to the type

of the response. The percentage of each type was worked out and compared both for related and unrelated persons, and then the average for the whole fifteen groups. It was found that the greatest difference in the types of response was to be found in unrelated female persons, closely followed by unrelated males. The least difference was between mother and daughters, closely followed by father and sons. The general difference between mothers and children was notably less than the difference between fathers and children. The reader will remember that in this experiment that a series of simple words is enunciated one by one and the subject is asked to give the first word that comes into his mind without stopping to think. Bearing this in mind the comment of Jung upon the experiment will be understood. "One might think that in this experiment, where full scope is given to chance, individuality would become a factor of the utmost importance, and that, therefore, one might expect a very great diversity and lawlessness of associations. But as we see the opposite is the case. Thus the daughter lives contentedly in the same circle of ideas as her mother, not only in her thought but in her form of expression; indeed, she even uses the same words. What could be regarded as more inconsequent, inconstant, and lawless than a fancy, a rapidly passing thought? It is not lawless, however, neither is it free, but closely determined within the limits of the milieu."¹ If such slight and superficial activities of the mind are so much influenced by the family environment, how much more should we expect, Jung asks, the more important conditions of the mind, the emotions, wishes and hopes, and intentions to be determined by that environment?

Most of us, probably at some time or other have laughed at some fond mother's exaggerated ideas of the intelligence of her infant child, but it is quite possible that she was nearer the truth than we were. It may be

¹ Jung, "Analytical Psychology."

true that the child's intelligence was not sufficiently developed for it to grasp the meaning of the words addressed to it, but the child has a remarkable emotional sensitivity, which often impels it to behave as though it really understood. We must remember that the wide differences that exist between the thought capacities of child and adult are far greater than the differences of emotional capacity. Even a young infant of little more than a year old is quite capable of manifesting signs of most of the great primary emotions, and very early his emotional life begins to organize itself into the simpler sentiments. Then again psychological observation goes to show that as a rule, the more restricted the powers of thought, the more sensitive is the emotional life within its range. For these reasons we regard the emotional atmosphere in the home as of the very utmost significance in the education of the child. Long before it can walk or talk the personality of mother and father, and especially the former are leaving their indelible mark on its young mind. The words of Jung on this subject are deserving of the most careful consideration by every parent and teacher. "It is not the good and pious precepts, nor is it any other inculcation of pedagogic truths that have a moulding influence upon the character of the developing child, but what most influences him is the peculiarly affective state which is totally unknown to his parents and educators. The concealed discord between the parents, the secret worry, the repressed and hidden wishes, all these produce in the individual a certain affective state with its objective signs which slowly but surely, though unconsciously, works its way into the child's mind, producing therein the same conditions and hence the same reactions to external stimuli. We know the depressing effect mournful and melancholic persons have upon us. A restless and nervous individual infects his surroundings with unrest and dissatisfaction, a grumbler with his discontent, etc. Since grown-up persons are so sensi-

tive to surrounding influences, we should certainly expect this to be even more noticeable among children, whose minds are as soft and plastic as wax. The father and mother impress deeply into the child's mind the seal of their personality; the more sensitive and mouldable the child the deeper is the impression. Thus things that are never even spoken about are reflected in the child. The child imitates the gesture, and just as the gesture of the parent is the expression of an emotional state, so in turn the gesture gradually produces in the child a similar feeling, as it feels itself, so to speak, into the gesture. Just as the parents adapt themselves to the world, so does the child."¹

This is so excellently expressed and backed by such an extensive experience that we hesitate to qualify it in any way. But we would warn the reader against forming the impression that the last two sentences may possibly leave, that it is all, or even mainly, a matter of imitation. The child's emotional response is far more sensitive and immediate than that. There can be no doubt that there are times when, to use McDougall's terminology, *the emotion is sympathetically induced, before the gesture is copied.*² Further it should not be thought that the child's adaptation is always a mere repetition of the parents'. The child's individuality is rarely obliterated to that extent, and the identification which such an adaptation involves is frequently modified by reaction formations to a parent who is feared or hated. But these observations only serve to emphasize more strongly the warnings to which Jung has here given expression.

But the question naturally arises in view of these considerations, Why is it that good and respectable people frequently have children who are quite the

¹ Op. cit., p. 126.

² Jung is perfectly well aware of this. In his Introduction to Mrs. Evans' "Problem of the Nervous Child," he says, "the infantile imitation is less concerned with the action than with the parent's state of mind from which the action emanates."

reverse? It would be foolish to answer this question with a sweeping generalization. Each particular case demands to be examined on its own merits. But many cases find their explanation in this direction. The goodness of the parents, to put it in general terms, is a reaction formation from, rather than a sublimation of, certain base impulses. In their earlier years, conscious of these impulses they turned away from them with revulsion and loathing. The result is that these tendencies are still active but find expression in harsh and immoderate condemnation. It is very probable that the children will inherit strong tendencies in the same direction. The harsh condemnation then only brings these things all the more vividly into consciousness, and thereby reinforces the already strong desire. If this desire is not satisfied in defiance of parental admonition, it not infrequently leads to "kicking over the traces" and its unpredictable consequences.

But it is possible that the explanation may be found in the fact that the parents were themselves subjected to stern discipline, and their undesirable impulses thereby checked. Then with a vague and perhaps scarcely realized desire they give their children the "freedom" which they so sorely missed, they allow them latitude without being able to sublimate the impulses that are receiving full play. It is a matter of common observation that parents often look to their children for the fulfilment of their own unrealized desires. But it is not only the conscious wish that is thus fulfilled, but also the unconscious tendency. For this reason Jung frequently advises in the case of young patients the treatment of the mother rather than the child. But let it be clearly understood that these considerations are not offered as a final answer to the question before us, but rather as an indication of the lines along which an explanation may probably be found.

It is not necessary, perhaps, to say very much about the special problem of only and favourite children.

The danger is well known. But the real peril is that we may see the mistakes of other people in this respect, while we are often blinded by our complexes to our own. A most interesting study of this question is to be found in the story of the Hebrew patriarchs as recorded in the book of Genesis. Ishmael, the son of Abraham and Hagar, the Egyptian bondslave, develops an inferiority complex through being deprived of his rightful place in the family life and compensates for it by becoming a skilled archer and a rebel against society, while Isaac, the pampered and petted son of his parents' old age, is a nonentity. In the next generation a tragedy is narrowly averted between Esau and Jacob whose rivalry, if not originally caused, was fomented by the favouritism of the father towards the one, and of the mother towards the other. It is interesting to note that Jacob marries his cousin on his mother's side, and between the wife, Rachel, and the mother, Rebecca, there was at least one explicitly stated resemblance. They were both deceitful. As psycho-analysis has shown over and over again, the choice of a wife is largely determined, in many cases, by the mother image. In the third generation the same family tragedy was again barely escaped. This time it was due to Jacob's favouritism of Joseph and afterwards of Benjamin. Indeed there can be little doubt that Brill is right in finding that many of the difficulties that have arisen in the course of the checkered history of the Jews have been caused by their deep conviction that they were Jehovah's peculiar people. It should not be thought, however, that we wish to maintain that "only" children are the inevitable victims of their position. Much depends on the common sense of the parents, and the opportunities that are provided of getting in touch with the outside world, and of mixing with other children. The position of favourite children is much more unfortunate. Here the parents are definitely to blame, and the problem is almost sure to be further

complicated by the jealous regard of the other children of the family.

Such considerations as these point to the conclusion that the child should not be denied a reasonable meed of affection, nor on the other hand swamped with sentimental indulgence. Either extreme is bound to produce baneful results. He should not be encouraged to waste his emotional energies in an undue attachment to the parents, or in resentment against real or imaginary wrongs, but his energies should rather be directed towards the tackling of the problems of his environment. The aim of the parent should be the graduation of those difficulties and an adjustment of them to his growing capacities. Interference should be reduced to a minimum, and should be directed towards the end of inducing the child to find his satisfaction in the tackling and overcoming of difficulties rather than in the pleasure of external rewards or the avoiding of the pain of external penalties. As far as possible he should learn from experience rather than from the exhortations and other types of interference of his would-be educators. Holt in his "Freudian Wish" has a chapter on the subject which is well worth attention. At the same time we readily admit that when we come up against the concrete problem it is often anything but easy of solution. It may be possible as Holt suggests, to let a little toddler get just sufficient contact with fire to know that it can be unpleasant as well as attractive, but he cannot be allowed to learn by experience the physiological effects of coal gas, by being allowed to play with the brass taps of the kitchen stove. It is true that much may be done by reducing the number of provoking but dangerous objects in his environment, and the provision of other objects of interest, but the problem cannot always be solved in this way. Sooner or later the child must learn not to touch the taps. The more such problems can be postponed till the child is able to understand and accept the simple word of

his parents, the better. But we do not think it is desirable to eliminate entirely all forms of punishment and reward from the training of a young and active child, but they should be reduced to a minimum, and should be as rational and impersonal as it is possible to make them. Too often punishment is just the abreaction of angry feelings, and not infrequently the expression of a definitely sadistic impulse. It may be necessary to remind some people that a child does not necessarily commit a crime because he acts in a way that is inconvenient to his elders.

It should scarcely be necessary at this stage, to point out the desirability of trying to discover the causes that underlie cases of misconduct. Such cases often take the form of a compromise formation, by means of which a tendency which is denied its natural expression, finds its satisfaction in some other way. In this connexion Healy's "Mental Conflict and Misconduct" is full of illuminating material. He cites in some detail the results of a mental analysis of forty cases selected out of 150 in which he found misconduct was determined by mental conflict. The cases cover kleptomania, bad temper, extreme wilfulness, destructiveness, running away from home, and malicious cruelty. It is a significant fact that Healy found in practically every case that "sex" played a large part in the production of the conflict, either in actual sexual experiences, or in sexual knowledge improperly acquired from bad companions, or through some stigma or doubt attaching to the child's parentage, etc. The examination of the cases reveals that often the child had no desire to steal or run away, that he gained nothing but trouble and pain by these activities, but was apparently under a kind of compulsion which the child himself often realized was connected with the sex interests. We will cite by way of illustration Case 3. It was of a boy of ten years, who was guilty of repeated acts of stealing and staying away from home at nights. His self-revelation is as

pathetic as it is artless. Healy gives the following extract in the boy's own words: "That kid I was telling you about was the first I heard bad words from. He was one of the kids that was in the barn that I was telling you about, where the rag-man was. I never told mamma about him. His family moved away now. He would tell bad words in the settlement house. I think of these: that's how it spoils me. I used to tell bad words, but no more. When a kid gets to know these things, he feels like saying them out. I don't no more: it makes me sick. . . . If I see a girl going to the store, I think about what they said about taking money away. I think of things. *It sounds it—it sounds it*; I don't like to tell about them, I'm ashamed. . . . Sure, it comes to my mind about robbing. When it comes in mind to take things, I get sort of scared, and then maybe I take it and put it down in my hand like this, roll it in my sweater sleeve. They don't like me in our house, my pa don't. . . . The teachers say they don't want me because I spoil the other boys. . . ."¹ Not so long ago, the only "cure" for such a case would have been the birch. It makes one sick to think of the intolerable wrong.

In reviewing these cases Dr. Healy is unable to find any explanation in family history, in nationality, in general abilities or special mental characteristics, or in environmental circumstances. The cases came from all ranks and conditions of society. But he makes one very significant comment. "There is one common feature, however, that belongs to what may be called the *psychical environment*. These misdoers with mental conflicts never had anyone near to them, particularly in family life, who supplied opportunities for sympathetic confidences. Repression has gone on very largely as the result of this need."² All too often the mind of

¹ P. 95.

² W. Healy, "Mental Conflict and Misconduct," p. 321. Kegan Paul, 1920.

the child is a sealed book to the parent, sealed by a lack of candour and sympathetic insight very often on the part of well-meaning parents. But we shall return to this subject in a later section.

It may possibly be objected that these are exceptional cases. In the offences that were committed it is true, but it must be borne in mind that as far as the most careful and expert examination could discover the vast majority of these children were otherwise perfectly normal. It must be remembered further that the mechanisms that were apparently responsible for these offences are at work to some extent in the mind of every child. It is the obvious duty, therefore, of every parent to try and win the child's confidence. It is not to be obtained by coercion, or by suspicious prying. But confidence begets confidence, and candour begets candour, while fear breeds fear and repression breeds repression. In view of these considerations it can hardly be denied that the thing that is of outstanding importance in the upbringing of a child is the character and spiritual quality of the parents, and that the aim of the latter should be to avoid repressing the individuality of the child, and to encourage the growth of a rational independence that when the time comes for the adolescent to go forth and face life for himself he may do so with resolute spirit and a stout heart.

2. THE SCHOOL

Practically everything that has been said of the home has its bearing on the problem and work of the school. At the present time, when, under economic pressure so much disparaging criticism of our educational efficiency is rife, it may possibly be some little comfort to teachers that psycho-analysis bids parents look first of all a little nearer home for the cause of the alleged failure. But

such comfort will be very short-lived for every right-minded teacher. Such consolation is very like the gratitude that was expressed in the story of the church official who after bewailing the poor attendance at his church, heaved a sigh of relief and said, "But thank God the church over the road is doing no better!"

Just as in the home it is the personality of the parent that is the most powerful influence, so in the school it is the personality of the teacher that counts most. Methods and curricula are undoubtedly important, but even so their importance is secondary. This, of course, does not mean that the teacher should dominate, and certainly he should not domineer. Even in such methods as the Montessori, where the rôle of the teacher is reduced as far as possible to that of an observer, the teacher is still the most significant fact in the child's environment. In his discussion of this subject, Prof. Nunn says, of the Montessori directress, "She, with her superior powers and knowledge and her developed personality, is herself a constant and most important element in the environment, and exercises on the growing minds about her an influence that will be none the less decisive because it is brought to bear in the indirect form of suggestion and example rather than by precept and command. . . . Insensibly but surely her values become their values, her standards their standards; and from her come the influences that direct the children's social impulses into definite forms of kindly action."¹ "The Law of Normal Suggestibility," formulated by Boris Sidis on the basis of an extensive series of experiments, provides an illuminating comment on this passage "Normal suggestibility varies as indirect suggestion, and inversely as direct suggestion."²

The task of the teacher is, in several respects more complicated than that of the parent, though it is well

¹ Nunn, "Education: Its Data and First Principles," Arnold, 1920.

² Boris Sidis, "Psychology of Suggestion."

to remember that in at least one way it is rendered more simple. Education is the sole business of the teacher, while the average mother finds her time very largely taken up with other household duties, and the father's work rarely provides much leisure to devote to his offspring. But the parents have the advantage of beginning at the beginning, while the teacher, as a rule, only takes up her duties when the first five most important years are past. The child comes to her already bearing the indelible marks of the home. It is essential that the teacher should discover as accurately as possible what the general trends of the home influence are, and where they are satisfactory, strive to co-operate with them, and where they are harmful, wisely and tactfully to endeavour to counteract them. This task is admittedly not an easy one. No two scholars and no two homes are exactly alike. Economic necessity in the home and the size of the class in the school, to say nothing of the factor of personal inertia, lead to the adoption of measures and devices, of which the aim is rather to secure the amenability of the child than his true education. But there are two considerations worthy of note in this connexion. The time that is spent in getting to understand the child, and winning his confidence and co-operation, will probably be more than saved later on, when instead of having to repeat lessons again and again in the endeavour to drive them home into a recalcitrant mind, or one that is inhibited by misgivings, the child responds with eagerness and confidence, and the lessons are learnt with a minimum of friction and loss of time. Further, if the spontaneous interests of the scholar were more utilized, and methods of self-education more extensively adopted, as in the Montessori method, the size of the class would constitute a less serious difficulty. By a wise use of the child's spontaneous interests the teacher's time might be considerably economized, and what is more important the child would bring to his work a unified interest and good-

will which would enable him to make the most of his natural gifts. Undoubtedly it is one of the most hopeful signs of the schools of to-day that they are curbing less that natural spontaneity which is the rightful possession of every child. The writer has personal knowledge of a school where twenty years ago, the ideal of goodness instilled by *force majeure* into the scholars' mind was to sit absolutely motionless with arms folded behind the back, and the children were allowed to believe that the further back they were able to hold their heads the more nearly they reached perfection. Any day an observer might see children from three to six years of age coming out of that school, and here and there he would see a little fellow with his cap peeping from under his blouse, marching the whole length of the playground with his arms still folded behind his back, apparently not realizing till he was right outside of the school precincts that he was free to relax. Such "discipline" can only create slaves or rebels.

Another difficulty the teacher has to contend with is the rigid school furniture, the rigid time-table and the rigid regulations. There is no doubt that these "rigidities" will have to yield if real progress is to be made. In the present day, however, it looks as if progress must take a "back seat" in the interests of economy. But "where there is a will there is a way." Finance is not an insuperable obstacle; it is more frequently an excuse to justify spiritual inertia which is the real obstacle. If teachers know what they want and have the courage to fight for it and the willingness to sacrifice for it, the strongest departmental opposition and the most obstinate social lethargy will yield. The real difficulty, we believe, lies in finding out what is really wanted. In this quest psycho-analysis may render real service.

But the teacher may ask, has this study any contribution to make with regard to the details of the curriculum? On this question we can only offer a few

general observations. The aim of education, as it appears to psycho-analysis, is the development of the individual so that he may make his maximum contribution to society and find in it his maximum satisfaction. It is obvious, therefore, that the child should acquire at least the rudiments of that knowledge and skill without which he is bound to be seriously incapacitated in taking his place in modern society. The training of the senses is undoubtedly desirable, especially the senses of sight, hearing and touch, for these are the chief gateways to the outer world. The average person probably imagines that these senses need no training, but then the average person has "eyes and sees not, ears and hears not," and is quite oblivious of the fact. It will be more readily agreed that the child should be able to read and write and be capable of simple arithmetical calculations. History, geography, literature, science, music, art, and manual training are all desirable, but the aim of the elementary school, it seems to us, should be to link these subjects to the child's actual interests and to awaken the desire for knowledge rather than to attempt to crowd his mind with facts. The question of religious training is the most difficult of all. To us the religious ideal stands for the final synthesis of all mental activity, both in thought and action, and the reconciliation of all the diverse interests of mankind in mutual service and fellowship. But we are a long way from that. Meanwhile we do not see what good is to be expected from religious training as long as it is left in the hands of teachers who have no religious faith and often no religious interest, or on the other hand to enthusiasts who have neither natural nor acquired qualifications for teaching. We do not wish to convey the impression that this is the universal state of affairs, but undoubtedly it is all too common.

We have said that psycho-analysis suggests as the aim of education the fitting of the individual to take his place in the world and in social life. If this aim is

sound then it follows as a consequence that our schools should be organized so as to make the transition from the home and the nursery to the workshop and the world as smooth and satisfactory as possible. It is impossible to reproduce in the school all the varied conditions the adolescent will meet in the world and it would not be desirable if it could be done. But at present the transition is far too abrupt. After being sheltered and shepherded in the school, he is turned out to fight and fend for himself as best he can, very often in the most critical years of his life. What is needed is such an arrangement of school life, especially in the later years, as will provide the scholar with *practical* lessons in self-control, independence and sound judgment by means of actual experience. To this end it is desirable that a certain amount of time should be set aside, at any rate for the older scholars, when tasks and plans of their own choosing, should be executed with a minimum of external aid or regulation. If, as is very possible, this involves a certain amount of confusion and conflict amongst the individual aims, the scholars should talk over their schemes in council with the view of devising a scheme by which these difficulties could be overcome. The teacher should interfere as little as possible and avoid settling difficulties by arbitrary decrees, seeking rather to indicate lines along which the children may find a solution of their troubles. They should be encouraged to talk in a simple and natural way to the teacher about their work and aims, not as to one to whom they are accountable, or of whom they stand in fear, but rather as to an interested and experienced friend. Further the recent developments of the Continuation Schools should provide the wise and sympathetic teacher with an opportunity of making the transition from school to workshop and business less abrupt. But boys at this age are not the most accessible of beings and are apt to regard the school as a menace to their freedom and as an unwelcome reminder that they are still boys. Hence

arise the challenge and temptation to rule with a strong hand. But the result of such measures is only to postpone the problem and render it more acute.

If psycho-analysis emphasizes the necessity of providing each individual with the fullest opportunities for development, it emphasizes not less the necessity of a healthy development of corporate life. The neurosis, as Jones reminds us, is essentially a social disorder, arising from, and perpetuating, social maladjustment. Here again, it is the personality of the teacher or parent that constitutes no small part of the difficulty, because with the best of intentions he is apt to dominate the situation. If the teacher is of a masterful spirit, he thereby overstimulates both the self-abasement and the self-assertion tendencies. The consequence is, that the children manifest in their relations to him, too great a degree of subservience, and in their relations to one another are inclined to be too overbearing so that they can only find a solution of their differences by a trial of brute strength. Rather should the teacher strive, by a wise self-effacement, to encourage the spirit of comradeship and co-operation which will lead the children to seek for themselves, a fair and equitable way out of their social difficulties.

Another aim of education suggested by the study on which we are engaged is the increasing of the powers of the child's adaptability. No educator can foresee what will be the future history of his charges, or what will be the nature of the social changes which will affect their lives. It is, therefore, very desirable that the child should learn to adapt himself to unexpected situations, and to face disappointments with such courage and resourcefulness, that he may make even these, as far as possible, serve his own legitimate ends.

There is one other question of very great interest to every educator, to which we must refer in this all-too-brief survey. It is the question of the child's intelligence. Ingenious tests have been devised by M. Alfred

Binet, of Paris, and developed by later investigators with a view to measuring intelligence. But analysis has revealed that a child's apparent intelligence is determined not merely by his native endowments, but also by his acquired unconscious "resistances." Physical factors, such as mal-nutrition, adenoids, etc., are now commonly recognized as playing a great part in determining the child's capacity, but the psychical factor of resistance is either overlooked or mis-interpreted. Many a scholar fails to make the most of his gifts because he is inhibited by fear or misgivings, or is animated by an unconscious hostility to the teacher, very probably a transference from one or other of his parents, or he is in the grip of an inferiority complex, which is also probably of family origin. It is possible that the backwardness may apply to only one or two subjects. In that case it is frequently that the pupil has a resistance against that subject on account of some unpleasant, but unrealized associations. In such cases it is rarely of much use to resort to questioning, exhorting or punishing. The teacher must endeavour to discover the causes of the trouble. A detailed psycho-analysis is rarely necessary. As a rule the child's unconscious is easily accessible to the sympathetic mind that is not blinded by its own complexes. It is usually quite sufficient to win the child's confidence and then to encourage him to talk freely. It is, perhaps, scarcely necessary to point out that the teacher who is in the habit of employing sarcasm or stinging ridicule as aids to discipline will make little headway in this direction. The discovery of the causes will suggest the remedy as far as it lies in the teacher's power. Indeed with the winning of the child's confidence the battle is more than three parts won. These considerations bring us face to face with the problem of freedom.

3. EDUCATION AND FREEDOM

It has been impossible entirely to avoid any reference to this question in considering the place of the home and the school in the work of education. We have only reserved it for separate attention because of its special importance from the point of view from which we are looking at the problem of education, and because of the great interest it is arousing in educational circles to-day.

The question of "freedom" is one involving extensive and subtle psychological and philosophical implications. We must perforce be content with a few observations on the subject. Democracy in the State involves freedom as an educative ideal. The old dictum, "that man is everywhere born free," is in flagrant contradiction to the facts. The new-born child is the most helpless and dependent of creatures, utterly devoid of all but the barest potentialities of freedom, and equally incapable of respecting the rights to it in others. It is only by education that he can enter into the liberty which a free community provides. There are, then, two aspects of freedom that must be carefully distinguished, which we may call *personal* freedom and *social* freedom. The latter is determined by the nature (not the multiplicity) of the laws, traditions and public opinion of the community. That community is most free which provides its members with the widest choice of ends and the fullest facilities for realizing them. But a man may be free by the law and customs of the State to enter any one of a hundred different occupations, but if he is lacking in the qualifications for these tasks, to use Prof. Hobhouse's phrase he is not "free by the law of the facts." He is lacking in personal freedom, and this is only to be obtained by education. In the same way social freedom can only be created and maintained by awakening within the

individual a sacred regard for the rights of freedom in others. "Freedom through education," should be the watch-word of democracy.

But the movement to which we referred above does not regard freedom merely as an end, but also as a means to that end. Its watchword is "*Freedom in Education.*" It works on the principle that the individual can only learn to be free by being free to learn. It is contended that coercion and constraint are bound to produce a certain amount of dissociation and a consequent dissipation of energy, and that as a matter of experimental fact children do learn more quickly and effectively when wise use is made of their spontaneous interests. Various methods have been devised to embody these ideas, the best known being that of Dr. Maria Montessori. With these efforts the psycho-analyst is bound to evince the keenest sympathy. But he is also bound to draw attention to these facts which may be easily overlooked. Spontaneity is not identical with freedom. The flock of sheep that rushes headlong over a precipice, following a leader who has caught sight of some toothless old mongrel, is not free. Nor is the child free who simply obeys the imitative impulse to carry out a certain activity, even though that activity is useful and not harmful. He is only truly free when he learns to think and act for himself and learns to think and act rationally. Further the child who is labouring under the tyranny of a parent or inferiority complex cannot be free no matter what may be the nature of the school environment. And it is on this spiritual freedom of the individual that psycho-analysis lays its supreme emphasis.

The reader who is interested in the effort to translate the ideal of "*Freedom in Education*" into practice, will find some interesting illustrations of what is being done in this direction, in Miss Alice Wood's "*Education Experiments in England.*" But a consideration of these experiments reveals the necessity of emphasizing

the importance of *personal* freedom. To provide the child with an environment where coercion and restraint are reduced to a minimum is desirable, but it is not enough. To some extent it is true that social freedom helps towards personal freedom. But in many cases, if not in all, something more is needed. And that "something more" cannot be obtained by the most skilful and liberal organization. It will depend almost entirely upon what we may call "mental contacts," of scholar with scholar, and especially of scholar with teacher. If the teacher is not free from the desire to domineer, free from vanity, free from the lust for spectacular results with the least expenditure of energy, if affection is not kept untainted with sentimentality, if in a word, the teacher is not spiritually free, neither can the children be free or learn to be free. But with this must go insight into the working of the individual child's mind, especially into the working of its deeper strata. To discover what are the impulses that are not finding satisfaction, what tendencies are being warped by the influence of home or companions—this is an essential if the child is to be led into true liberty. The way to this discovery lies through the child's day-dreams. To be able to win and deserve this confidence seems to us the hall-mark of the true teacher. Freedom and friendship go hand-in-hand. The supreme requirements of the teacher are character and discernment. Knowledge in the ordinary sense is important, but it is subordinate to them.

In conclusion we would repeat that it is beyond the province of this study to formulate a complete theory of education. Even in this brief sketch we must plead guilty to having trespassed on other domains. The observations we have ventured to make need to be amplified and orientated in the light of the facts to be obtained from other branches of knowledge. After all man is not merely an animal with an unconscious. But the theory which ignores the unconscious is seriously

incomplete in that it fails to take account of a most powerful dynamic for weal or woe in the psychic life of man.

4. SEXUAL EDUCATION

It is becoming increasingly recognized that the education of the child is deplorably incomplete if it ignores the tremendous significance and power of the sexual instinct. If there is any truth in the theories that we have endeavoured to expound in this book, then such an omission comes perilously near to reducing education to a systematized process of evasion. Fortunately, however, we often build better than we know, and without realizing it, provide opportunities for the partial sublimation of these impulses. But in these days of scientific enquiry we can never rest contented with such an attitude, nor can we regard it as being adequate to the needs of the child. The process of sublimation is rarely, if ever complete. As a rule all it can do is to effect a certain amount of relief from the definitely sexual urge. The facts must still be faced. The problem is undoubtedly one of great difficulty and delicacy, and possibly always will be. There is a considerable difference of opinion as to how it should be tackled, though these tend to converge on two or three main principles. It is universally agreed that the conspiracy of silence must cease. It is both futile and dangerous. A child probably never entirely outgrows the effects of learning the root facts of life from vulgar and possibly obscene sources. Even if the effort to shield him from these is successful, he is still exposed to the danger of unguided fantasies. The impression that some parents have, that because their children never speak about these things they never think about them, has been proved in case after case to be utterly

erroneous. Because the subject is difficult that is all the more reason why the child should not be left to haphazard discovery. We shall now endeavour briefly to indicate what seem to be the best lines of procedure.

In the first place the sexual instinct should be shielded as far as possible from unnecessary stimulation. This stimulation may be internal or external. With regard to the former, if a child is found to be over-interested in its sexual organs, one visit to the doctor will probably be sufficient to put this matter right. In any case stern threats and punishment should be avoided. If they secure apparent success they are almost bound to turn that interest into a secret but fearful fascination. The parent may be successful in controlling the child's actions, but such methods only drive the trouble inward and accentuate it. It is far better to engage the attention in external objects and thus divert it from the self. If it is necessary to speak, this should be done in matter-of-fact, everyday tones, and epithets calculated to arouse disgust and fear should be avoided. Another recommendation on which psycho-analysts are unanimous, is that children over twelve months of age should not sleep in the same room as their parents. The reason for this is, that, as we have already explained, a child's emotional sensibility is far greater than the range of his understanding, and he is capable of being profoundly moved by things of which he has the very vaguest intellectual apprehension. Another common practice which should be avoided is that of tickling. This is undoubtedly a form of sexual stimulation and gratification. Young people should not indulge in literature or entertainments whose principal appeal is to the erotic motive. This does not include merely what is commonly recognized as vulgar or immoral. Many a novel that ends up with the orthodox wedding bells is quite capable of arousing a most powerful sexual interest, and not infrequently gives a totally false impression of the realities of life. In this respect,

at least, Sir Walter Scott is a more healthy influence for the adolescent than Charlotte Brontë.

The second principle that should be observed is that of absolute candour. Evasion, deception and lies should be eschewed. It is time the stork and the apple-tree were dead, and the doctor's bag buried with them. The child's questions should receive simple straightforward answers. But there is no need to go beyond what the child wants to know. Further, candour does not mean bluntness. There is no reason why birth should not have its poetry as well as youthful love. But the poetry must not conceal the truth, but bring out its real beauty. These simple truths should be imparted by the parents, preferably by the mother, and no pains should be spared on their part to find out the best way to carry out this responsibility. It is their sacred duty and privilege. If they fail there must always be a gulf between them and the children which nothing else can bridge. Too often parents have not the slightest idea how it should be done. It is as much their business to find out as it is to feed and clothe their offspring. It must be remembered, too, that it is not merely a question of knowledge. Unless birth and love are beautiful in their own eyes they cannot make them appear beautiful to the young mind, which is keenly sensitive to pretence and insincerity. The complexes of the parents are "visited upon the children unto the third and fourth generations." The only thing to do is to get rid of the complex.

The question as to whether definite sexual instruction should be given in schools is a very difficult one. But one thing we hold most strongly. We can never regard it as a satisfactory state of affairs if such instruction is regarded as a substitute for parental. But so many parents are so hopelessly incompetent or negligent, or both, that it seems almost a necessity to look outside the home for any immediate solution of the problem. On the other hand it is necessary to ask whether school

teachers as a body are qualified to carry out this delicate piece of work. Again we repeat, it is not merely a question of knowledge. It is a question of attitude and personal fitness. The subject must not be made to appear funny to the scholars, as in a case we recently heard of, nor should it be made to appear a shameful thing. No teacher should be compelled to teach it, feeling that it is a distasteful duty that must be got through somehow. The solution that appears most satisfactory to us is the institution by educational authorities of travelling lectureships in "Physical and Mental Hygiene." For this purpose teachers should be most carefully selected and thoroughly trained in the physiology and psychology of sex, as well as in the general principles of hygiene. They should visit the various schools in their district, not to give lessons on this one topic, but they should treat it in its natural place in a course of lessons on "The Care of the Body and the Mind." The lessons should be given to boys and girls separately by members of their own sex. If this were thoroughly and wisely carried out we believe it would be a great national gain.

But individual difficulties are likely to arise at puberty when the child needs a wise and intimate friend. The parents should be ready to fill that need.

Finally, instruction in these subjects forms but a small part of true sexual education, if it is true that sex covers the wide field that psycho-analysis has ascribed to it. There is the still larger task of sublimation. We must now consider this question in more detail.

5. SUBLIMATION

Dr. Ernest Jones has given this subject fairly full consideration in Chapters XXXV and XXXVII of his "Papers on Psycho-analysis." He defines sublimation

in the words of Freud as "the capacity to exchange an originally sexual aim for another one which is no longer sexual, though it is psychically related." He then distinguishes four characteristics of true sublimation. In the first place, using our own terminology, it is not the substitution of one tendency for another, but rather the directing of the original tendency towards another, and, more satisfactory end, for instance the childish desire to exhibit the body is sublimated into the exhibition of prowess in work or in games. Secondly, the process is mainly an unconscious one. It may sometimes be initiated deliberately, but unless the new goal eventually becomes capable of arousing spontaneous interest there is no real sublimation. The third fact that he points out is that this process takes place chiefly in childhood. Hence it is of especial importance to the educator. Finally, he reminds the reader that it is not sexual interest in the narrower sense of the term, but that complex of tendencies with its variety of objects and aims as described in the last section of Chapter IV of this book.

In Chapter XXXVII he considers the factors on which the process depends. There are three: the strength of the original impulse, the force of the repressing activity, and the opportunities provided by the environment for a transition on to suitable objects. With regard to each of these factors there are two things at any rate that we need to know. What is the effect of each and how far is it accessible to control? If the impulse is too strong it will seek its primitive gratification in spite of every obstacle and every effort at sublimation. All that can be done is to avoid stimulating it as far as possible. If, for instance, the emotional reaction to one or other of the parents is excessive, the parent should seek to avoid as far as possible arousing that emotion. If this policy is consistently followed and not too much pressure is exerted to bring about the desired change, then the impulse may

be eventually sufficiently weakened to permit of satisfactory sublimation. The danger in such cases is that a parent, keenly interested in the welfare of the child, may be inclined to be over-anxious to expedite the process. All too often the child's display of emotion, of affection, hostility, or whatever it may be, calls out a strong emotional response in the parent which only serves to strengthen the impulse. Quietness and patience are more needed. Sublimation must have its own time. With the second factor, that of repression, the greater part of this book has been concerned. If it is too strong it may bring about nervous disorders, or at any rate compromise or reaction formations, which involve a considerable waste of energy in directions that are unprofitable to the individual or society. Thus repressed exhibitionism may lead to excessive shyness or bashfulness, repressed love leads to hate. This factor, however, is far more within the control of the educator. He can regulate and graduate to a very considerable extent the demands that are made upon the child. This must be governed by a consideration of the individual case, for ordinary observation reveals the fact that *one child may be more repressed by a word than another is by a blow*. The demands that are made upon the child should be so adjusted that they constitute a challenge to his powers, a challenge that he will soon learn to find a joy in meeting. It follows, therefore, that the method which seeks to put every child through the same stereotyped process must prove unsatisfactory. And this is equally true of the third factor, the provision of suitable opportunities for the redirecting of primitive tendencies. If we take two children in whom the impulse of curiosity is strong, in the one case the impulse may be complicated with other tendencies which lead him to find his greatest satisfaction in prying into the secrets of mechanical constructions, while in the other exploring expeditions may provide a more satisfactory outlet for his energies. While it is possible

that our schools might be so organized as to give a greater variety of opportunities for sublimation, it is evident that they can never be expected to meet fully such a tremendous demand. There will always be a need for the intelligent co-operation of parents and voluntary agencies of divers kinds, such as Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, Boys' and Girls' Clubs, etc. The difficulty here is that such agencies are too often at the mercy of unenlightened enthusiasm. In the case of the Scout and Guide movement, this difficulty is largely obviated by its organization and methods.

In connexion with this positive aspect, we must emphasize the concluding phrase of the definition of sublimation. The secondary object must be "psychically related" to the primary object of the impulse. If the connexion is too slight then the transition will be rendered too difficult or perhaps impossible. If the associations are too close, then the new object is apt to serve as a reminder of the old one, instead of being a way of escape from it. But the most the educator can do in this respect is to provide as large a variety of "occupation" as is possible, and let the child discover his own *métier*. If this process does not develop satisfactorily he should endeavour to discover the cause and apply the suitable remedy. Further, he should endeavour to show how the child's particular interest is linked up with others, so that they may gain an attraction which they fail to exert on their own account. The boy who is interested in machinery will of course, learn that this means he must acquire skill with his pencil and in mathematical calculation, etc.

But when all has been said it is easier to find out by analysis why a certain course in sublimation has been taken than to predict beforehand what is the most likely or the best course for any particular individual. We must leave him to work out his own sublimations as much as possible, or we shall be in danger of perpetuating the state of dependence which it should

be our aim to overcome. We may sum up briefly, then, the rules that should guide us in this work. Begin early. Avoid as far as possible stimulating impulses that are unusually strong. Do not force the pace. Give the child as wide a range of choice as circumstances will allow. Remember that all children have not the same capacity for sublimation.

When this work is satisfactorily accomplished the individual devotes his undivided energies to a worthy "life's task." He does not waste his strength in useless day-dreams, or stand wavering and irresolute before life's demands; he is not enervated by sentimentality, nor are his powers frittered away in petty personal resentments; he is neither obsequious nor overbearing, but in fellowship with all free men he marches steadily forward towards the goal of his heart's desire.

CHAPTER VIII

SOCIETY AND RELIGION

WE have seen that psycho-analysis is firstly a special psychological *technique* and secondly a psychological *theory*. It will be obvious that the technique cannot be applied to a community. We cannot submit a Trades Union or a Church to the process of free-association, though a great deal could probably be learned of the unconscious impulses which provide no small part of the dynamic of these social activities, if the method could be applied to a sufficient number of their members, especially to the leading spirits of these movements. Whether this is possible on a sufficiently wide scale, the future alone will reveal. The obstacles to such an inquiry are enormous and obvious. There is no need to dwell on them. On the other hand, the insight that has been obtained already into the working of the unconscious processes of the individual, may reasonably be expected to afford great help to our understanding of the genesis and development of social activities. A beginning in this direction has already been made. As examples we may mention Freud's "Totem and Taboo" in which he endeavours to lay bare the mental processes underlying these strange and widespread primitive institutions, and the recently published "Psycho-analysis and Sociology" in which Aurel Kolnai has attempted to discover the hidden springs of present-day Anarchist Communism. But the work has only just begun and it would be a great mistake, in our opinion, either to accept the results of such investigations as finally established truth, or to disregard them

as worthless generalizations based on insufficient evidence. Similar work is being done for religious phenomena by such men as Pfister, Silberer, Reik, Flournoy and Morel. The aim of these investigators is to discover the hidden psychical springs of social and religious activity. But the services of psycho-analysis are not exhausted in such investigations. It has its contributions to make to social and religious philosophy. It not only helps us to understand what *has been*, and what *is*, but it cannot be ignored when we are considering the question of what *ought to be*. It is from this standpoint that we shall consider its value in these departments of human interest. What is the nature of the society, and what is the nature of the religion which will do justice to the ascertained facts of man's unconscious nature?

First of all let us recognize that there are no questions of human interest that have suffered more at the hands of the amateur and the one-sided specialist than the two with which we are at present concerned. "The man in the street," and the "man in the study," the physicist and physiologist, the geographer and economist, the biologist and psychologist, have all at different times attempted to settle these questions from their own exclusive points of view. The psycho-analyst in facing these problems will do well to be warned by such attempts, and avoid the temptation to regard social activity as merely the functioning of a great unconscious. Society is not to be explained by metaphors and analogies. It is something unique and *sui generis*. It is neither mechanism, organism nor mind, but it is an interaction of minds in and through an environment, and these minds are both conscious and unconscious. All the psycho-analyst can legitimately do is to present the ascertained facts of man's unconscious nature to the social philosopher and leave him to take these into account together with other psychological data, as well as the relevant physical, economic, and biological facts when he is constructing his social theory. If we bear

this clearly in mind we may safely venture outside the strictly defined analytical province and indulge in social speculation which we must leave the social philosopher to evaluate and assimilate as best he can.

In a similar way he may consider the bearing of this theory on religious problems, leaving the final synthesis to the philosopher of religion. If the reader feels that this attitude is somewhat vague and evasive, let it be remembered how much wasted effort and disillusionment have been due to over hasty, dogmatic generalizations. We are always striving for finality in thought and security in religion, but the best we can attain is fertility and salvation. May it not be, that after all, these are the greater things? At any rate it is for this attitude that we venture to ask the reader's sympathy.

I. THE SOCIAL IDEAL

The first question we shall venture to consider from this standpoint is the nature of an ideal society. The answer of psycho-analysis is: a society that is free from neuroticism, a community, the behaviour of whose members is guided by the reality principle and not dominated by the pleasure-pain principle. But it may be objected that many of our greatest poets and artists have been neurotics. Are we to sacrifice the possibilities of art and literature to the dream of a peaceful but mediocre society? To this it may be replied that a number of artists have been analysed with no discernible trace of deteriorating effect upon their work, and that what art would lose in passion and tragic power, it would probably more than make up in serenity and joy. At any rate, a neurotic society is a tremendous price to pay for the poet and the artist.

If we accept this aim—the elimination of the neurotic element from the community—as, at any rate, a possible

goal, what does it demand in the social constitution? What can be done in the way of prevention, and what is necessary for cure?

We have seen already that according to psycho-analysis the chief incubator for nervous disorders is the home,¹ that the most important factor in the home is, usually, the mother, then the father and the rest of the family. From our point of view the supreme concern of the society is to produce psychically healthy parents, and, above all, mothers who are mentally sound. Fretful, worrying, nagging, obstinate, harsh or over-indulgent parents cannot but exercise a baneful influence upon their children. Must we then abolish family life? No doubt there are many cases where that is the only remedy. Parents who are totally incapable of exercising the parental functions should have their children taken away. As examples, we may mention alcoholic, immoral and brutal parents. But when all is said, there is no institution so good as a good home. Especially in the earlier years is it important. The best nurse and the wisest teacher are never able to make up for the lack of a good father and mother.

How then, shall society tackle the problem of improving itself in this respect? No doubt if psycho-analysis fulfils the hopes of its early apostles a great deal will be done through sound psychological treatment. But this will not be sufficient of itself. A readjustment of social relations and a reorganization of social activities are imperative. And in so far as the psychological treatment is effective it will hasten the time when these changes will be inevitable. The problem seems capable of being attacked from two directions, either by individual psychological treatment or by social readjustment. The most desirable course is that both methods should be used. The question for us here is—

¹ We are leaving out of consideration here the difficult eugenic problem of the need or desirability of the elimination of those strains which produce the "neurotic egg."

what is the nature of the social readjustment which is necessary to enable parents to exercise a healthy, spiritual influence over their children ?

In Chapter IV we saw that there are three factors at work according to Freud in every neurosis, congenital endowment, failure to sublimate sexual impulses, and current conflict. With regard to the first factor all we shall say is, that only in the worst cases should measures be adopted to prevent the perpetuation of the stirps in which such defects are found. As long as the individual is capable of taking his place in society and does not need to be restrained it is rather to psychological treatment we should look than to measures of prohibition and prevention. The problem of the mentally defective is, of course, quite different.

With reference to the second factor it will be remembered that sublimation takes place chiefly in childhood and that the main determinant outside of the child mind itself is the parent. We must begin with the neurotically inclined parent. The most satisfactory thing to do would be to resolve those fundamental conflicts which are the ultimate cause of the trouble. But something may be done to reduce the occasions of current conflict which are often the preliminary skirmishes before the bigger battle. It is here that social readjustment may be most helpful. If this appears to be demanding a very drastic remedy to secure only a relatively superficial improvement it should be remembered that if the neurotic element is ever eradicated from society, these social changes are bound to come in the end, for strange as it may seem, both the stability and the instability of the present social order are dependent in no small measure upon neurotic transferences. If there is any reliability to be placed upon the findings of psycho-analysis then both the docility and the intractability of the employee are "transferences" of the different father-attitudes to the employer or capitalist. In the same way the benevolent paternalism or stern despotism

of the employer is explained as an identification with similar father-images. "In a study of social unrest we shall find that the conduct of the labouring classes possesses in periods of unrest all the characteristics of that of an individual revolting under the influence of a repressed complex, all the quality of the behaviour of a neurotic son of a stern, unbending father. The attitude of the employer towards labour is also frequently the result of a pathological reaction due to subconscious fear."¹ From the standpoint of living the full life of a man, the labourer is just as right in his objection to well-meant paternalism as to over-bearing despotism. He has as much right to object to being bathed and taken out to play as to being told how he must vote at an election. Psycho-analysis emphasizes the fundamental right of a man to be treated as a man, and the equally fundamental duty of every man to be, not a slave, a fawner, a rebel, a demi-god, a wet-nurse, but a *man*. Why should a labourer who is making a contract to sell his labour be treated differently from a proprietor who is contracting to sell his land? The answer that the labourer would not understand civil treatment or would take advantage of it, if true, only confirms the contention with regard to him, and if untrue, proves our thesis with respect to the employer. For ourselves we believe the evidence points unmistakably to the conclusion that capitalist and employer are as much the victims of unconscious mechanism as those they employ. The conclusion of our argument is this—that when the slave or rebel through some transformation becomes a *man*, he will expect and demand to be treated as a man. Social relations will have to be adjusted to that claim. We can hasten that transformation by the gradual adjustment of the present relations to that anticipated demand. The first principle of our ideal society then is this. Treat every man with respect till he makes it

¹ Frank Watts. "Psychological Problems of Industry." 1921. Allen & Unwin.

an impossibility.¹ Treat no man with anything more than respect till he becomes something more than man.² This does not mean, of course, that the judgment of an expert in his own department should be valued at the same level as that of a mere smatterer. But it does mean that because a man is versed in the intricacies of high finance he has not thereby a right to expect any other man to play the part of "flunky." It is the failure to act on this first principle that perpetuates and aggravates in society the complexes that originated in the home.

The second principle of reconstruction is still more directly concerned with the third factor of the neurosis—the current conflict. It is this. Every man should have the opportunity to be a man. At present he is frequently little more than a cog in a wheel, a machine minder, a barrow pusher, a sledge swinger. The work in which the greater part of his working moments is occupied gives little or no scope for the satisfaction of that wonderful complex of instincts and impulses with which he is endowed. He is spiritually starved. Is it any wonder that he becomes a hungry rebel or a spiritless slave, or takes to drink as his only hope? The only interest he has in his work is the economic interest. The rest all too often is dull, dreary drudgery. Is it not hopeless to expect a man working under such conditions to manifest an altruism and a far-sighted concern for the welfare of the community which has only considered him in so far as it has been compelled by the force of his Trade Union? The point we wish to emphasize is this: that the economic issue which is so much to the fore in the present day is, no doubt, a real issue, it is almost the only conscious issue, but it is not the *only* issue. The reason for its overwhelming predominance is that industry has so evolved as to

¹ The case of the "impossible" man is treated later.

² Respect does not exclude the sentiment of "love," but only its "sentimentality."

repress in a vast number of cases every other interest, and the discontent a man feels with the monotony of his work is vented in a claim for higher wages. The claim for a share on the part of the worker in the control of the industry is apparently the war-cry of a few rather than the demand of the many. And it is very probable that this demand is largely motivated by a desire to get a bigger cash return for labour. In so far as it is inspired by a genuine desire to humanize industry we are bound to sympathize with it as an ideal even if we think it impracticable as a programme.¹ And it is not only of the workers that it is true that the economic interest is almost the exclusive conscious issue, it is still more true of the multitude of shareholders who are concerned only with dividends.

When we take all the facts into consideration we shall not be surprised at the case cited by Ordway Tead in his "Instincts in Industry." "One successful department store in a large Eastern city is in charge of a man who is really admired by his employees. To this manager, who really wants to run his store on genuinely democratic lines, the subservience of the workers is a constant source of irritation. He stands up in meetings of the store employees and berates them soundly for their lack of initiation and aggressiveness. The spectacle of this gentleman belabouring the workers about their reluctance to assume leadership and responsibility is one to make the student of industrial democracy ponder and inquire more deeply into the psychological springs of action. Such a phenomenon, however, presents no difficulties when we bear in mind the history of the average working man and woman. From the earliest days, curiosity and enterprise are repressed in the home and the child's difficulties solved for him because it is the quickest way out of the trouble; the process of repression is carried a step further by the discipline of

¹ We do not say that it is impracticable. Only a fair and prolonged trial can demonstrate this.

the school, so that by the time a boy goes out to work it is almost a miracle if he can think and plan for himself. What we need is an educational and industrial system which will give scope and stimulus for all the varied impulses of man. It is doubtful whether modern industry as a whole can be organized in such a manner as to provide this. Then its demands should be reduced to an absolute and bare minimum that a man may be able to find in some other activity the scope and inspiration that his daily work denies. A possible alternative might be the reorganization of society on the basis of the "village community" as suggested by Fielding Hall in his book called "The Way of Peace." No doubt there are many difficulties in the way of such schemes. We are not concerned here to advocate any particular plan but to emphasize the necessity, not merely of a man's right to work, but of a man's right to be a man. If we cannot devise a social order which will provide this opportunity, then it seems clear to us that our society is doomed to neurotic disintegration. The history of the last seven years should be sufficient to give even the most sceptical pause ere he flings out the taunt, Cassandra!

We cannot leave this question of the provision of opportunity for every man to realize the full legitimate satisfaction of his nature without special reference to that system of impulses with which psycho-analysis is specially concerned—the sexual. Side by side with the trend of modern industry towards ever-increasing division of labour with its consequent exclusive emphasis on the economic aspect, there has been a growing tendency to postpone the marriage age. This most powerful instinct is baulked of legitimate expression, and, at the same time, its opportunities of sublimation have been drastically curtailed by the stereotyping of human activity. The consequences are all but inevitable,—deep-seated unrest and wide-spread immorality. There are three possibilities with regard to this instinct,—direct indulgence, sublimated satisfaction

and repression. If the possibilities of sublimation are practically non-existent, then there is nothing left but the choice between two evils. We do not wish to convey the impression that we regard marriage merely as legalized indulgence of crude passion, but there can be no doubt that it tends to become that, in so far as men and women are denied the opportunities of living a full and varied life. Just as society, by the course of development it has followed, has made money the supreme concern of industry, and mere pleasure the main demand in recreation, so it tends to make love very little more than lust. It is quite possible that the postponement of marriage would have meant, as in many cases it has meant, a spiritual enrichment of human life, if there had been a widening of the scope of creative activity. Mere mechanical routine cannot provide channels for sublimation. There must be scope for individual self-expression, a self-expression that is not mere eccentricity, but a joyous contribution towards the fellowship of the community. The work of the individual must bear the indelible mark of individuality, but it must have more than that, or it is a mere miser's hoard. There must be the feeling that it is *mine*, yet *not mine*. Whether it is possible to organize society so that the individual may find room for such creative activity, is another question. At any rate it will be impossible as long as the merely economic issue is allowed to dominate the situation.

The third principle of reconstruction is that every parent should be a parent and not merely an instrument of reproduction. It is true that most parents also provide food and shelter for their children. But if it is true that the influence of parent upon child is as powerful as it appears, then we are very largely wasting or mis-using an enormous power for the shaping of our social destinies. It is evident that before a father can be a real father he must be a real man, not merely the baulked possibility of one. But it should also be evident

that he cannot exercise his functions *in absentia*. We have cursed the evils of the "absentee landlord," occasionally, we have lamented the evils of the "absentee mother," but apparently the absence of the father does not matter or is regarded as a final inevitability. It is, of course, inevitable in the majority of cases, under present conditions, and possibly in view of the fact that so often life has narrowly circumscribed his interests it does not, as things are, greatly matter. It may be arguable that his absence is even desirable, for his rôle in too many families is that of arch-represser. But in so far as these things are true it constitutes a terrible indictment of our society. What is needed is not merely more idle, leisure time, in which the father can nurse the baby or romp with the older children, but new activities in which the children can take an interest and an active share. A larger life, and a life in which the children can play their part, is absolutely necessary if the functions of the father are to be satisfactorily fulfilled. And if this is true with respect to the father, it is not less true with respect to the mother. How can we expect a woman absorbed all day long with the routine of household duties, and obsessed with household cares to exercise a healthy influence on her children. The bickering, nagging, quarrelling of family life are all symptoms of neurotic tendencies. For the most part we try to shut our eyes to it and indulge in compensatory phantasies of happy, home life, or else we regard it as inevitable, and get away to the club as quickly as possible. But the average housewife has no such escape. She must submit and endure. It is an absolute necessity that the mothers of our country should have the opportunity of a wider life. We have put this requirement last, but in any programme of reconstruction there is no doubt that it should come first.

In conclusion, we would remind the reader that the foregoing suggestions are merely what appear to us the obvious corollaries of the facts that psycho-analysis has

revealed. They are submitted for criticism. If anything survives, that residue must be taken into account with all the other facts that concern the problem of human society. The principles we have enumerated are these. We must begin with the home. Every man should be a man and be treated as a man. Every man should have the opportunities of being a man. Every parent should have the opportunities of exercising the full functions of a parent. Before such principles are described as visionary and incapable of practical application, let the accuser be sure that he is free from unconscious bias, and that "inner resistance" which "doth so easily beset us." If the changes that are involved appear revolutionary, let it not be thought that we are advocating revolution. Revolution is but another neurotic symptom. The need is for steady, rational advance.

2. SOCIAL MISFITS

We have very briefly considered what is demanded by the nature of man's unconscious tendencies in an ideal society, and we have laid down the principle that every man should be treated as a man as long as that is possible. The question we must now consider is—what should be done when this stage is reached? We will consider two instances, which will illustrate, as it seems to us, the attitude in which psycho-analysis indicates that this question should be faced—the problem of the unemployed and the problem of the criminal.

With regard to the latter it will be readily, all too readily recognized, that he cannot be treated as a man. He is a menace to society, and must be punished, or at least restrained. With regard to the former, it will, perhaps, be indignantly denied that it is as impossible to treat the unemployed as a man. We are not con-

cerned to argue about the abstract question of possibilities in this connexion. The fact is that he is not usually so regarded. In times of good trade he is regarded with suspicion. He would not be out of work it is thought, if there were not some deficiency of character, ability, or physique. In times of bad trade he is regarded probably with some measure of pity as the victim of misfortune. But neither suspicion nor pity have any place in that respect to which a normal man is entitled. The fact is that the unemployed is not a normal man, he is only the potentiality of a man. We may abandon him and let him die, we may feed him and turn him into a parasite, or we may provide work for him and an opportunity to achieve his rightful status. But as long as he is ignored, pampered or pitied, he is denied, rightly or wrongly, the regard which is the *sine quâ non* of full manhood.

The problem of "unemployment" is exceedingly complicated, and all that we may be expected to do is to point out some of the factors of human nature that must be taken into consideration in any attempted solution. First of all, we would issue a warning against the tendency of interested parties to enunciate economic laws as though they were divine fiat which require nothing but unquestioning obedience. There can be little doubt that all too often this talk about "economic law" is merely a rationalization to cover up the ugly motives of greed and suspicion. We need to inquire with strict impartiality as to the truth of the accusation that "economics" is being exploited in the interests of a capitalist class, and we need to recognize that if this evil does exist, it is not to be corrected by a mere change of the class. "Class consciousness" is a social neurosis. It can never be the basis of a stable social order. It is the product of repression, of an inferiority complex. It is a denial of the fundamental principle that a man shall be treated as a man. At the same time we must bear in mind that it is little more than a

waste of breath to condemn "class consciousness," we must strive to understand the conditions that have produced it, and remove the repressions in the home and in the community which lie at its root. We must remember, too, that it is not a monopoly of one section of the community. There is more than one "class."

Here, as in the case of individual mental disorders, the prime need is for *insight*, but here as there, that insight is often but superficial because of the resistance of dynamic unconscious factors. Greed, fear, and mental inertia, prevent us from seeing the truth. At the present moment we are confronted with this situation. There is a great need for food, clothes and houses, and yet there are hundreds of thousands of people doing nothing. Why? We cannot put the blame on nature in spite of the fact that there has been a certain amount of drought. We are bound to recognize that the main fault belongs to *human* nature. If it were true that nature had failed, then that is all the more reason why we should be diligent in trying to compensate for it. The facts seem clear, that it is either that these unemployed are not being allowed to work, they are being refused access to the land, or hampered by trade regulations, or they are incapable of adapting themselves to doing such work as is needed. We need to recognize that the "land question" is not merely an economic question, it is a psychological question too. The motives that lead men to acquire land and cling to it, land that they cannot use themselves, land from which they possibly derive relatively little profit, need to be examined. It will probably be found that "land hunger" is in many cases as pathological as *sabotage*. If the first principle which we have laid down is sound, benevolent administration is not a sufficient justification for great accumulations of wealth in land or any other form. Benevolence, that perpetuates the feeling of inferiority and dependence in its objects, is not a virtue but a vice. But there is not only a psychological

difficulty in getting access to the raw material of labour, there is a psychological difficulty in adapting the available labour, to the tasks that are waiting to be done. Food is needed, but the dock labourer will not, or cannot put his hand to the plough, and the city clerk will not, or cannot turn herdsman even supposing he got the chance. There is a lack of adaptability which goes deeper than the mere question of vocational training. The problem of individual lack of adaptability is further complicated by the rigidity of socially organized interests. We need houses, but more energy has been spent and wasted in discussing the problem of "dilution" than has been put into actual building. There can be no doubt that Trades Unions are an obstacle in some ways to industrial adaptation. We are not condemning Trades Unions. They are symptoms of a social neurosis, defence-mechanisms brought about by industrial repression. The doctor does not waste breath in condemning symptoms, but looks for the cause.

There are then two psychological requirements which must be satisfied before we can hope for any permanent settlement of unemployment. First we must cease to regard the wealthy man as something more than man, and we must cease to regard the poor man as something less than man. A tendency towards a more just distribution would soon make itself felt. Secondly we must see that our school education and industrial training develop adaptability, so that labour can adapt itself to human need. It should be clearly understood that it is not maintained that this is all that is necessary for a solution of the problem. It is not even contended that such an ideal is fully attainable. All that we can infer, from such evidence as psycho-analysis affords, is that no solution will be entirely satisfactory that excludes these elements.

Many other problems besides that of "unemployment" are clamouring for an answer. It is not possible here even to mention them. We will refer to one other

only, as an illustration of the bearing of our study upon social life, the problem of the criminal. It is no exaggeration to say, that until comparatively recent years the policy of society towards the criminal was dictated mainly by mingled hate and fear. Retribution and prevention through fear, were the dominating ideas. But as L. T. Hobhouse in his "Morals in Evolution," says, "The criminal, too, has his rights—the right to be punished, but so punished that he may be helped in the path of reform." But even though these rights be denied, even if it is asserted that the criminal has outlawed himself from society, which alone confers rights, even if we ignore the part and responsibility of society in producing the criminal and bluntly assert that it is the first concern of society to maintain its own physical, mental and moral integrity, even then we may well inquire whether our methods are the best possible for securing this end. It is true that during the last half century there has been a very gratifying and large decrease in the amount of imprisonment and considerable improvement in the methods of treating prisoners, but still we have to recognize that in a great number, if not in the vast majority of cases, the effect is either to harden the offender or to break his spirit. Is this necessary?

The whole problem has two main issues—prevention and cure. But with regard to both issues our attitude should be the same—first and foremost, a determination to get at the facts. Modern medicine has abandoned the method of prescribing without diagnosis, and it is not content with removing symptoms and pains, it seeks to abolish the cause of these troubles. This must be our attitude. We spend a great deal of money and time and brains in repressing crime. Our strongest men are made policemen, our cleverest men are made lawyers and judges. But would it not be a wise and desirable thing to devote more of this wealth and wisdom to the task of discovering what are the factors that produce

the criminal, and what is the best way to eliminate them. At present our almost sole concern is to prove that a certain offence has been committed by a certain person. The treatment of the offender is then prescribed more or less rigidly by a law that utterly ignores the personality of the wrong-doer. What latitude of prescription is allowed, is in the hands of a magistrate who is usually appointed on the grounds of his social, municipal or political standing, or by a judge because of his acquaintance with the intricacies of modern law. Insight into human nature is not regarded as necessary, and where it happens to be possessed its exercise is narrowly circumscribed by the enactments of the law. In the case of young and first offenders this state of things has been to some extent remedied. More care has been exercised in the appointment of suitable magistrates and more latitude is allowed in treatment. But the objection to this course is that it leaves too much to the intuition of the individual. We are not prepared as a rule to submit our serious bodily ailments to the untutored intuitions of the amateur. Is it not reasonable, therefore, that we should demand that in dealing with social evils, intuition should be grounded in experience and training? Our magistrates and judges should be required to have a certain amount of training in sociology and psychology and have experts in these subjects to give advice whenever needed. It should be their aim in dealing with any particular case, not merely to consider whether the prisoner is guilty, but how far it is possible to rectify the defective character that is responsible for the offence. There is no doubt that in this connexion, psycho-analysis could render valuable service especially with the *young* miscreants.

But still more important is the problem of discovering the conditions that produce defective characters. A careful and thorough investigation of the subject on a wider scale than has yet been attempted is necessary. The problem may be considered from many points of

view, such as the biological, taking into account heredity and environment, or the economical taking into account the factor of wealth, or the physiological which considers the effect of bodily functions, but ultimately the question must become a psychological one because it is only as these factors work through the mind that they can affect character. But psycho-analysis suggests that the most fruitful method of inquiry will be through the careful study of the individual. Mass statistics may be useful, but they will be very misleading if they are not interpreted in the light of wide experience with the real man. What we need to discover is the *relevant* factors and these can only be found in the careful study of the body and mind of the individual. It is obvious, for instance, that the effect of wealth or poverty is by no means constant. In the same way, measures of prevention, which rely upon the stimulation of fear, are very variable in their results. What would crush one individual, only rouses the fighting spirit of another. A month's hard labour may stain one man's life with indelible disgrace, it may render another a hero in his own eyes and those of his associates. These are facts obvious in our ordinary experience, but the law takes very little cognizance of them. It cannot. We cannot legislate for individuals. When we come to the deeper unconscious impulses and their effects in the production of crime, we are still further from doing justice to the complexities of human nature. Here we can only look to the fuller development of psychological science to help us. It is not much use punishing an individual for acts that are due to unconscious compulsion. It is neither just nor wise.

The problem is exceedingly complex. But we suggest that if the attitude towards the delinquent were less judicial and more remedial, this in itself would have its preventive value. It would lessen the hypnotic effects of fear which impels some natures to do the forbidden thing, and it would take away the romance of

being a swashbuckling villain from another type, if he were regarded not as a rebel, but as a sick man. Doubtless there would be some attempts at malingering and pretence, but this is fairly easy for the skilled and practised expert to expose. The procedure then, which in the light of our present knowledge seems most desirable, would be something after this fashion. Where there was any possible doubt or denial that a particular offence had been committed by the person charged, the evidence should be examined in the usual way by a judicial court, and if the charge were proved, the offender should be handed over for expert physical and mental examination, to discover to what extent the action was due to physiological factors or mental complexes. If such conditions were revealed and the expert were satisfied that remedial measures were possible, then the option should be given to the offender to submit to these or return for sentence to the judicial court. Where no definite judgment could be formed as to the possibilities of remedial efforts, a report with recommendations for treatment should be sent back with the offender to the president of the judicial court, whose business it should be to take into consideration in passing judgment, the interests of society, as well as the recommendations of the expert. As for the expense involved, we believe that the community would find that prevention is cheaper than cure, and cure cheaper than punishment. At any rate it would be worth while making experiments in this direction especially in the children's courts. In the case of the more serious offences, it would obviously be necessary that such remedial measures should be prescribed, as would not expose the community to the depredations of the unsocialized individual.

In conclusion we would emphasize that we are not concerned so much with the advocacy of specific reforms as to appeal for a new attitude to the problem, an attitude which would make judicial and moral judgment

dependent upon sound psychological insight. And this insight we believe is not to be obtained if the unconscious factor is ignored. Hence the value of psycho-analysis in dealing with this phase of human life.

3. THE RELIGIOUS IDEAL

If social philosophy is a realm of debate and wide divergencies, religion is not less so, but perhaps more. We cannot hope to avoid collision with some of the contending interests. But we shall endeavour to approach this question in the same way as we have dealt with the problems of education and society. We shall accept the religious spirit as a fact, and consider what guidance psycho-analysis has to offer, leaving it to the religious mind to criticize and assimilate as best it can. At the same time we confess for ourselves a keen sympathy with the late Dr. J. J. Putnam, of whom Jones says, "He maintained that it was highly desirable, if not absolutely essential, to widen the base of psycho-analytical principles by incorporating into them certain philosophical views especially concerning the relationship of the individual to the community at large and to the universe in general. For years he maintained a steady correspondence with me on this question, and I fear it was a genuine disappointment to him that his views made so little impression on his psycho-analytical colleagues."¹ We are prepared to go further than this first statement about Putnam goes, and say that no psycho-analyst, indeed no scientist of any kind can proceed without assuming, wittingly or unwittingly, critically or uncritically, some philosophical principles. We admit that the findings of any science must not be prejudiced by *à priori* considerations. Its method of procedure may be subjected to philosophic criticism,

¹ Obituary by Dr. E. Jones in "Addresses on P. A.," by J. J. Putnam, p. 463.

but once it is accepted it must be left to make its own discoveries, which philosophy must accept and synthesize with its other data as far as it is able. But as it appears to us, psycho-analysis is more than a scientific procedure. It is that first of all if it has any justification at all. But it is more. It is a therapeutic art. If, as Jones repeatedly says, the neurosis is a form of social maladaptation, it seems to us impossible for the analyst to carry on his therapeutic efforts without having some conception of what the relation of the individual to the community *ought* to be. In holding such a conception, he must transcend the limitations of an empirical science. We believe there should be a healthy interaction between science and philosophy. In the present state of things we cannot expect to effect a perfectly harmonious synthesis, but it is only by attempting the synthesis that we can discover the defects. To attempt to keep the two subjects in absolute isolation, seems to indicate a dissociation and repression which we should have thought would have rendered it suspect to every psycho-analyst.

Dr. Pfister in "The Psycho-Analytic Method," to which Freud has contributed an introduction says, "Psycho-analysis in no way violates the claims of the truth of the Christian religion as such. Of course, as already noticed, it destroys many spurious religious experiences by showing the illusory complex-function at the bottom of these. It must do this in order to banish misfortune. It would be all too small for Christianity to think that harm is to be feared for its future from analysis. . . . Psycho-analysis also teaches us to estimate the value of religion anew. I confess that the beauty and the blessing of a healthy, ethically pure piety have only become overwhelmingly clear to me from the investigations here described. Religion, in favourable cases, guards the libido repelled by the rude, avaricious reality, against conversion into hysterical, physical symptoms and against introversion

into anxiety, melancholia, obsessional phenomena, etc.”¹ Dr. Rivers in his John Rylands Lecture on “Medicine and Religion” sees in the recent development of psychological medicine, of which psycho-analysis is the outstanding feature, a new possibility of co-operation between these two old, but now separated, friends. There are dangers, of course, that one should attempt to tyrannize over the other. These must be carefully watched. In a recent lecture by Dr. Hadfield on “The Ethical Significance of the New Psychology” the writer sat near a clergyman who whispered, as the exposition proceeded, “It sounds like the seventh chapter of Romans.” This classical exposition of spiritual conflict is well known. But it is possible to trace resemblances not so obvious as this outstanding one. Paul’s conception of the “flesh” has close affinities with Freud’s “libido,” possibly more than with Jung’s conception of this “psychic energy.”² To regard the “flesh” as a physical thing, or merely physical thing, is a misinterpretation. In the following chapter he speaks of the “mind of the flesh.” Sin is the outcome of the “flesh” in conflict with the “law.” In the final synthesis or sublimation, conflict and repression are done away. “There is therefore now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.” Pfister also quotes Freud, Stekel and Jung on the place of religion as a factor in healthy mental life. Freud refers to the “extraordinary increase of neuroses since the decline of religion,” and Jung says “In a time, when a great part of humanity is beginning to deny Christianity, it is well worth while to perceive clearly why it has really been accepted. It has been accepted to escape eventually the grossness of antiquity. If we lay it aside, then the unbridled licence is already at hand, of which life in modern large cities gives us an impressive foretaste. The step thither is not progress but a retrogression.” It needs in our

¹ Published by Kegan Paul, p. 412.

² See page 93 of this book.

opinion, no strained exegesis to see that many of the principles which we have endeavoured to expound in the earlier pages of this book are exemplified in the practice and method of Jesus as He is portrayed in the Gospels. The Churches have emphasized the importance of faith, but if the Gospels are carefully read, we believe it will become clear that Jesus emphasized also the importance of "insight." "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free" is a statement of the fourth Gospel, but it is reiterated in different forms in the Synoptics. As it appears to us, the key to at any rate one aspect of His teaching lies in the words "It is given unto you to *know* the mysteries of the Kingdom of heaven, but unto them it is not given." When it is remembered that this was the explanation of His parabolic method of teaching, it cannot be denied that the right interpretation of such a passage is of the greatest importance for a right understanding of His aim. The whole evidence of the documents is against the idea that He reserved for a select coterie, an initiation into a kind of Eleusinian mystery. On the other hand, there is considerable evidence to show that He realized as keenly as any modern psycho-analyst the importance of the affective processes for right thinking and real insight. See for example Matt. xiii. The whole idea is summed up in the beatitude, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." His words on the family relationship have constituted a difficulty for many believers, but they receive new illumination in the light of these studies. The way He drew to Himself the affections and indeed the whole emotional life of His disciples and then in the end told them, "It is expedient for you that I go away" indicates something that is not so very distantly analogous to the analyst's method of "transference" and the "overcoming of resistance." But we must leave this question to the reader who is interested to work out for himself.

There are many religious practices and conceptions

which afford striking and obvious parallels with the analytic method. Confession and catharsis have evidently close connexion. We need to remember, however, that catharsis is not the confession of offences, but the evocation of memories or phantasies that have been forgotten because they were disapproved. Penitence and abreaction have resemblances, but the latter is a wider term and has not necessarily any ethical implications. Faith and transference have undoubtedly close connexions. Indeed, it would probably be asserted by most analysts that it is the transference of the emotional life of the individual on to some ideal object. The object of the physician when the emotional energies have been transferred to him is to get them redirected towards reality. *The essential requirement in faith is evidently then, that if it is possible, in its object, the ideal and the real should be reconciled.* We have examples of this, interpreting "ideal" in its psychological sense, in the man who devotes himself to science, interpreting it in its ethical sense, we may cite the individual whose energies are absorbed in a sound moral purpose.

But religion, if it is to find any justification and place in modern life, must involve more than this. It must be, potentially at least, an all-embracing synthesis, not merely of ideas but of all human interests. In actual fact, the reconciliations we achieve are full of defects, and religious faith in many instances is only possible by the creation of "water-tight compartments" in the mind, which involves some measure of mental dissociation. But the religion that rests upon such dissociation is merely an attempt to escape from reality, it is a phantasy creation which, no matter how beautiful, psycho-analysis must pronounce to be neurotic. The apparently irreconcilable elements must not be ignored, but faced. The essence of a sound religious faith is that it faces the world of discord and conflict with an assurance that these disharmonies can be resolved. Its ideal is not a flight from the real, but is discovered

within the real. The real contains at least the possibility of the ideal, if not the conditions of its inevitable achievement. To the fulfilment of that possibility the religious spirit gives its undivided allegiance and energy. Such it seems to us is the corollary of psycho-analysis with regard to its application to the religious life. It is not within its province to say that such a condition of things actually holds, but in the light of its discoveries up to the present, it is apparently entitled to say that, if it does not, then man is inextricably entangled within the net of mental conflict, and he can only escape from the realm of discord by seeking a refuge in phantasy. It is possible to hold that the disharmonies are unreal, mere illusions, that the individual has merely to shed his illusions and he will perceive that the real *is* the ideal. This is not the place to consider such a view in detail. All we need say is, that the problem is not fundamentally altered by calling evil, or discord, an illusion. The illusion at any rate is real and admittedly evil. The problem remains.

A second inference we may draw from these studies is, that the nature of Reality should not destroy the *independence* of the individual. We are here faced with what appears to be an ultimate spiritual antimony. The individual is evidently dependent upon Reality; he is the product of an evolutionary process. But unless, in the evolution of personality, man has secured some measure of real independence, then the whole psycho-analytic procedure is a vain delusion. We are trying to give the individual what he never can have, or at least attempt to enlarge a sphere of freedom which is non-existent. The aim of this therapeutic effort apparently involves a conception of an evolutionary process in which something new can "emerge" to use the term adopted by Prof. Lloyd Morgan, in his recent presidential address to the Psychological Section of the British Association. We cannot consider this implied philosophy here, but only point out its religious implica-

tions. Schleiermacher's religion of absolute dependence and the Calvinistic doctrine of "irresistible grace" both do violence to this need for independence. It must be acknowledged, however, that the Presbyterians and Puritans of the seventeenth century were possessed of this quality to a rugged and virile degree. A possible explanation is that they compensated for an absolute surrender to God, by an "over-determined" independence in their attitude towards man. In his book on "Grace and Personality," which deals in a very able manner with the question we are now considering, Oman says, "The true test of a father's aid is the responsibility, freedom and independence of his son; and we speak of God as Father, not first because He gives good gifts, but because He knows how to give them that they may secure us in freedom and not merely in fortune. The most liberal domination on God's side and the most indebted subjection on ours will never make us sons of God." Authority must not paralyse initiative; faith must not chloroform thought; obedience must ripen into fellowship; moral law must become spiritual principle; "I ought" must become "I want." Such, it seems to us, must be the religion that does justice to the unconscious element in man's nature.

The third requirement in religion is that it should provide adequate scope for "sublimation." If, as Freud maintains, the impulses of the unconscious are the crude stuff of fleshly love, then it is only possible to sublimate them into some higher form of *love*. That religion will be most adequate which is most capable of evoking this response in its fullest measure. We need a reality rich enough at least to sustain the highest possibilities of man's nature, otherwise we shall get a religion which is comparable to an old maid's sentimental poodle worship. In the sublimating process, it is desirable that as far as possible mere reaction formations should be avoided, because, while the new

attitude may be preferable to the old, it usually involves a disproportionate emphasis and corresponding waste of energy. This may, in our present state of knowledge, be unavoidable. An obvious and common illustration of such reaction formations is to be found in the attitude of many converted drunkards. Much energy is devoted to extreme denunciation that would be better devoted towards more constructive activity. But religion should not be judged by a narrow utilitarian standard of "work value." Its silence, its rest, its satisfactions, should not be hastily condemned or lightly despised. A religion, which is a mere luxuriating in emotionalism is admittedly pathological, whether this emotion is stimulated by elaborate ritual or generated in a prayer-meeting. Such results are merely the outcome of a feeble sublimation of a love that spends itself in cuddles and caresses, but shrinks from the sterner tests of service and sacrifice. But this does not necessarily mean that the spirit should never rest in the joyous contemplation of the beautiful, or express the gladness of a grateful heart. True love demands these, as well as the opportunity to spend itself in self-forgetting ministries.

But a purely individualistic religion cannot satisfy human need. The "reality," call it by what name you will, of religion, must be capable not only of sustaining the sublimated affections of the individual, it must be rich enough to meet the needs of the community. The "Kingdom of heaven" must not only be *within* us, but it must be *amongst* us. The sublimated individual can only be at home in a sublimated society. If it is true, that the unconscious consists of the repressed impulses of a crude and fleshly love, aggravated by sentimental indulgence, or thwarted and turned to hate by neglect and harsh treatment, then we are compelled to infer, that when it is purified and transformed, it will only attain to its fullest possibilities in an atmosphere and environment of like nature. Philosophy, regarding

only the *conscious* aspect of man's nature, has exalted Reason as the ideal of life. Now it must take into account the *unconscious* too, and make room in its scheme of things for Love. In this direction, we believe, lies the hope of the final synthesis, in the union of Reason and Love. Is there in "reality" anything to correspond with this conception, or is it only a phantasy?

GLOSSARY

<i>Abreaction.</i>	The relief of emotional tension by "living through" again the experiences which originally occasioned it.
<i>Amnesia.</i>	A defect of memory which affects the capacity to recall.
<i>Auto-Erotism.</i>	Self-love.
<i>Catharsis.</i>	The resolution of mental conflict by the recall of the experiences in which it originated.
<i>Complex.</i>	A repressed or partially repressed emotional system.
<i>Exhibitionism.</i>	A sexual impulse to self-display.
<i>Masochism.</i>	The impulse to find sexual satisfaction in suffering.
<i>Narcissism.</i>	A more highly organised form of self-love.
<i>Observationism.</i>	Sexual curiosity.
<i>Ontogenesis.</i>	Development of the individual.
<i>Phylogenesis.</i>	Development of the race.
<i>Regression.</i>	The mental process in which the individual returns to an earlier stage of his emotional development.
<i>Sadism.</i>	The impulse to find sexual satisfaction by inflicting suffering.
<i>Sublimation.</i>	The redirection of a sexual tendency to a non-sexual and socially satisfactory end.
<i>Transference.</i>	The assumption of a new "object" by an emotional system. Transference on to the physician is one important form.

INDEX

ABREACTION, 99-102, 181
 Adaptability, 145, 172
 Adler, A., 20, 21
 Amnesia, 7, 100-102
 Analysis, of Dreams, 28-32, 41,
 42, 45-7
 Anxiety, 40, 82
 Appetite, 70
 Archaic Thought Forms, 66
 Art, 160
 Association, Free, 18, 29-32, 44,
 56, 158
 of Ideas, 2
 Word, 18, 19, 99, 130
 Auto-analysis, 107-113, 115,
 117, 118
 Auto-erotism, 85
 Automatism, 6, 9
 Auto-suggestion, 113-18

 BAUDOUIN, C., 114-17
 Bergson, H., 44, 93, 123
 Bernheim, 6
 Binet, A., 146
 Bleuler, 18
 Breuer, 16, 17, 20, 102
 Brill, 125, 135
 Brown, W., 21, 100-102

 CATHARSIS, 17, 98, 99, 181
 Censor, 10, 32-37, 50
 Charcot, 6, 17
 Childhood, 42, 43, 131-139
 Children, Only, 135
 Favourite, 135, 136
 Claustrophobia, 59
 Collection, 115
 Communism, 158
 Compensation, 21
 Theory of Dreams, 52
 Complex, 13, 75, 78, 79, 121, 152,
 163
 Condensation, 48, 49

Confession, 181
 Conflict, 19, 35, 74-77, 95, 137,
 162, 164, 179
 Consciousness, 2, 7-13, 44, 55
 Class, 170, 171
 Secondary, 7, 8
 Conscience, 55
 Content, Manifest and Latent,
 27-29
 Contention, 115
 Coué, 113, 114, 116
 Courts, Judicial, 174-176
 Crime, 173-177

 DAY DREAMS, 36, 149
 Darwin, C., 3
 Defence Mechanism, 40, 121,
 172
 Demosthenes, 21
 Displacement, 49
 Dissociation, 13, 37, 38, 76, 181
 Dream Disguise, 33
 Symbolism, 50, 53
 Work, 48-51
 Dreams, Analysis of, 28-32, 41,
 42, 45-47, 51
 and Auto-analysis, 111
 and Hysteria, 18, 22
 and Recent Experience, 23
 Anxiety, 40
 Children's, 26
 Content of, 27-29
 Ego-centric Interest of, 47
 Examples, 22, 25, 26, 28, 41,
 42, 45-48, 51-53
 Fear, 39-43
 Function of, 32
 of Normal and Neurotic Sub-
 jects, 24
 Popular Interpretation of, 22
 Sources of, 43-48
 Terror, 39, 40
 Wish-Fulfilment, 25-27, 32

Drever, J., 11, 13, 70, 78, 96

ECONOMICS, 164, 165, 167, 170, 175

Education and Democracy, 147
and Home, 128-139
and School, 139-146
and Society, 143-147, 172
Curriculum, 142, 143
Freedom in, 144, 147-150
Religious, 143
Sexual, 150-153

Effort, Voluntary, 114
Reversed, Law of, 114

Egotistic Impulse, 20, 77, 79, 91

Elaboration, Secondary, 50

Emotions, 3, 4, 49, 58, 76, 99, 100, 132, 133, 155, 184

Environment, 4, 62, 136, 138, 149

Ethics, 16, 56

Excuses, 61, 111, 120, 128

Exhibitionism, 89, 155

Experience, 10, 17

Evans, E., 133

FAITH, 181

Ferenczi, 28, 94

Finalism, 54

Fixation, 75

Flournoy, 159

Forgetting, 34, 37, 38, 120, 121, 124, 126-128

Formations, Compromise, 75, 155
Reaction, 75, 134, 155, 184

Freedom, 134, 144, 147-150

Freud, S., and Adler, 21
and Breuer, 16, 17, 20
and Jung, 54, 55
Censor, 36
Dissociation, 38
Free Association, 30, 31
Function of Dreams, 32
Instinctive Tendencies, 15, 77, 93
Libido, 93
Mislaying of Articles, 125, 126
Psychic Apparatus, 8, 9
Reality and Pleasure-Pain
Principle, 71

Freud, Religion, 179
Riding Dream, 48
Sexual Trends, 79
Sexual Theory, 80-93
Slip of the Tongue, 125
Theory of Neuroses, 83
Totem and Taboo, 158
Transference, 18, 104, 105

GOSPELS, 180
Grévvillers, 127, 128
Gregarious Instincts, 94

HABIT, 108, 109
Hadfield, 179
Hall, F., 166
Healey, W., 75, 137, 138
Heredity, 107
Herd Instinct, 77, 79, 94, 96
Hobhouse, L. T., 147, 173
Holt, E., 136
Home, 130-139, 161
Homosexuality, 88
Hygiene, 153
Hypnotism, 6, 7, 9, 17, 99
Hysteria, 7, 8, 61, 82

IDENTIFICATION, 49, 64, 65, 69
Imagination, 114
Imitation, 133
Independence, 182, 183
Industry, 164, 165
Inferiority Complex, 21, 121, 170
Instinct, 3, 4, 15, 77-96
Intellectualism, 3, 6
Intelligence, of children, 131, 170
Tests, 145, 146
Introjection, 95
Introspection, 78, 109-110

JANET, PIERRE, 6, 11
Jews, 135
Jones, E., 21, 61, 66, 71, 72, 94, 95, 104, 120, 123, 153, 154, 177, 178
Jung, C., 11, 18-21, 51-56, 66, 73, 84, 86-88, 91, 131-134, 179

KLEPTOMANIA, 75, 137, 138
Kolnai, A., 158

LEARNING, 121, 122, 136
 Libido, 20, 93, 178, 179
 Long, C., 21

MACDOUGALL, W., 3-6, 11, 13,
 21, 77, 79, 90, 91, 94, 101,
 133

Magistrates, 174

Masochism, 79, 89, 90

Mechanism, 4

Memory, 9, 10, 17, 20

Mind, 8

and disease, 108, 109, 128

Neurotic, 18

Misconduct, 137, 138

Mislaying of Articles, 125, 126

Montessori, 140, 141, 148

Morel, 159

Morgan, Lloyd, 182

Myers, C. S., 21, 101, 102

NEUROSES, 35, 69, 72, 73, 83, 97,

162, 170

War, 82, 100-102

Nicoll, M., 21

Nietzsche, 20

Nunn, P., 140

OBLIVISCENCE, 120

Observationism, 89

Obsession, 7

Œdipus Complex, 86, 92

Offenders, Young, 174

Oman, J., 183

PARENT-RELATION, 85, 86, 131-

139, 161

Parents, 167-169

Patriarchs, Hebrew, 135

Penitence, 181

Personality, 140, 183

Double, 6, 14

Pfister, 159, 178

Philosophy, 177, 178, 184, 185,

Religious, 159

Social, 159

Phobias, 7

Pleasure-Pain Principle, 69-74

Pre-conscious, 9-12, 14

Presentability, Regard for, 50

Prince, M., 6, 11, 14

Process, Primary and Secondary
 71-74

Psycho-Analysis and Crime,
 173-177

and Educational Aims, 143,
 145

and Ethics, 55, 56

and Home, 130

and Human Problems, 119

and Motives, 61, 62

and Non-sexual Instincts, 93

and Overcoming of Resis-
 tance, 77, 105

and Philosophy, 177, 178

and Religion, 178, 179

and Society, 160

and Suggestion, 29, 102, 103,
 113, 117, 118

and Symbolism, 65

and Transference, 104

and Unemployment, 169-172

and War Neuroses, 98-102

Origin and History, 16-22

Technique, 29-32, 84, 98-107,
 128, 146

Terminology, 76, 93

Theory of, 8-15, 25, 92, 158

Psychology, 2, 15, 21, 62, 76,
 92, 129, 175

Comparative, 3, 5, 6

New, 1, 129

Psycho-Pathology of Everyday

Life, 37, 119-128

Puberty, 88

Punishment, 137, 138, 173

Putnam, J. J., 91, 177

RATIONALIZATION, 60-62, 75, 76

Reality, 71, 95, 181-185

Principle, 63, 69-74

Recall, 10, 17

Regression, 17, 20, 92

Reik, 159

Relations, Social, 163

Religion, 143, 178-185

Relaxation, 29, 115

Repression, 15, 32-38, 95, 106,
 155

Resistance, 17, 30, 77, 84, 105,
 106

Rivers, W. H. R., 21, 33-35, 94,
 179

SADISM, 79, 89, 90, 137
 Schleiermacher, 183
 Self-consciousness, 5, 7, 8, 13, 14
 Sensations, 47
 Sentiments, 13
 Sex, 17, 20-22, 75, 77, 80-93,
 137, 150-153, 166, 167
 Sidis, B., 6, 11, 140
 Silberer, 50, 159
 Slip of the Tongue, 125
 Social Ideal, 160-169
 Misfits, 169-177
 Society, 96, 145, 147, 159, 160
 Sociology, 158
 Spontaneity, 141, 142, 148
 Stekel, 41, 179
 Subconscious, 6-8, 11, 14-16,
 114
 Sublimation, 22, 53, 68, 90, 106,
 112, 153-157, 183, 184
 Suggestion, 6, 7, 29, 94, 102, 103
 Suggestibility, Law of, 140
 Suppression, 34, 35
 Suspense, 40
 Symbolism, 50, 53, 65-69
 Synthesis, Mental, 8, 13, 101,
 102

 TANSLEY, 78, 79, 110
 Teacher, Personality of, 140, 145
 Tead, O., 165
 Teleology, 5, 31
 Tendency, 10, 11, 13, 14, 32, 62-
 69
 and wish, 27

Tendency, Definition of, 63
 Tendencies, Childhood, 42, 43
 Conflict of, 74, 77
 Disguise of, 33, 36
 Innate and acquired, 63
 Instinctive, 77-96
 Modification of, 64
 Repressed, 38
 Types of Unconscious, 57-59
 Trades Unions, 158, 172
 Transference, 18, 102-107, 162,
 180-181
 Trotter, 93, 95

 UNCONSCIOUS and Crime, 177
 and Determinism, 31, 120
 and the Immediately Painful,
 35
 and Industrial Relations, 163
 and Morals, 54
 and Philosophy, 185
 and Repression, 38, 43
 and Society, 159
 Tendencies, Types of, 58-60
 Wish, 27, 128
 Unemployment, 169-172
 Utilitarianism, 2, 3

 WATTS, F., 163
 Wallas, G., 3, 63
 White, W. A., 108-109
 Will, 114
 Wish-fulfilment, 25-27, 97, 128
 Wish, Death, 42, 43
 Woods, A., 148

Printed in Great Britain by Jarrold & Sons, Ltd., Norwich

H 125 82 14



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process.
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide
Treatment Date: Oct. 2004

Preservation Technologies
A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION

111 Thomson Park Drive
Cranberry Township, PA 16066
(724) 779-2111



APR 82

N. MANCHESTER,
INDIANA 46962



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 013 312 819 0

